14 ideas
| 8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: The source of the concept of objective truth is interpersonal communication. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209) | |
| A reaction: This is a distinctively Davidsonian idea, arising out of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument. We could go a step further, and just say that 'objectivity is a social concept'. Davidson more or less pleads guilty to pragmatism in this essay. |
| 8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: Having a belief demands in addition appreciating the contrast between true belief and false, between appearance and reality, mere seeming and being. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209) | |
| A reaction: This sets the bar very high for belief (never mind knowledge), and seems to imply that animals don't have beliefs. How should we describe their cognitive states then? I would say these criteria only apply to actual knowledge. |
| 16719 | The primary qualities are mixed to cause secondary qualities [Burley] |
| Full Idea: Secondary qualities are caused by a mixture of primary qualities. | |
| From: Walter Burley (De formis [1330], pars post p.65), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 21.2 | |
| A reaction: Like paint. He probably has in mind hot, cold, wet and dry as the primary qualities. |
| 10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: An entity is objective in so far as it is intersubjective. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]), quoted by Martin Kusch - Knowledge by Agreement Ch.10 | |
| A reaction: This thought baffled me until I saw it in the context of socialised epistemology. Effectively objectivity is subsumed under justification, which in turn is seen in a social context, not private to individuals. |
| 8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: If the mental states of others are known only through their behavioral and other outward manifestations, while this is not true of our own mental states, why should we think our own mental states are anything like those of others? | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.207) | |
| A reaction: His point is that if you seriously doubt other minds, you should follow through on the implications. But that is to treat it as a theory about other minds, rather an a sceptical worry. Descartes didn't walk into walls while writing Meditation 1. |
| 10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
| Full Idea: Davidson argues that knowledge of other minds presupposes knowledge of one's own mind, and that there is no knowledge of other minds without knowledge of the external world. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]) by Michael Dummett - Common Sense and Physics Ch.10 | |
| A reaction: Davidson't argument is actually hard to swallow because it is so long and complex. Compressing the point makes it begin to sound like a variant of the argument from analogy. |
| 8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: Until a baseline has been established by communication with someone else, there is no point is saying one's own thoughts have a propositional content. Hence knowledge of another mind is essential all thought and all knowledge. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.213) | |
| A reaction: This really is building a skyscraper on the slightly shaky claims of the Private Language Argument (e.g. Idea 4158). Animals are so important in discussions of this kind. Is an albatross more or less devoid of thought and belief? |
| 8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: Concerning charity, the Principle of Coherence seeks logical consistency in the thought of the speaker, and the Principle of Correspondence seeks a similar response to features of the world to that of an interpreter. The speaker has logic and true belief. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.211) | |
| A reaction: Davidson adds a Kantian commitment to pure and universal reason to the very sceptical framework created by Quine. I agree with Davidson, but it seems more like faith than like an argument or an empirical observation. |
| 7602 | In the Bible God changes his mind (repenting of creating humanity, in the Flood) [Armstrong,K] |
| Full Idea: In the Bible God changes his mind, as when he repents of having made man and decides to destroy the human race in the Flood. | |
| From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: It becomes apparent that the most startling feature of Christian fundamentalism is its uncritical reading of the Bible, in which passages are wilfully lifted from context, and inconvenient inconsistencies are ruthlessly ignored. |
| 7605 | Monotheism introduced intolerance into religious thinking [Armstrong,K] |
| Full Idea: We have become so used to the intolerance of monotheism that we may not appreciate that its hostility towards other gods was a new religious attitude; paganism was an essentially tolerant faith. | |
| From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: The comedian Dave Allen always signed off with "may your god go with you". To me the most striking feature of monotheists is frequently their barely controlled aggression, beneath a mask of strained compassion. |
| 7599 | Around 800 BCE teachers superseded gods in India [Armstrong,K] |
| Full Idea: Around the eighth century BCE the gods ceased to be very important in India, and would be superseded by the religious teacher, who would be considered higher than the gods. | |
| From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: At least there has been one culture that gave an appropriate status to teachers. It seems astonishing in that age that human beings could have higher status than gods - way before the European 'humanists'. |
| 7597 | There is virtually no sign of monotheism in the Pentateuch [Armstrong,K] |
| Full Idea: It is very difficult to find a single monotheistic statement in the whole of the Pentateuch, and even the Ten Commandments take the existence of other gods for granted ("There shall be no strange gods for you before my face"). | |
| From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: The transition from polytheism to monotheism is very strange. First God is 'jealous' of other gods, then supremely above them, and eventually totally exclusive. It's like watching the rise of Stalin. |
| 7606 | The idea that Jesus was God was only settled in the fourth century [Armstrong,K] |
| Full Idea: Jesus himself certainly never claimed to be God, and the doctrine that Jesus had been God in human form was not finalised until the fourth century. | |
| From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: It was this final view which seems to have provoked Muhammed into developing a religion with the slogan "there is only one God". In Christianity an initially promising set of teachings grew into a prolonged irrational hysteria. |
| 7596 | Faith is not just belief in propositions, but also putting trust in them [Armstrong,K] |
| Full Idea: There is a distinction between belief in a set of propositions and a faith which enables us to put our trust in them. | |
| From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is interestingly distinct from the usual idea that faith is putting belief in propositions which are not sufficiently rationally justified. How many philosophers actually have faith in the propositions they say they believe? |