|
18702
|
Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson]
|
|
Full Idea:
The simple thesis that names and descriptions often refer to things, and that predicates often have an extension in the world of things, is obvious, and essential to the most elementary appreciation of both language and the thoughts we express.
|
|
From:
Donald Davidson (Replies to Critics [1998], p.323)
|
|
A reaction:
In 1983 Davidson had been a rare modern champion of the coherence theory of truth, but this is his clearest later renunciation of that view (and quite right too).
|
|
9390
|
Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt]
|
|
Full Idea:
Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking.
|
|
From:
Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13)
|
|
A reaction:
There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy.
|
|
9389
|
Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]
|
|
Full Idea:
Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept.
|
|
From:
Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5)
|
|
A reaction:
I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy.
|
|
23684
|
Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
|
Full Idea:
In her early work she also defends moral rationalism, which is the idea that morality gives reasons for action to everyone, even those who lack the desire to do what is right.
|
|
From:
report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
|
|
A reaction:
Evidently a rejection of the Humean view that only a desire can motivate action, including moral action. There is an ongoing debate about whether reasons can cause anything, or motivate anything. I think the contents of reasons pull us towards action.
|
|
23690
|
We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
|
Full Idea:
Foot advocates the view that anyone has reason to cultivate the virtues, even if they lack the desire to do so at a given moment.
|
|
From:
report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], Pt II) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 2 'Concepts'
|
|
A reaction:
The view which she soon abandoned, but then returned to later. It specifically repudiates the view of Hume, that only desires can motivate. I'm unsure, because the concept of 'reason' strikes me as too imprecise. She sees self-interest as a reason.
|
|
22379
|
The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot]
|
|
Full Idea:
There is no describing the evaluative meaning of 'good', evaluation, commending, or anything of the sort, without fixing the object to which they are supposed to be attached.
|
|
From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], p.112)
|
|
A reaction:
I go further, and say that a specification of the feature(s) of the object that produce the value must also be available (if requested). 'That's a good car, but I've no idea why' makes no sense. 'Apparently that's a good car', if other people know why.
|