Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Freedom to Act', 'Elimination of Metaphysics by Analysis of Language' and 'Semantics for Propositional Attitudes'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

4 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics

16252	Metaphysics uses empty words, or just produces pseudo-statements [Carnap]
	Full Idea: Since metaphysics doesn't want to assert analytic propositions, nor fall within the domain of physical science, it is compelled to employ words for which no criteria of application are specified, ..or else combine meaningful words..into pseudo-statements.
	From: Rudolph Carnap (Elimination of Metaphysics by Analysis of Language [1959]), quoted by Tim Maudlin - The Metaphysics within Physics 2.4
	A reaction: A classic summary of the logical positivist rejection of metaphysics. I incline to treat metaphysics as within the domain of science, but at a level of generality so high that practising scientists become bewildered and give up.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment

15785	Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system [Hintikka]
	Full Idea: We must distinguish between what we are committed to existing in the actual world or a possible world ('ontology'), and what we are committed to as a part of our ways of dealing with the world conceptually, as a part of our conceptual system ('ideology').
	From: Jaakko Hintikka (Semantics for Propositional Attitudes [1969], p.95), quoted by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 02
	A reaction: I think this is the most illuminating idea I have read on the subject of ontological commitment. I'm fighting for the idea that what we think is true should be kept separate from what we think exists. Ideology is a nice addition to the mix.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

15786	Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka]
	Full Idea: Quantification over members of one particular world is a measure of ideology, quantification that crosses possible worlds is often a measure of ideology.
	From: Jaakko Hintikka (Semantics for Propositional Attitudes [1969], p.95), quoted by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 02
	A reaction: I like this. See Idea 15785 for the underlying distinction. It leaves the question open of what we might mean by 'ideological commitment'.

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes

19698	Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta]
	Full Idea: A 'deviant causal chain' is when an agent has a reason for performing an action, and for the reason to cause the performance, without that being the reason for which the agent performed it.
	From: report of Donald Davidson (Freedom to Act [1973]) by Ram Neta - The Basing Relation II
	A reaction: Davidson's thesis is that 'reasons are causes'. This was a problem he faced. I think this discussion is now obscured by the complex and multi-layered account of action which is emerging from neuroscience.