27 ideas
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The source of the concept of objective truth is interpersonal communication. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209) | |
A reaction: This is a distinctively Davidsonian idea, arising out of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument. We could go a step further, and just say that 'objectivity is a social concept'. Davidson more or less pleads guilty to pragmatism in this essay. |
1708 | In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Take, for example, "Callias is just", "Callias is not just", and "Callias is unjust"; which of these are contraries? | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 23a31) |
1703 | It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not necessary for a sea-battle to take place tomorrow, nor for one not to take place tomorrow - though it is necessary for one to take place OR not take place tomorrow. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 19a30) |
1704 | Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Statements are true according to how things actually are. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 19a33) |
22272 | Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When Aristotle moved from basic name+verb (in 'De Interpretatione') to noun+noun logic...names had to be treated as special cases, so that 'Socrates' is treated as short for 'everything that is Socrates'. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Supp' | |
A reaction: Just the sort of rewriting that Russell introduced for definite descriptions. 'Twas ever the logicians' fate to shoehorn ordinary speech into awkward containers. |
9405 | Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Square of Opposition: horizontals - 'contraries' can't both be true, and 'subcontraries' can't both be false; verticals - 'subalternatives' have downwards-only implication; diagonals - 'contradictories' have opposite truth values. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], Ch.12-13) | |
A reaction: This is still used in modern discussion (e.g. by Stalnaker against Kripke), and there is a modal version of it (Fitting and Mendelsohn p.7). Corners read: 'All F are G', 'No F are G', 'Some F are G' and 'Some F are not G'. |
9730 | Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Modal Square of Opposition 3: 'It is necessary that P' and 'It is not possible that not P' are the contradictories (different truth values) of 'It is not necessary that P' and 'It is possible that not P'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], Ch.12c) by M Fitting/R Mendelsohn - First-Order Modal Logic 1.4 |
9728 | Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Modal Square of Opposition 1: 'It is necessary that P' and 'It is not possible that not P' are the contraries (not both true) of 'It is necessary that not P' and 'It is not possible that P'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], Ch.12a) by M Fitting/R Mendelsohn - First-Order Modal Logic 1.4 |
9729 | Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Modal Square of Opposition 2: 'It is not necessary that not P' and 'It is possible that P' are the subcontraries (not both false) of 'It is not necessary that P' and 'It is possible that not P'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], Ch.12b) by M Fitting/R Mendelsohn - First-Order Modal Logic 1.4 |
9731 | Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Modal Square of Opposition 4: 'It is necessary that not P' and 'It is not possible that P' are the contradictories (different truth values) of 'It is not necessary that not P' and 'It is possible that P'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], Ch.12d) by M Fitting/R Mendelsohn - First-Order Modal Logic 1.4 |
9732 | Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Modal Square of Opposition 5: 'It is necessary that P' and 'It is not possible that not P' are the subalternatives (first implies second) of 'It is not necessary that not P' and 'It is possible that P'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], Ch.12e) by M Fitting/R Mendelsohn - First-Order Modal Logic 1.4 |
9733 | Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Modal Square of Opposition 6: 'It is necessary that not P' and 'It is not possible that P' are the subalternatives (first implies second) of 'It is not necessary that P' and 'It is possible that not P'. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], Ch.12f) by M Fitting/R Mendelsohn - First-Order Modal Logic 1.4 |
21593 | In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson] |
Full Idea: Unlike Aristotle, Stoics did not reject Bivalence for future contingencies; it is true or false that there will be a sea-fight tomorrow. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 19a31) by Timothy Williamson - Vagueness 1.2 | |
A reaction: I'd never quite registered this simple account of the sea-fight. As Williamson emphasises, one should not lightly reject the principle of bivalence. Has Aristotle entered a slippery slope? Stoics disagreed with Aristotle. |
1701 | A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 17a01) |
1706 | Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not true to say that what is not, since it is thought about, is something that is; for what is thought about it is not that it is, but that it is not. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 21a31) | |
A reaction: At least there has been one philosopher who was quite clear about the distinction between a thought and what the thought is about (its content). Often forgotten! |
1707 | Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Perhaps the necessary and non-necessary are first principles of everything's either being or not being. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 23a18) | |
A reaction: Is that 'first' in time, or in priority? If they are the grounds of being, how could there ever be non-necessary existents? Why would necessary being permit intruders? |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Having a belief demands in addition appreciating the contrast between true belief and false, between appearance and reality, mere seeming and being. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209) | |
A reaction: This sets the bar very high for belief (never mind knowledge), and seems to imply that animals don't have beliefs. How should we describe their cognitive states then? I would say these criteria only apply to actual knowledge. |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
Full Idea: An entity is objective in so far as it is intersubjective. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]), quoted by Martin Kusch - Knowledge by Agreement Ch.10 | |
A reaction: This thought baffled me until I saw it in the context of socialised epistemology. Effectively objectivity is subsumed under justification, which in turn is seen in a social context, not private to individuals. |
5960 | When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch] |
Full Idea: The soul, when it has partaken of intelligence and reason and concord, is not merely a work but also a part of god and has come to be not by his agency but both from him as source and out of his substance. | |
From: Plutarch (67: Platonic Questions [c.85], II.1001) | |
A reaction: A most intriguing shift of view from earlier concepts of the psuché. How did this come about? This man is a pagan. The history is in the evolution of Platonism. See 'The Middle Platonists' by John Dillon. Davidson is also very impressed by reason. |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
Full Idea: If the mental states of others are known only through their behavioral and other outward manifestations, while this is not true of our own mental states, why should we think our own mental states are anything like those of others? | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.207) | |
A reaction: His point is that if you seriously doubt other minds, you should follow through on the implications. But that is to treat it as a theory about other minds, rather an a sceptical worry. Descartes didn't walk into walls while writing Meditation 1. |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Davidson argues that knowledge of other minds presupposes knowledge of one's own mind, and that there is no knowledge of other minds without knowledge of the external world. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]) by Michael Dummett - Common Sense and Physics Ch.10 | |
A reaction: Davidson't argument is actually hard to swallow because it is so long and complex. Compressing the point makes it begin to sound like a variant of the argument from analogy. |
2337 | For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam] |
Full Idea: In 'De Interpretatione' Aristotle laid out an enduring theory of reference and meaning, in which we understand a word or any other sign by associating that word with a concept. This concept determines what the word refers to. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE]) by Hilary Putnam - Representation and Reality 2 p.19 | |
A reaction: Sounds right to me, despite all this Wittgensteinian stuff about beetles in boxes. When you meet a new technical term in philosophy, you must struggle to fully grasp the concept it proposes. |
13763 | Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, ...and just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of - affections of the soul - are the same for all. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 16a03-08) | |
A reaction: Loux identifies this passage as the source of the 'conceptualist' view of propositions, which I immediately identify with. The view that these propositions are 'the same for all' is plausible for normal objects, but dubious for complex abstractions. |
1705 | It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is not necessary that of every affirmation and opposite negation one should be true and the other false. For what holds for things that are does not hold for things that are not but may possibly be or not be. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 19a39) | |
A reaction: Thus even if Bivalence holds, and the only truth-values are T and F, it doesn't follow that Excluded Middle holds, which says that every proposition must have one of those two values. |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Until a baseline has been established by communication with someone else, there is no point is saying one's own thoughts have a propositional content. Hence knowledge of another mind is essential all thought and all knowledge. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.213) | |
A reaction: This really is building a skyscraper on the slightly shaky claims of the Private Language Argument (e.g. Idea 4158). Animals are so important in discussions of this kind. Is an albatross more or less devoid of thought and belief? |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Concerning charity, the Principle of Coherence seeks logical consistency in the thought of the speaker, and the Principle of Correspondence seeks a similar response to features of the world to that of an interpreter. The speaker has logic and true belief. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.211) | |
A reaction: Davidson adds a Kantian commitment to pure and universal reason to the very sceptical framework created by Quine. I agree with Davidson, but it seems more like faith than like an argument or an empirical observation. |
1702 | Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: To say that everything that is, is of necessity, when it is, is not the same as saying unconditionally that it is of necessity. | |
From: Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 19a25) |