11 ideas
| 12295 | 3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Three-dimensionalist think a thing is somehow 'stretched out' through its location at a given time though not through the period during which it exists, and it is present in its entirety at a moment when it exists though not at a position of its location. | |
| From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.1) | |
| A reaction: This definition is designed to set up Fine's defence of the 3-D view, by showing that various dubious asymmetries show up if you do not respect the distinctions offered by the 3-D view. |
| 12298 | Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: In order to have genuine motion, rather than mere variation in position, it is necessary that the object should be 'entirely present' at each moment of the change. Thus without entire presence, or existence, genuine motion will not be possible. | |
| From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.6) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 4786 for a rival view of motion. Of course, who says we have to have Kit Fine's 'genuine' motion, if some sort of ersatz motion still gets you to work in the morning? |
| 12296 | 4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Four-dimensionalists have thought that a material thing is as equally 'stretched out' in time as it is in space, and that there is no special way in which it is entirely present at a moment rather than at a position. | |
| From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.1) | |
| A reaction: Compare his definition of 3-D in Idea 12295. The 4-D is contrary to our normal way of thinking. Since I don't think the future exists, I presume that if I am a 4-D object then I have to say that I don't yet exist, and I disapprove of such talk. |
| 18882 | You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons] |
| Full Idea: Fine says it is acceptable to ask when a wedding was and where it was, and it is acceptable to ask or state where the bride was (at a certain time), but not when she was. | |
| From: report of Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.18) by Peter Simons - Modes of Extension: comment on Fine p.18 | |
| A reaction: This is aimed at three-dimensionalists who seem to think that a bride is a prolonged event, just as a wedding is. Fine is, interestingly, invoking ordinary language. When did the wedding start and end? When was the bride's birth and death? |
| 12297 | Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Even if one is a three-dimensionalist, one might affirm the existence of temporal parts, on the grounds that everything merely endures for an instant. | |
| From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems an important point, as belief in temporal parts is normally equated with four-dimensionalism (see Idea 12296). The idea is that a thing might be 'entirely present' at each instant, only to be replaced by a simulacrum. |
| 6455 | Maybe 'sense-data' just help us to talk about unusual perceptual situations [Lacey] |
| Full Idea: One possibility is that talk of sense-data is a mere linguistic convenience, providing a noun for talking about appearances, as when seeing a red object in sodium light (when it looks grey). | |
| From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196) | |
| A reaction: The term seems to have been coined to deal with situations where there is a gap between appearance and presumed reality, as in illusions. Maybe illusions prove the existence of sense-data, rather than it being a 'convenient' term. |
| 6454 | Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they? [Lacey] |
| Full Idea: It is hard to individuate sense-data, saying where one ends and the next begins, and hard to say whether they can change; are they substances, qualities, events, or what? | |
| From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196) | |
| A reaction: The problem is not that these questions are unanswerable. The answer seems to be either that they are physical and external, or that they are mental and internal, and that there is no ontological space for them between the two. |
| 6453 | Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects [Lacey] |
| Full Idea: Sometimes it is said that sense-data are public, and parts either of objects or of the surfaces of objects. | |
| From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196) | |
| A reaction: This suggests two drastically different theories, one making sense-data into mental events, the other placing them in the 'external' world. The latter theory can dovetail them with the physics, but then why would we need them? |
| 6000 | The goal is rationality in the selection of things according to nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the goal to be rationality in the selection and rejection of the things according to nature. | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
| A reaction: This captures the central Stoic idea quite nicely. 'Live according to nature', but this always meant 'live according to reason', because that is (as Aristotle had taught) the essence of our nature. This only makes sense if reason and nature coincide. |
| 5999 | The good is what is perfect by nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the good as what is perfect by nature. | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
| A reaction: This might come close to G.E. Moore's Ideal Utilitarianism, but its dependence on the rather uneasy of concept of 'perfection' makes it questionable. Personally I find it appealing. I wish we had Diogenes' explanation. |
| 6001 | Justice is a disposition to distribute according to desert [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined justice as the disposition which distributes to everyone what he deserves. | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
| A reaction: The questions that arise would be 'what does a new-born baby deserve?', and 'what do animals deserve?', and 'does the lowest and worst of criminals deserve anything at all?' |