10 ideas
2661 | Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], I.viii.32) |
2673 | There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero] |
Full Idea: There cannot be more than one truth. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xlviii.147) |
2669 | Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero] |
Full Idea: It is a fundamental principle of dialectic that every statement is either true or false. So is this a true proposition or a false one: "If you say that you are lying and say it truly, you lie"? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xxix.95) |
14289 | There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Jackson, by Edgington] |
Full Idea: Jackson came to realise that there are assertable conditionals which one would not continue to believe if one learned the antecedent, such as Lewis's "If Reagan worked for the KGB, I'll never find out". | |
From: report of Frank Jackson (Conditionals [1987]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.2 | |
A reaction: That pesky David Lewis made trouble for everybody. Edgington agrees that his earlier formulation (Idea 14288) holds good for nearly all cases. There is a self-referential element in Lewis's example. |
2664 | If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If human nature were interrogated by some god as to whether it was content with its own senses in a sound and undamaged state or demanded something better, I cannot see what more it could ask for. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.vii.19) |
2665 | How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: How can there possibly be a memory of what is false? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.vii.22) |
20800 | Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero] |
Full Idea: [The sceptical Academics say] what is false cannot be perceived, but every true presentation is such that there can be a false presentation of the same quality. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.40) | |
A reaction: It was the stoics who focused the discussion on 'presentations'. This claim is purely theoretical; no one has ever experienced a false presentation of talking to a family member that was as vivid as the real thing. |
4042 | Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson] |
Full Idea: An intelligible metaphysics will assign a central place to the idea of people (= speakers) with a location in public space and time. | |
From: Donald Davidson (The Method of Truth in Metaphysics [1977], §III) | |
A reaction: The 'location' is the interesting bit, requiring people to be bodies, not abstractions. A big, plausible claim, but hard to prove. |
4041 | Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Sentences held true (the linguistic representatives of beliefs) determine the meanings of the words they contain. | |
From: Donald Davidson (The Method of Truth in Metaphysics [1977], §II) | |
A reaction: Maybe. Historically, truth and belief presumably precede words and sentences. But words separate off from beliefs very easily. I'm not convinced. Words initiate language, not beliefs? |
2672 | Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero] |
Full Idea: None of the virtues can exist unless they are disinterested, for virtue driven to duty by pleasure as a sort of pay is not virtue at all but a deceptive sham and pretence of virtue. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xlvi.140) |