7 ideas
| 18702 | Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: The simple thesis that names and descriptions often refer to things, and that predicates often have an extension in the world of things, is obvious, and essential to the most elementary appreciation of both language and the thoughts we express. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Replies to Critics [1998], p.323) | |
| A reaction: In 1983 Davidson had been a rare modern champion of the coherence theory of truth, but this is his clearest later renunciation of that view (and quite right too). |
| 13856 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington] |
| Full Idea: Grice argued that the truth-functional account of conditionals can withstand objections, provided that we are careful to distinguish the false from the misleadingly true. | |
| From: report of H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Dorothy Edgington - Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? 2 |
| 8948 | The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher] |
| Full Idea: According to Grice, it is the rules that govern conversation beyond the merely logical that account for the counter-intuitiveness of the truth table for the material conditional. | |
| From: report of H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Jennifer Fisher - On the Philosophy of Logic 8.I | |
| A reaction: There is a conversational rule which says that replies should normally relevant to context. It would be nice if logical implications were also relevant to context. |
| 13767 | Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice] |
| Full Idea: Grice defended the truth-functional account of conditionals, noting the gap between what we are justified in believing and what is appropriate to say. .But the problem arises at the level of belief, not at the level of inappropriate conversational remarks | |
| From: comment on H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals 17.1.3 |
| 14277 | A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington] |
| Full Idea: Grice drew attention to situations in which a person is justified in believing a proposition, which would nevertheless by an unreasonable thing for the person to say, in normal circumstances. I think he is right about disjunction and negated conjunctions. | |
| From: report of H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 2.4 | |
| A reaction: Edgington considers Grice's ideas of implicature as of permanent value, especially as a clarification of 1950s ordinary language philosophy. |
| 21989 | Man is dominated by money, which is the essence of his alienation [Marx] |
| Full Idea: Money is the alienated essence of man's labour and life, and this alien essence dominates him as he worships it. | |
| From: Karl Marx (On the Jewish Question [1844], p.60), quoted by Peter Singer - Marx 3 | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is inherit in the very nature of money, rather than in the wickedness of capitalists who control it. But money is not inherently alienting for the rich, or for the comfortable bourgeoisie (is it?). |
| 20519 | Marxists say liberal rights are confrontational, and liberal equality is a sham [Marx, by Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: For Marx liberal rights are egoistic rights of separation: they encourage each individual to view others as limitations to his or her freedom. ....Liberals set up a sham community of 'equal' citizens. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (On the Jewish Question [1844]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 4 'Marxist' | |
| A reaction: The point is that equality in law does not ensure equal treatment in daily life. I suppose a liberal right can be seen as an opt-out clause for some aspect of society. |