36 ideas
3358 | Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: In contemporary metaphysics the major areas of discussion are Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], After) |
3312 | There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: At least since Russell, one has routinely distinguished between the 'is' of predication ('Socrates is wise', Fx), the 'is' of identity ('Morning Star is Evening Star', =), and the 'is' of existence ('the cat is under the bed', Ex). | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: This seems horribly nitpicking to many people, but I love it - because it is just true, and it is a truth right at the basis of the confusions in our talk. Analytic philosophy forever! [P.S. 'Tiddles is a cat' - the 'is' membership] |
3352 | Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Analytical philosophy excels in the piecemeal analysis of causation, perception, knowledge and so on, but there is a striking poverty of any synoptic vision of these independent studies. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.22) |
3329 | Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: As our bible, the Book of Science is presumed to contain only true sentences, but it is less clear how they are to be construed, which literally and which non-literally. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13) |
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The source of the concept of objective truth is interpersonal communication. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209) | |
A reaction: This is a distinctively Davidsonian idea, arising out of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument. We could go a step further, and just say that 'objectivity is a social concept'. Davidson more or less pleads guilty to pragmatism in this essay. |
21697 | The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [Quine] |
Full Idea: The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [which I name from the Greek for 'ostrich'] | |
From: Willard Quine (Lecture on Nominalism [1946], §4) | |
A reaction: David Armstrong said this is the the fallacy involved in a denial of universals. Quine is accusing Carnap and co. of the fallacy. |
3326 | Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Set theory offers the promise of a complete mathematization of the 'is' of predication. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13) |
3327 | The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Set inclusion is sharply distinguished from set membership (as the set of Greeks is found to be included in, but not a member of, the set of men). | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.13) |
3335 | The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms [Benardete,JA, by PG] |
Full Idea: Zermelo proposed seven axioms for set theory, with Fraenkel adding others, to produce the standard Z-F Intuition. | |
From: report of José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.17) by PG - Db (ideas) |
21698 | All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic [Quine] |
Full Idea: Much of the theory of relations can be developed as a virtual theory, in which we seem to talk of relations, but can explain our notation in terms {finally] of just the logic of truth-functions, quantification and identity. The exception is ancestrals. | |
From: Willard Quine (Lecture on Nominalism [1946], §8) | |
A reaction: The irreducibility of ancestrals is offered as a reason for treating sets as universals. |
3332 | Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The Greeks saw the independent science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.15) |
3330 | Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: The Negative numbers are postulated (magic word) to solve x=5-8, Rationals postulated to solve 2x=3, Irrationals for x-squared=2, and Imaginaries for x-squared=-1. (…and Zero for x=5-5) …and x/0 remains eternally open. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.14) |
3337 | Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory) [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: One approaches the natural numbers in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory). | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.17) |
21696 | Nominalism rejects both attributes and classes (where extensionalism accepts the classes) [Quine] |
Full Idea: 'Nominalism' is distinct from 'extensionalism'. The main point of the latter doctrine is rejection of properties or attributes in favour of classes. But class are universals equally with attributes, and nominalism in the defined sense rejects both. | |
From: Willard Quine (Lecture on Nominalism [1946], §3) | |
A reaction: Hence Quine soon settled on labelling himself as an 'extensionalist', leaving proper nominalism to Nelson Goodman. It is commonly observed that science massively refers to attributes, so they can't just be eliminated. |
3310 | If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Once we conceded that Tom can walk slowly or quickly, and that the slowness and quickness is a property of the walking and not of Tom, we can hardly refrain from quantifying over events (such as 'a walking') in our ontology. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6) |
12793 | Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: With their 'mass-noun' ontologies, the early pre-Socratics were blind to plurality ...but the count-noun ontologists came to dominate the field forever after. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: The mass-nouns are such things as earth, air, fire and water. This is a very interesting historical observation (cited by Laycock). Our obsession with identity seems tied to formal logic. There is a whole other worldview waiting out there. |
3353 | If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: How can you learn of the existence of transcendent Platonic objects if there is no causal interaction with them? | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.22) |
3304 | Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Why suppose these particles packed together constitute a macro-entity (namely, Mt Everest), whereas those, of equal number, scattered around, fail to add up to anything beyond themselves? | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 2) |
3350 | Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Is being a horse an essential property of a horse? Can we so much as conceive the abstract possibility of a horse's ceasing to be a horse even while continuing to exist? | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.20) |
3309 | If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: If a soldier need not cease to exist merely because he ceases to be a soldier, there is room to doubt that the wind ceases to exist when it ceases to be a wind. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6) |
3351 | One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: One can step into the same river twice, but one must not expect to step into the same water. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.21) |
3323 | Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: 'Existence' can't be glossed as self-identical (critics say) because Pegasus, even while being self-identical, fails to exist. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.11) |
3314 | Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: With the thesis that to be as such is to be relative, the absolutist may be found to concur, but the issue turns on what it might be that a thing is supposed to be relative to. Why not itself? | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 8) |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Having a belief demands in addition appreciating the contrast between true belief and false, between appearance and reality, mere seeming and being. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209) | |
A reaction: This sets the bar very high for belief (never mind knowledge), and seems to imply that animals don't have beliefs. How should we describe their cognitive states then? I would say these criteria only apply to actual knowledge. |
3306 | The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: One proves non-existence (e.g. of round squares) by using logic to derive a contradiction from the concept; it is precisely here, in such proofs, that we find the clearest example of a priori knowledge. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 4) |
3345 | Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Appeals to intuition - no matter how informal - can hardly fail to smack of the synthetic a priori. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
3349 | If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Assume that we know to be true propositions of the form 'There are exactly x prime numbers between y and z', and synthetic a priori truths about Platonic objects are delivered to us on a silver platter. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
3341 | Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori' [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Logical positivism has been concisely summarised as 'there is no synthetic a priori'. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
3344 | Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: No one thinks that the proposition that something exists that transcends all possible experience harbours a logical inconsistency. Its denial cannot therefore be an analytic proposition, so it must be synthetic, though only knowable on a priori grounds. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18) |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
Full Idea: An entity is objective in so far as it is intersubjective. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]), quoted by Martin Kusch - Knowledge by Agreement Ch.10 | |
A reaction: This thought baffled me until I saw it in the context of socialised epistemology. Effectively objectivity is subsumed under justification, which in turn is seen in a social context, not private to individuals. |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
Full Idea: If the mental states of others are known only through their behavioral and other outward manifestations, while this is not true of our own mental states, why should we think our own mental states are anything like those of others? | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.207) | |
A reaction: His point is that if you seriously doubt other minds, you should follow through on the implications. But that is to treat it as a theory about other minds, rather an a sceptical worry. Descartes didn't walk into walls while writing Meditation 1. |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Davidson argues that knowledge of other minds presupposes knowledge of one's own mind, and that there is no knowledge of other minds without knowledge of the external world. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]) by Michael Dummett - Common Sense and Physics Ch.10 | |
A reaction: Davidson't argument is actually hard to swallow because it is so long and complex. Compressing the point makes it begin to sound like a variant of the argument from analogy. |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Until a baseline has been established by communication with someone else, there is no point is saying one's own thoughts have a propositional content. Hence knowledge of another mind is essential all thought and all knowledge. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.213) | |
A reaction: This really is building a skyscraper on the slightly shaky claims of the Private Language Argument (e.g. Idea 4158). Animals are so important in discussions of this kind. Is an albatross more or less devoid of thought and belief? |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Concerning charity, the Principle of Coherence seeks logical consistency in the thought of the speaker, and the Principle of Correspondence seeks a similar response to features of the world to that of an interpreter. The speaker has logic and true belief. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.211) | |
A reaction: Davidson adds a Kantian commitment to pure and universal reason to the very sceptical framework created by Quine. I agree with Davidson, but it seems more like faith than like an argument or an empirical observation. |
3334 | Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Rationalists have been happier with an ontology of points, and empiricists with an ontology of regions. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.16) |
3308 | In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God' [Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: In the ontological argument a deep enough understanding of the very concept of God allows one to derive by logic a contradiction from the statement 'There is no God'. | |
From: José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 4) |