Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', 'The Foundations of Mathematics' and 'Elucidation of some points in E.Schrder'

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13 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The notion of fitting the totality of experience ...adds nothing intelligible to the simple concept of being true. ....Nothing, ...no thing, makes sentences and theories true: not experience, not surface irritations, not the world.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.11), quoted by Willard Quine - On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma p.39
     A reaction: If you don't have a concept of what normally makes a sentence true, I don't see how you go about distinguishing what is true from what is false. You can't just examine the sentence to see if it has the 'primitive' property of truth. Holism is involved....
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
A class is an aggregate of objects; if you destroy them, you destroy the class; there is no empty class [Frege]
     Full Idea: A class consists of objects; it is an aggregate, a collective unity, of them; if so, it must vanish when these objects vanish. If we burn down all the trees of a wood, we thereby burn down the wood. Thus there can be no empty class.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Elucidation of some points in E.Schröder [1895], p.212), quoted by Oliver,A/Smiley,T - What are Sets and What are they For?
     A reaction: This rests on Cantor's view of a set as a collection, rather than on Dedekind, which allows null and singleton sets.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: there is an infinity of distinguishable individuals [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: The Axiom of Infinity means that there are an infinity of distinguishable individuals, which is an empirical proposition.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §5)
     A reaction: The Axiom sounds absurd, as a part of a logical system, but Ramsey ends up defending it. Logical tautologies, which seem to be obviously true, are rendered absurd if they don't refer to any objects, and some of them refer to infinities of objects.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Reducibility: to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility asserted that to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [note: two functions are equivalent when the same arguments render them both true or both false].
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §2)
     A reaction: Ramsey in the business of showing that this axiom from Russell and Whitehead is not needed. He says that the axiom seems to be needed for induction and for Dedekind cuts. Since the cuts rest on it, and it is weak, Ramsey says it must go.
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: In 'a = b' either 'a' and 'b' are names of the same thing, in which case the proposition says nothing, or of different things, in which case it is absurd. In neither case is it an assertion of a fact; it only asserts when a or b are descriptions.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §1)
     A reaction: This is essentially Frege's problem with Hesperus and Phosphorus. How can identities be informative? So 2+2=4 is extensionally vacuous, but informative because they are different descriptions.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: Group A consists of contradictions which would occur in a logical or mathematical system, involving terms such as class or number. Group B contradictions are not purely logical, and contain some reference to thought, language or symbolism.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], p.171), quoted by Graham Priest - The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference 1
     A reaction: This has become the orthodox division of all paradoxes, but the division is challenged by Priest (Idea 13373). He suggests that we now realise (post-Tarski?) that language is more involved in logic and mathematics than we thought.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Formalists neglect content, but the logicists have focused on generalizations, and neglected form [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: The formalists neglected the content altogether and made mathematics meaningless, but the logicians neglected the form and made mathematics consist of any true generalisations; only by taking account of both sides can we obtain an adequate theory.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §1)
     A reaction: He says mathematics is 'tautological generalizations'. It is a criticism of modern structuralism that it overemphasises form, and fails to pay attention to the meaning of the concepts which stand at the 'nodes' of the structure.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism is hopeless, because it focuses on propositions and ignores concepts [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: The hopelessly inadequate formalist theory is, to some extent, the result of considering only the propositions of mathematics and neglecting the analysis of its concepts.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], §1)
     A reaction: You'll have to read Ramsey to see how this thought pans out, but it at least gives a pointer to how to go about addressing the question.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
I just confront the evidence, and let it act on me [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: I can but put the evidence before me, and let it act on my mind.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], p.202), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 70 'Deg'
     A reaction: Potter calls this observation 'downbeat', but I am an enthusiastic fan. It is roughly my view of both concept formation and of knowledge. You soak up the world, and respond appropriately. The trick is in the selection of evidence to confront.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The third dogma of empiricism is the dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, which cannot be made intelligible and defensible. If we give it up, it is not clear that any distinctive empiricism remains.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.189)
     A reaction: The first two dogmas were 'analyticity' and 'reductionism', as identified by Quine in 1953. Presumably Hume's Principles of Association (Idea 2189) would be an example of a scheme. A key issue is whether there is any 'pure' content.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
A belief is knowledge if it is true, certain and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: I have always said that a belief was knowledge if it was 1) true, ii) certain, iii) obtained by a reliable process.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (The Foundations of Mathematics [1925], p.258), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 66 'Rel'
     A reaction: Not sure why it has to be 'certain' as well as 'true'. It seems that 'true' is objective, and 'certain' subjective. I think I know lots of things of which I am not fully certain. Reliabilism long preceded Alvin Goldman.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Different points of view make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.184)
     A reaction: This seems right to me. I am very struck by the close similarities between people from wildly differing cultural backgrounds, as seen, for example, at the Olympic Games.
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Studying the criteria of translation is a way of focusing on criteria of identity for conceptual schemes.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.184)
     A reaction: This is why it was an inspired idea of Quine's to make translation a central topic in philosophy. We must be cautious, though, about saying that the language is the conceptual scheme, as that leaves animals with no scheme at all.