Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Three Varieties of Knowledge', 'Absolute Necessities' and 'Presupposition'

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17 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The source of the concept of objective truth is interpersonal communication.
     From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209)
     A reaction: This is a distinctively Davidsonian idea, arising out of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument. We could go a step further, and just say that 'objectivity is a social concept'. Davidson more or less pleads guilty to pragmatism in this essay.
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
Logic would be more natural if negation only referred to predicates [Dummett]
     Full Idea: A better proposal for a formal logic closer to natural language would be one that had a negation-operator only for (simple) predicates.
     From: Michael Dummett (Presupposition [1960], p.27)
     A reaction: Dummett observes that classical formal logic was never intended to be close to natural language. Term logic does have that aim, but the meta-question is whether that end is desirable, and why.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Natural language 'not' doesn't apply to sentences [Dummett]
     Full Idea: Natural language does not possess a sentential negation-operator.
     From: Michael Dummett (Presupposition [1960], p.27)
     A reaction: This is a criticism of Strawson, who criticises logic for not following natural language, but does it himself with negation. In the question of how language and logic connect, this idea seems important. Term Logic aims to get closer to natural language.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale]
     Full Idea: Maybe peaceful co-existence between absolute logical necessity and absolute metaphysical necessity can be secured, ..and absolute necessity is their union. ...However, a truth would then qualify as absolutely necessary in two quite different ways.
     From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 4)
     A reaction: Hale is addressing a really big question for metaphysic (absolute necessity) which others avoid. In the end he votes for rejecting 'metaphysical' necessity. I am tempted to vote for rejecting logical necessity (as being relative). 'Absolute' is an ideal.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale]
     Full Idea: It might be metaphysically necessary that p but logically possible that not-p, so that metaphysical necessity is not, after all, absolute.
     From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996]), quoted by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 1.5
     A reaction: Lowe presents this as dilemma, but it sounds fine to me. Flying pigs etc. have no apparent logical problems, but I can't conceive of a possible world where pigs like ours fly in a world like ours. Earthbound pigs may be metaphysically necessary.
A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale]
     Full Idea: One type of necessity may be said to be 'stronger' than another when the first always entails the second, but not conversely. This will obtain only if the possibility of the first is weaker than the possibility of the second.
     From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 1)
     A reaction: Thus we would normally say that if something is logically necessary (a very strong claim) then it will have to be naturally necessary. If something is naturally possible, then clearly it will have to be logically possible. Sounds OK.
'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale]
     Full Idea: Necessity is 'relative' if a claim of φ-necessary that p just claims that it is a logical consequence of some statements Φ that p. We have a 'strong' version if we add that the statements in Φ are all true, and a 'weak' version if not.
     From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 1)
     A reaction: I'm not sure about 'logical' consequence here. It may be necessary that a thing be a certain way in order to qualify for some category (which would be 'relative'), but that seems like 'sortal' necessity rather than logical.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale]
     Full Idea: Friends of metaphysical necessity would want to hold that when it is metaphysically necessary that p, there is no good sense of 'possible' (except, perhaps, an epistemic one) in which it is possible that not-p.
     From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 2)
     A reaction: We might want to say which possible worlds this refers to (and presumably it won't just be in the actual world). The normal claim would refer to all possible worlds. Adding a '...provided that' clause moves it from absolute to relative necessity.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale]
     Full Idea: 'Broadly' logical necessities are propositions whose truth derives entirely from the concepts involved in them (together, of course, with relevant structure).
     From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], 3)
     A reaction: Is the 'logical' part of this necessity bestowed by the concepts, or by the 'structure' (which I take to be a logical structure)?
Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale]
     Full Idea: The logical necessities can be taken to be the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts.
     From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], p.10)
     A reaction: This is part of his story of essences giving rise to necessities. His proposal sounds narrow, but logical concepts may have the highest degree of generality which it is possible to have. It must be how the concepts connect that causes the necessities.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale]
     Full Idea: Conceptual necessities can be taken to be propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all concepts.
     From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], p.9)
     A reaction: Fine endorse essences for these concepts. Could we then come up with a new concept which contradicted all the others, and destroyed the necessity? Yes, presumably. Presumably witchcraft and astrology are full of 'conceptual necessities'.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Having a belief demands in addition appreciating the contrast between true belief and false, between appearance and reality, mere seeming and being.
     From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209)
     A reaction: This sets the bar very high for belief (never mind knowledge), and seems to imply that animals don't have beliefs. How should we describe their cognitive states then? I would say these criteria only apply to actual knowledge.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson]
     Full Idea: An entity is objective in so far as it is intersubjective.
     From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]), quoted by Martin Kusch - Knowledge by Agreement Ch.10
     A reaction: This thought baffled me until I saw it in the context of socialised epistemology. Effectively objectivity is subsumed under justification, which in turn is seen in a social context, not private to individuals.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson]
     Full Idea: If the mental states of others are known only through their behavioral and other outward manifestations, while this is not true of our own mental states, why should we think our own mental states are anything like those of others?
     From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.207)
     A reaction: His point is that if you seriously doubt other minds, you should follow through on the implications. But that is to treat it as a theory about other minds, rather an a sceptical worry. Descartes didn't walk into walls while writing Meditation 1.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett]
     Full Idea: Davidson argues that knowledge of other minds presupposes knowledge of one's own mind, and that there is no knowledge of other minds without knowledge of the external world.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]) by Michael Dummett - Common Sense and Physics Ch.10
     A reaction: Davidson't argument is actually hard to swallow because it is so long and complex. Compressing the point makes it begin to sound like a variant of the argument from analogy.
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Until a baseline has been established by communication with someone else, there is no point is saying one's own thoughts have a propositional content. Hence knowledge of another mind is essential all thought and all knowledge.
     From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.213)
     A reaction: This really is building a skyscraper on the slightly shaky claims of the Private Language Argument (e.g. Idea 4158). Animals are so important in discussions of this kind. Is an albatross more or less devoid of thought and belief?
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Concerning charity, the Principle of Coherence seeks logical consistency in the thought of the speaker, and the Principle of Correspondence seeks a similar response to features of the world to that of an interpreter. The speaker has logic and true belief.
     From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.211)
     A reaction: Davidson adds a Kantian commitment to pure and universal reason to the very sceptical framework created by Quine. I agree with Davidson, but it seems more like faith than like an argument or an empirical observation.