Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'works' and 'Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae'

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7 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance is that which can act [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I define substance as that which can act.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
     A reaction: This is in tune with the notion that to exist is to have causal powers. I find the view congenial, and the middle period of Leibniz's thought, before monads became too spiritual, chimes in with my view.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / d. Explaining people
Nature requires causal explanations, but society requires clarification by reasons and motives [Weber, by Critchley]
     Full Idea: Weber coined the distinction between explanation and clarification, saying that natural phenomena require causal explanation, while social phenomena require clarification by giving reasons or offering possible motives for how things are.
     From: report of Max Weber (works [1905]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.7
     A reaction: This is music to the ears of property dualists and other non-reductivists, but if you go midway in the hierarchy of animals (a mouse, say) the distinction blurs. Weber probably hadn't digested Darwin, whose big impact came around 1905.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: All the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by final causes, exactly as if there were no efficient causes; and all the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by efficient causes, as if there were no final causes.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1403), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
     A reaction: Somewhat speculative (a virtue!), but it is interesting to see him suggesting that there might be two complete and satisfactory explanations, which never touched one another. I can't see Aristotle agreeing with that.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
The goal is rationality in the selection of things according to nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank]
     Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the goal to be rationality in the selection and rejection of the things according to nature.
     From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon
     A reaction: This captures the central Stoic idea quite nicely. 'Live according to nature', but this always meant 'live according to reason', because that is (as Aristotle had taught) the essence of our nature. This only makes sense if reason and nature coincide.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We are disenchanted because we rely on science, which ignores values [Weber, by Boulter]
     Full Idea: Weber contends that modern western civilisation is 'disenchanted' because our society's method of arriving at beliefs about the world, that is, the sciences, is unable to address questions of value.
     From: report of Max Weber (works [1905]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 6
     A reaction: This idea, made explicit by Hume's empirical attitude to values, is obviously of major importance. For we Aristotelians values are a self-evident aspect of nature. Boulter says philosophy has added to the disenchantment. I agree.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is what is perfect by nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank]
     Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the good as what is perfect by nature.
     From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon
     A reaction: This might come close to G.E. Moore's Ideal Utilitarianism, but its dependence on the rather uneasy of concept of 'perfection' makes it questionable. Personally I find it appealing. I wish we had Diogenes' explanation.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice is a disposition to distribute according to desert [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank]
     Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined justice as the disposition which distributes to everyone what he deserves.
     From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon
     A reaction: The questions that arise would be 'what does a new-born baby deserve?', and 'what do animals deserve?', and 'does the lowest and worst of criminals deserve anything at all?'