12 ideas
| 5673 | If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self [Cassam] |
| Full Idea: Since sensations such as pain generally present themselves as in some part of one's body, the bodily self seems to be anything but elusive in sensory awareness. | |
| From: Quassim Cassam (Introduction to 'Self-Knowledge' [1994], §I) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a really good observation. Whenever we do Hume's experiment in introspection, we tend to examine either pure sense experiences or abstract ideas. If we introspect a pain, we actually find the body at the centre of activity. |
| 5670 | Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam] |
| Full Idea: Our knowledge of our thoughts includes both our knowledge that we think and our knowledge of the contents of our thought. | |
| From: Quassim Cassam (Introduction to 'Self-Knowledge' [1994], §I) | |
| A reaction: This seems like a simple, self-evident and true distinction. We might question the first part, though. Knowledge involves the contents, but the fact that we think may be an inference from the contents, or even a fictional abstraction. Contents alone? |
| 5671 | Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam] |
| Full Idea: It would be quite legitimate to claim that the outer senses are at least as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge. | |
| From: Quassim Cassam (Introduction to 'Self-Knowledge' [1994], §I) | |
| A reaction: It is interesting to speculate about the extent to which a 'mind in a void' could have a personal identity. Experiences tend to be 'mine' because of my body, which has a history and a space-time location. But this doesn't make identity entirely cultural. |
| 5672 | Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam] |
| Full Idea: The key questions are: can one be introspectively aware of oneself other than through an inner sense, and, if there is a non-perceptual mode of introspective self-awareness, can it be the ground or basis of one's self-knowledge? | |
| From: Quassim Cassam (Introduction to 'Self-Knowledge' [1994], §I) | |
| A reaction: Perception would involve a controlled attempt to experience a separate object. The other mode would presumably be more direct. The question boils down to 'is there an object which introspection can attempt to perceive?' Good question. |
| 5675 | Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam] |
| Full Idea: According to Kant, self-consciousness does not require self-knowledge, and it also appears that self-reference does not require self-knowledge. | |
| From: Quassim Cassam (Introduction to 'Self-Knowledge' [1994], §II) | |
| A reaction: Kant's point is that knowledge requires a stage of conceptualisation, which simple self-consciousness might not involve. The second point is that self-reference require no knowledge because error is impossible. Two nice points, and useful distinctions. |
| 5674 | We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam] |
| Full Idea: One can identify an object in a mirror as oneself, but that brings with it the possibility of misidentification, so since introspective awareness statements are immune to error, one is not introspectively aware of oneself as an object. | |
| From: Quassim Cassam (Introduction to 'Self-Knowledge' [1994], §I) | |
| A reaction: As a pure argument this looks weak. There could be two sorts of knowledge of objects, one admitting possible error, the other not. Introspecting pain appears to be awareness of oneself as an object. Planning my future needs my body. |
| 6000 | The goal is rationality in the selection of things according to nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the goal to be rationality in the selection and rejection of the things according to nature. | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
| A reaction: This captures the central Stoic idea quite nicely. 'Live according to nature', but this always meant 'live according to reason', because that is (as Aristotle had taught) the essence of our nature. This only makes sense if reason and nature coincide. |
| 5999 | The good is what is perfect by nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the good as what is perfect by nature. | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
| A reaction: This might come close to G.E. Moore's Ideal Utilitarianism, but its dependence on the rather uneasy of concept of 'perfection' makes it questionable. Personally I find it appealing. I wish we had Diogenes' explanation. |
| 6001 | Justice is a disposition to distribute according to desert [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined justice as the disposition which distributes to everyone what he deserves. | |
| From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
| A reaction: The questions that arise would be 'what does a new-born baby deserve?', and 'what do animals deserve?', and 'does the lowest and worst of criminals deserve anything at all?' |
| 21991 | The middle class gain freedom through property, but workers can only free all of humanity [Marx, by Singer] |
| Full Idea: Where the middle class can win freedom for themselves on the basis of rights to property - thus excluding others from their freedom - the working class have nothing but their title as human beings. They only liberate themselves by liberating humanity. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (Contrib to Critique of Hegel's Phil of Right [1844]) by Peter Singer - Marx 4 | |
| A reaction: Individual workers might gain freedom via education, marriage, or entrepreneurship, or by opting for total simplicity of life, but in general Marx seems to be right about this. But we must ask what sort of 'freedom' is needed. |
| 21990 | Theory is as much a part of a revolution as material force is [Marx] |
| Full Idea: Material force must be overthrown by material force. But theory also becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Contrib to Critique of Hegel's Phil of Right [1844], Intro p.69), quoted by Peter Singer - Marx 4 | |
| A reaction: A huge problem, I think, is that every theory (even conservatism) has to be simplified in a democracy if it is to grip the imagination of the majority. My current hatred is labels in political philosophy. They give us a cartoon view of the world. |
| 7128 | Religion is the opium of the people, and real happiness requires its abolition [Marx] |
| Full Idea: Religion is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is required for their real happiness. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Contrib to Critique of Hegel's Phil of Right [1844], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Not being religious myself, I have some sympathy with this ringing clarion-call. However, while opium satisfies an artificial and superficial need, religion certainly seems to speak to something deeper and more central in people. |