Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Freedom to Act', 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood' and 'Aristotle and Descartes on Matter'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth

6343	For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell]
	Full Idea: Given Russell's notion of a proposition, as an arrangement of objects and properties, it is hard to see how there could be any difference at all between such a proposition and the fact corresponding to it, since they each involve the same arrangement.
	From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood [1910]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Ch.7.35
	A reaction: This seems a little unfair, given that Russell (in 1912) uses the notion now referred to as 'congruence', so that the correspondence is not in the objects and properties, but in how they are 'ordered', which may differ between proposition and fact.

19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique

7534	In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk]
	Full Idea: With a characteristic readiness to abandon views that he had previously considered definitively correct, Russell declared in 1906 that there were, after all, no such 'things' as propositions. It is judgements that are true or false.
	From: report of Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood [1910]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.6
	A reaction: Written 1906. Russell developed a 'multiple relation theory of judgement'. But if a judgement is an assessment of truth or falsehood, what is it that is being assessed?

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes

19698	Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta]
	Full Idea: A 'deviant causal chain' is when an agent has a reason for performing an action, and for the reason to cause the performance, without that being the reason for which the agent performed it.
	From: report of Donald Davidson (Freedom to Act [1973]) by Ram Neta - The Basing Relation II
	A reaction: Davidson's thesis is that 'reasons are causes'. This was a problem he faced. I think this discussion is now obscured by the complex and multi-layered account of action which is emerging from neuroscience.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter

19399	Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Primary matter is nothing if considered at rest.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Aristotle and Descartes on Matter [1671], p.90)
	A reaction: This goes with Leibniz's Idea 13393, that activity is the hallmark of existence. No one seems to have been able to make good sense of prime matter, and it plays little role in Aristotle's writings.