Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Freedom to Act', 'Letters to Regius' and 'Are Persons Bodies?'

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5 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism

12251	Substantial forms are not understood, and explain nothing [Descartes]
	Full Idea: Clearly no explanation can be given by these substantial forms for any natural action, since their defenders admit that they are occult and that they do not understand them themselves, ...so they explain nothing.
	From: René Descartes (Letters to Regius [1642], 1642.01), quoted by David S. Oderberg - Real Essentialism 267 n5
	A reaction: [Oderberg gives refs for attack by Locke and Hume, p.66] Descartes' target is Aristotle's hylomorphism. The problem seems to be understanding what Aristotle meant, which is much more than mere 'shape'. More like 'controlling principle'.

16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons

3238	'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: If we say (in opposition to a physical view of identity) that when Jones dies 'Jones ceases to exist' but 'Jones' body does not cease to exist', this shouldn't be pressed too hard, because it would make 'dead person' a contradiction.
	From: Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.74)
	A reaction: A good point, which nicely challenges the distinction between a 'human' and a 'person', but the problem case is much more the one where Jones gets advanced Alzheimer's, rather than dies. A dead body ceases as a mechanism, as well as as a personality.

3239	You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: If you love a person as a type instead of as a token (i.e. a "person", instead of a physical body) you might prefer a run-down copy of them to no person at all, but at this point our idea of loving a person begins to crack.
	From: Bernard Williams (Are Persons Bodies? [1970], p.81)
	A reaction: Very persuasive. If you love a person you can cope with them getting old. If you own an original watercolour, you can accept that it fades, but you would replace a reproduction of it if that faded. But what, then, is it that you love?

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes

19698	Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta]
	Full Idea: A 'deviant causal chain' is when an agent has a reason for performing an action, and for the reason to cause the performance, without that being the reason for which the agent performed it.
	From: report of Donald Davidson (Freedom to Act [1973]) by Ram Neta - The Basing Relation II
	A reaction: Davidson's thesis is that 'reasons are causes'. This was a problem he faced. I think this discussion is now obscured by the complex and multi-layered account of action which is emerging from neuroscience.

29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels

16772	An angelic mind would not experience pain, even when connected to a human body [Descartes, by Pasnau]
	Full Idea: Descartes points out that an angelic mind, even if causally connected to a human body, would not experience the same sort of bodily sensations; it would, instead, simply observe flesh being torn, like a piece of paper.
	From: report of René Descartes (Letters to Regius [1642], III:493) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.6
	A reaction: Does that mean that the angel could not have the experience even if it wanted to have it. So they can't pick up a cup either? So they can't make themselves known to us, even if they are desperate to? So the Annunciation never happened?