7 ideas
| 8460 | Philosophers have given precise senses to deduction, probability, computability etc [Quine/Ullian] |
| Full Idea: Successful explications (giving a precise sense to a term) have been found for the concepts of deduction, probability and computability, to name just three. | |
| From: W Quine / J Ullian (The Web of Belief [1970], 65), quoted by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: Quine also cites the concept of an 'ordered pair'. Orenstein adds Tarski's definition of truth, Russell's definite descriptions, and the explication of existence in terms of quantifications. Cf. Idea 2958. |
| 11993 | Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung] |
| Full Idea: If Jones ceases to be a father, or ceases to be over eight years old, he will cease to exist, yet these properties surely do not belong essentially to him. | |
| From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], II) | |
| A reaction: This seems to correct, though I would doubt whether either of these count as true properties, in the causal sense I prefer. If being 'over 8' is a property, how many 'over n' or 'under m' properties does he have? One for each quantum moment? |
| 11997 | A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung] |
| Full Idea: It is possible that a property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another. | |
| From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], III) | |
| A reaction: Thus a love of blues music may be part of your essence, but only a minor part of me. Sounds right. Spin or charge are part of the essence of an electron, but only contingently part of a child's top. |
| 11992 | Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung] |
| Full Idea: Three essentialist claims are labelled 'Aristotelian': the thing would cease to exist without the property; an essential property is explanatory; and it is such that it must belong to everything to which it belongs. | |
| From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], Intro) | |
| A reaction: She says the second one is indispensable, and that it rules out the third one. My working assumption, like hers, is that the second one is the key part of the game, because Aristotle wanted to explain things. |
| 11995 | Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung] |
| Full Idea: There will be demonstrated properties at the edge of the system, so to speak. They will be explained in terms of the essential properties of the basic entities and principles of the science, but will themselves not be explanatory of further properties. | |
| From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], II) | |
| A reaction: This is an important line of thought which needs clarification. We can't glibly say that essences are what explain the other properties. Some properties do more than others to explain subsequent dependent properties. |
| 11996 | Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung] |
| Full Idea: It seems highly likely that some non-essential properties may explain more about the individual or about things of his kind than the peripheral properties. | |
| From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], II) | |
| A reaction: Another important issue, if one is defending the explanatory role of essences. It is not only essences which explain. A key question is whether we endorse individual essences as well as generic ones. I think we should. They explain the details. |
| 19698 | Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta] |
| Full Idea: A 'deviant causal chain' is when an agent has a reason for performing an action, and for the reason to cause the performance, without that being the reason for which the agent performed it. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Freedom to Act [1973]) by Ram Neta - The Basing Relation II | |
| A reaction: Davidson's thesis is that 'reasons are causes'. This was a problem he faced. I think this discussion is now obscured by the complex and multi-layered account of action which is emerging from neuroscience. |