23 ideas
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The source of the concept of objective truth is interpersonal communication. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209) | |
A reaction: This is a distinctively Davidsonian idea, arising out of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument. We could go a step further, and just say that 'objectivity is a social concept'. Davidson more or less pleads guilty to pragmatism in this essay. |
18767 | Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: Free logics say 1) singular terms are allowed that do not designate anything that exists; sometimes 2) is added: the domain of discourse is allowed to be empty. Logics with both conditions are called 'universally free logics'. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.3) | |
A reaction: I really like the sound of this, and aim to investigate it. Karel Lambert's writings are the starting point. Maybe the domain of logic is our concepts, rather than things in the world, in which case free logic sounds fine. |
18763 | Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: Under its now standard principal interpretation, the monadic predicate variables in second-order logic range over subsets of the domain on individuals. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This is an interpretation in which properties are just sets of things, which is fine if you are a logician, but not if you want to talk about anything important. Still, we must play the game. Boolos introduced plural quantification at this point. |
18771 | Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: Ontological quantifiers might just as well range over all the entities needed for the semantics. ...The minimal way would be to just stop calling '∃' an 'existential quantifier', and always read it as 'there is...' rather than 'there exists...'. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6) | |
A reaction: There is no right answer here, but it seems to be the strategy adopted by most logicians, and the majority of modern metaphysicians. They just allow abstracta, and even fictions, to 'exist', while not being fussy what it means. Big mistake! |
4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
Full Idea: The Lottery Paradox says that for 100 tickets and one winner, each ticket has a .99 likelihood of defeat, so they are all likely to lose, so there is unlikely to be a winner. | |
From: report of Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §5) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: The problem seems to be viewing each ticket in isolation. If I buy two tickets, I increase my chances of winning. |
18769 | Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: A cursory examination shows that mathematicians have no aversion to saying that this-or-that mathematical entity exists. But is this a different sense of 'existence'? | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6) | |
A reaction: For those of us like me and my pal Quine who say that 'exist' is univocal (i.e. only one meaning), this is a nice challenge. Quine solves it by saying maths concerns sets of objects. I, who don't like sets, am puzzled (so I turn to fictionalism...). |
18770 | We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: There are sensible ways to maike a distinction between different kinds of being. ..One need not fear that this leads to a 'bloated ontology'. ...We need only distinguish 'ontological commitment' from 'existential commitment' | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6) | |
A reaction: He speaks of giving fictional and abstract entities a 'lower score' in existence. I think he means the 'ontological' commitment to be the stronger of the two. |
18766 | 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: The paradox of negative existentials says that if 's' does not designate something, then the sentence 's is non-existent' is untrue. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This only seems be a problem for logicians. Everyone else can happily say 'my coffee is non-existent'. |
18768 | We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: Parmenides was correct - one cannot speak of that which is not, even to say that it is not. But one can speak of concepts and say of them that they do not correspond to anything real. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.5) | |
A reaction: [This summarises Alonso Church, who was developing Frege] This sounds like the right thing to say about non-existence, but then the same principle must apply to assertions of existence, which will also be about concepts and not things. |
18765 | Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: The medieval philosophers and then Leibniz were keen on finding 'principles of individuation', and the idea appears again in Frege, to be taken up in some respects by Wittgenstein. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 1.6) | |
A reaction: I take a rather empirical approach to this supposed problem, and suggest we break 'individuation' down into its component parts, and then just drop the word. Discussions of principles of individuations strike me as muddled. Wiggins and Lowe today. |
18764 | The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA] |
Full Idea: In the Identity of Indiscernibles, one speaks about properties, and the notion of a property is by no means clearly fixed and formalized in modern symbolic logic. | |
From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 1.5) | |
A reaction: The unclarity of 'property' is a bee in my philosophical bonnet, in speech, and in metaphysics, as well as in logic. It may well be the central problem in our attempts to understand the world in general terms. He cites intensional logic as promising. |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Having a belief demands in addition appreciating the contrast between true belief and false, between appearance and reality, mere seeming and being. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209) | |
A reaction: This sets the bar very high for belief (never mind knowledge), and seems to imply that animals don't have beliefs. How should we describe their cognitive states then? I would say these criteria only apply to actual knowledge. |
4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], Intro) | |
A reaction: I don't see why there shouldn't be a phenomenalist, anti-realist version of externalism, which just has 'starting points' instead of a serious commitment to foundations. |
4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: The fundamental question that must be answered by any acceptable version of foundationalism is: how are basic beliefs possible? | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §I) | |
A reaction: This question seems to be asking for a justification for basic beliefs, which smacks of 'Who made God?' Look, basic beliefs are just basic, right? |
4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: The central argument for foundationalism is simply that all other possible outcomes of the regress of justifications lead inexorably to scepticism. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §I) | |
A reaction: If you prefer coherence to foundations, you need the security of reason to assess the coherence (which seems to be an internal foundation!). |
4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: The most extreme version of externalism would be one that held that the external condition required for justification is simply the truth of the belief in question. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §II) | |
A reaction: The question is, why should we demand any more than this? The problem case is, traditionally, the lucky guess, but naturalist may say that these just don't occur with any regularity. We only get beliefs right because they are true. |
4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: External or objective reliability is not enough to offset subjective irrationality (such as unexplained clairvoyance). | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §IV) | |
A reaction: A good argument. Where do animals fit into this? If your clairvoyance kept working, in the end you might concede that you 'knew', even though you were baffled about how you managed it. |
4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: It may be that where there are no positive grounds for a charge of irrationality, the acceptance of a belief with only external justification is still subjectively irrational in a sense that rules out its being epistemologically justified. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §IV) | |
A reaction: A key objection. Surely rational behaviour requires a judgement to be made before a belief is accepted? If you are consistently clairvoyant, you must ask why. |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
Full Idea: An entity is objective in so far as it is intersubjective. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]), quoted by Martin Kusch - Knowledge by Agreement Ch.10 | |
A reaction: This thought baffled me until I saw it in the context of socialised epistemology. Effectively objectivity is subsumed under justification, which in turn is seen in a social context, not private to individuals. |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
Full Idea: If the mental states of others are known only through their behavioral and other outward manifestations, while this is not true of our own mental states, why should we think our own mental states are anything like those of others? | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.207) | |
A reaction: His point is that if you seriously doubt other minds, you should follow through on the implications. But that is to treat it as a theory about other minds, rather an a sceptical worry. Descartes didn't walk into walls while writing Meditation 1. |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Davidson argues that knowledge of other minds presupposes knowledge of one's own mind, and that there is no knowledge of other minds without knowledge of the external world. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]) by Michael Dummett - Common Sense and Physics Ch.10 | |
A reaction: Davidson't argument is actually hard to swallow because it is so long and complex. Compressing the point makes it begin to sound like a variant of the argument from analogy. |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Until a baseline has been established by communication with someone else, there is no point is saying one's own thoughts have a propositional content. Hence knowledge of another mind is essential all thought and all knowledge. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.213) | |
A reaction: This really is building a skyscraper on the slightly shaky claims of the Private Language Argument (e.g. Idea 4158). Animals are so important in discussions of this kind. Is an albatross more or less devoid of thought and belief? |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Concerning charity, the Principle of Coherence seeks logical consistency in the thought of the speaker, and the Principle of Correspondence seeks a similar response to features of the world to that of an interpreter. The speaker has logic and true belief. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.211) | |
A reaction: Davidson adds a Kantian commitment to pure and universal reason to the very sceptical framework created by Quine. I agree with Davidson, but it seems more like faith than like an argument or an empirical observation. |