40 ideas
3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Philosophy studies everything: it tries to provide a theory of the whole of things. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Good, but you can't avoid value-judgements about which things are important; philosophers place more value on moral theories than on theories about glacier movement. There is a tension in philosophy between human and eternal concerns. |
3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
Full Idea: If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 15.7) |
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The source of the concept of objective truth is interpersonal communication. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209) | |
A reaction: This is a distinctively Davidsonian idea, arising out of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument. We could go a step further, and just say that 'objectivity is a social concept'. Davidson more or less pleads guilty to pragmatism in this essay. |
3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The 'open question' argument is clearly invalid. A question remains open just so long as our ignorance permits. …It may be an open question whether promoting happiness is good, even though this is what 'good' means. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 20.1) | |
A reaction: A nice objection. Like small children, we can keep asking questions forever. Whether there is a question to be asked about a thing is not a property of that thing, but of us who ask it. |
3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
Full Idea: A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition: no truth is contradicted by another. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 9.1) | |
A reaction: Interesting. It resembles the rule that if you always tell the truth you don't need to remember what you said. Close to the heart of the concept of truth. Coherence and correspondence. |
3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 9.4) |
3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Could someone have a perfect intellectual acquaintance with numbers, but be incapable of counting a flock of sheep? | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 26.6) |
3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
Full Idea: If there can be unprovable truths of mathematics, then mathematics cannot be reduced to the proofs whereby we construct it. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 26.7) |
3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
Full Idea: If the only way of defining properties involves quantifying over possible worlds, this could be taken as another reason for abandoning properties altogether. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 26.4) |
3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
Full Idea: It was one of the assumptions of Hume's empiricism that all necessities are de dicto: i.e. they are artefacts of language. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 13.5) |
3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
Full Idea: If there are things which are possible but inconceivable, we must abandon the view, which has had a considerable following since Descartes, that the conceivable is a test of the possible. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 25) |
3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
Full Idea: In my view the concept of knowledge is of no very great interest in epistemology, which actually concerns the justification of belief. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 22) | |
A reaction: I think this is an excellent thought. I see knowledge as slippery, and partially contextual, and I don't care whether someone precisely 'knows' something. I just want to know why they believe it. |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Having a belief demands in addition appreciating the contrast between true belief and false, between appearance and reality, mere seeming and being. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209) | |
A reaction: This sets the bar very high for belief (never mind knowledge), and seems to imply that animals don't have beliefs. How should we describe their cognitive states then? I would say these criteria only apply to actual knowledge. |
3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
Full Idea: In the course of the argument the first person has acquired a character; he is not merely conscious, but self-conscious. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 4) |
3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
Full Idea: 'Every event has a cause' and 'truth is correspondence to facts' are candidates for being synthetic a priori knowledge. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 13.2) |
3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Touch seems to deliver a purely primary-quality account of the world. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 24) | |
A reaction: Interesting, though a little over-confident. It seems occasionally possible for touch to be an illusion. |
3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Bradley argued that we cannot conceive of primary qualities except as attached to secondary qualities. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 10.1) |
3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
Full Idea: If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what do secondary qualities inhere in? | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], Ch.10 n) | |
A reaction: What is the problem? A pin causes me pain, but I know the pain isn't in the pin. It is the same with colour. It is a mental property, if you like, triggered by a wavelength of radiation. |
3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The representational theory is the unsurprising view that perceptual states are intentional, like beliefs, emotions and desires. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 23.3) |
3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
Full Idea: It is impossible that my present belief that it will rain tomorrow is caused by its raining tomorrow. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 22.4) | |
A reaction: This doesn't demolish a causal account of belief. It would be very surprising if I were to believe it was going to rain tomorrow for no cause whatsoever. That would be irrational. |
3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
Full Idea: If the evidence for p is q, and that is the only evidence there is or can be, then 'p' means q. Hence there is no gap between evidence and conclusion, and the sceptical problem does not arise. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 3.2) |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
Full Idea: An entity is objective in so far as it is intersubjective. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]), quoted by Martin Kusch - Knowledge by Agreement Ch.10 | |
A reaction: This thought baffled me until I saw it in the context of socialised epistemology. Effectively objectivity is subsumed under justification, which in turn is seen in a social context, not private to individuals. |
3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
Full Idea: A writer who says that there are no truths, or that all truth is 'merely relative', is asking you not to believe him. So don't. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 1.1) |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
Full Idea: If the mental states of others are known only through their behavioral and other outward manifestations, while this is not true of our own mental states, why should we think our own mental states are anything like those of others? | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.207) | |
A reaction: His point is that if you seriously doubt other minds, you should follow through on the implications. But that is to treat it as a theory about other minds, rather an a sceptical worry. Descartes didn't walk into walls while writing Meditation 1. |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Davidson argues that knowledge of other minds presupposes knowledge of one's own mind, and that there is no knowledge of other minds without knowledge of the external world. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]) by Michael Dummett - Common Sense and Physics Ch.10 | |
A reaction: Davidson't argument is actually hard to swallow because it is so long and complex. Compressing the point makes it begin to sound like a variant of the argument from analogy. |
3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
Full Idea: To say that every event has a cause is one thing; to say that every event is determined by its cause is quite another thing. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 17.1) |
3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
Full Idea: It is often held to be a consequence of the rationalist conception of substance, that separate substances cannot interact (since causal interaction is a form of mutual dependence). | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], Ch.16 n) | |
A reaction: Yes, substances seem incapable of interaction, just as Leibniz argues that perfections could never interact. They are too pure. |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Until a baseline has been established by communication with someone else, there is no point is saying one's own thoughts have a propositional content. Hence knowledge of another mind is essential all thought and all knowledge. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.213) | |
A reaction: This really is building a skyscraper on the slightly shaky claims of the Private Language Argument (e.g. Idea 4158). Animals are so important in discussions of this kind. Is an albatross more or less devoid of thought and belief? |
3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Wittgenstein's point is that if I search for foundations in what can only be known to me, then the belief that I have discovered those foundations will also fall victim to Descartes' demon. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Why should foundations based in wider society or a language community fare any better? Getting a lot of people to agree won't trouble the demon too much. Flat earthers. |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Concerning charity, the Principle of Coherence seeks logical consistency in the thought of the speaker, and the Principle of Correspondence seeks a similar response to features of the world to that of an interpreter. The speaker has logic and true belief. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.211) | |
A reaction: Davidson adds a Kantian commitment to pure and universal reason to the very sceptical framework created by Quine. I agree with Davidson, but it seems more like faith than like an argument or an empirical observation. |
3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Any attempt to provide a social justification of morality runs the risk of the 'free rider' - one who pretends to play the game in order to enjoy the fruits of it. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 20.6) |
3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Membership is the greatest source of obligation. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 11.2) | |
A reaction: An interesting and rather Aristotelian idea. The alternative is individual debt or obligation. |
3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The categorical imperative is also an instrument of negotiation and compromise between strangers, through which they can rise out of enmity and confront each other as equals. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 20.6) |
20582 | World government needs a shared global identity [Oksala] |
Full Idea: Critics have argued that a global 'demos' would require a shared global identity. | |
From: Johanna Oksala (Political Philosophy: all that matters [2013], Ch.9 'Epi') | |
A reaction: The great divisions are religion and language. The great unifiers are sport, arts and entertainment, plus basic human needs like food, health and housing. The reply is that there cannot be identity without differences, so global democracy is out. |
20568 | The principles Rawls arrives at do not just conform to benevolence, but also result from choices [Oksala] |
Full Idea: The advantage of Rawls's method is that the principles the individual chooses are not only fair according to some abstract principle of benevolence, but also the result of rational choice. | |
From: Johanna Oksala (Political Philosophy: all that matters [2013], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: That is a very nice way of putting the beauty of Rawls's idea. In modern political philosophy you hear far more criticisms of Rawls than praise. If a philosopher is criticised a lot, it is probably because they have stated their views clearly. |
20578 | Anarchists prefer local and communal government [Oksala] |
Full Idea: Anarchists advocate forms of governance such as communes and associations that are as local and close to the direct control of the people as possible. | |
From: Johanna Oksala (Political Philosophy: all that matters [2013], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: Which might explain why recent conservative governments have steadily eliminated local government in Britain. |
20574 | Utilitarianism neglects responsibility, duties and rights [Oksala] |
Full Idea: A focus solely on utility excludes considerations of personal responsibility and duty, as well as considerations of the basic rights of individuals. | |
From: Johanna Oksala (Political Philosophy: all that matters [2013], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: [He cites these as the common modern criticisms] The defence is to explain the value of each of these in utilitarian terms. There is a general problem (conceded by Mill) of motivation in utilitarianism. There's not much in it for me! |
3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Traditionally (before Leibniz and Spinoza) the world 'cause' signified any valid explanation. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 14) |
3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
Full Idea: I can measure the length of something only if I know that it has not moved between the moment when I locate one end of it and the moment when I locate the other. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 25.3) | |
A reaction: A nice example of how even simple propositions have many presuppositions. |
3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |
Full Idea: When I say that a man exists, Frege argues, I do not predicate existence of a man, but rather of the concept man: I say the concept has at least one instance (and existence is a predicate of predicates). | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 26.2) |