12 ideas
16186 | The Barcan Formulas express how to combine modal operators with classical quantifiers [Simchen] |
Full Idea: The Barcan Formula and its converse gives expression to the most straightforward way of combining modal operators with classical quantification. | |
From: Ori Simchen (The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics [2013], §1) |
16187 | The Barcan Formulas are orthodox, but clash with the attractive Actualist view [Simchen] |
Full Idea: The Barcan Formulas are a threat to 'actualism' in modal metaphysics, which seems regrettable since the Formulas are validated by standard modal logics, but clash with the plausible and attractive actualist view (that there are no merely possible things). | |
From: Ori Simchen (The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics [2013], §1) | |
A reaction: He notes that the Barcan Formulas 'appear to require quantification over possibilia'. So are you prepared to accept the 'possible elephant in your kitchen'? Conceptually yes, but actually no, I would have thought. So possibilia are conceptual. |
16190 | BF implies that if W possibly had a child, then something is possibly W's child [Simchen] |
Full Idea: In accordance with the Barcan Formula we assume that if it is possible that Wittgenstein should have had a child, then something or other is possibly Wittgentein's child. | |
From: Ori Simchen (The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics [2013], §5) | |
A reaction: Put like this it sounds unpersuasive. What is the something or other? Someone else's child? A dustbin? A bare particular? Wittgenstein's child? If it was the last one, how could it be Wittgenstein's child while only possibly being that thing? |
21315 | A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler] |
Full Idea: When a man swears to the same tree having stood for fifty years in the same place, he means ...not that the tree has been all that time the same in the strict philosophical sense of the word. ...In a loose and popular sense they are said to be the same. | |
From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1) | |
A reaction: A helpful distinction which we should hang on. Of course, by the standards of modern physics, nothing is strictly the same from one Planck time to the next. All is flux. So we either drop the word 'same' (for objects) or relax a bit. |
16188 | Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen] |
Full Idea: Serious Actualism is the view that in possible circumstances in which something does not exist there are no facts about it of any kind, including its very non-existence | |
From: Ori Simchen (The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics [2013], §1 n4) | |
A reaction: He suggests that the Converse Barcan Formula implies this view. It sounds comparable to the view of Presentism about time, that no future or past truthmakers exist right now. If a new square table were to exist, it would have four corners. |
21317 | Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler] |
Full Idea: Though the successive consciousnesses which we have of our own existence are not the same, yet they are consciousnesses of one and the same thing or object; of the same person, self, or living agent. | |
From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1) | |
A reaction: Butler's arguments seems to be that he appears to be the same person, so he is the same person. He is explicitly disagreeing with Locke. |
21313 | If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler] |
Full Idea: Though consciousness of what is past does ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons is to say a person has not existed a single moment but what he can remember. | |
From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1) | |
A reaction: An over-cautious scepticism has crept in about the reliability of bodily identity. Now we can have photographs and CCTV to prove that we experienced events we have forgotten. Butler is right. |
21314 | Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler] |
Full Idea: One would think it really self-evident that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity, any more than knowledge can presuppose truth, which it presupposes. | |
From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1) | |
A reaction: It rather begs the question to dogmatically assert that mere consciousness presupposes a self, especially after Hume's criticisms. That consciousness implies a subject to experience needs arguing for. Is it the best explanation? |
21318 | If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler] |
Full Idea: If personality is a transient thing ...then it follows that it is a fallacy to charge ourselves with any thing we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in any thing which befell us yesterday, or what will befall us tomorrow. | |
From: Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1) | |
A reaction: We seem to care about the past and future of our children, without actually being our children. Can't my future self be my descendant, a close one, instead of me? |
6000 | The goal is rationality in the selection of things according to nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the goal to be rationality in the selection and rejection of the things according to nature. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
A reaction: This captures the central Stoic idea quite nicely. 'Live according to nature', but this always meant 'live according to reason', because that is (as Aristotle had taught) the essence of our nature. This only makes sense if reason and nature coincide. |
5999 | The good is what is perfect by nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the good as what is perfect by nature. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
A reaction: This might come close to G.E. Moore's Ideal Utilitarianism, but its dependence on the rather uneasy of concept of 'perfection' makes it questionable. Personally I find it appealing. I wish we had Diogenes' explanation. |
6001 | Justice is a disposition to distribute according to desert [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined justice as the disposition which distributes to everyone what he deserves. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
A reaction: The questions that arise would be 'what does a new-born baby deserve?', and 'what do animals deserve?', and 'does the lowest and worst of criminals deserve anything at all?' |