13 ideas
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The source of the concept of objective truth is interpersonal communication. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209) | |
A reaction: This is a distinctively Davidsonian idea, arising out of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument. We could go a step further, and just say that 'objectivity is a social concept'. Davidson more or less pleads guilty to pragmatism in this essay. |
20660 | At one level maths and nature are very similar, suggesting some deeper origin [Wolfram] |
Full Idea: At some rather abstract level one can immediately recognise one basic similarity between nature and mathematics ...this suggests that the overall similarity between mathematics and nature must have a deeper origin. | |
From: Stephen Wolfram (A New Kind of Science [2002], p.772), quoted by Peter Watson - Convergence 17 'Philosophy' | |
A reaction: Personally I think mathematics has been derived by abstracting from the patterns in nature, and then further extrapolating from those abstractions. So the puzzle in nature is not the correspondence with mathematics, but the patterns. |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Having a belief demands in addition appreciating the contrast between true belief and false, between appearance and reality, mere seeming and being. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209) | |
A reaction: This sets the bar very high for belief (never mind knowledge), and seems to imply that animals don't have beliefs. How should we describe their cognitive states then? I would say these criteria only apply to actual knowledge. |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
Full Idea: An entity is objective in so far as it is intersubjective. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]), quoted by Martin Kusch - Knowledge by Agreement Ch.10 | |
A reaction: This thought baffled me until I saw it in the context of socialised epistemology. Effectively objectivity is subsumed under justification, which in turn is seen in a social context, not private to individuals. |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
Full Idea: If the mental states of others are known only through their behavioral and other outward manifestations, while this is not true of our own mental states, why should we think our own mental states are anything like those of others? | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.207) | |
A reaction: His point is that if you seriously doubt other minds, you should follow through on the implications. But that is to treat it as a theory about other minds, rather an a sceptical worry. Descartes didn't walk into walls while writing Meditation 1. |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Davidson argues that knowledge of other minds presupposes knowledge of one's own mind, and that there is no knowledge of other minds without knowledge of the external world. | |
From: report of Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]) by Michael Dummett - Common Sense and Physics Ch.10 | |
A reaction: Davidson't argument is actually hard to swallow because it is so long and complex. Compressing the point makes it begin to sound like a variant of the argument from analogy. |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Until a baseline has been established by communication with someone else, there is no point is saying one's own thoughts have a propositional content. Hence knowledge of another mind is essential all thought and all knowledge. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.213) | |
A reaction: This really is building a skyscraper on the slightly shaky claims of the Private Language Argument (e.g. Idea 4158). Animals are so important in discussions of this kind. Is an albatross more or less devoid of thought and belief? |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Concerning charity, the Principle of Coherence seeks logical consistency in the thought of the speaker, and the Principle of Correspondence seeks a similar response to features of the world to that of an interpreter. The speaker has logic and true belief. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.211) | |
A reaction: Davidson adds a Kantian commitment to pure and universal reason to the very sceptical framework created by Quine. I agree with Davidson, but it seems more like faith than like an argument or an empirical observation. |
23395 | Mohists desire wealth, population and social order as the best consequences [Mozi, by Norden] |
Full Idea: The consequentialist Mohists give a fairly objective characterisation of benefits as wealth, populousness, and social order, and harm as poverty, depopulation, and social chaos. | |
From: report of Mozi (The Mozi [c.440 BCE]) by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 4.I | |
A reaction: That is a formula favoured by many authoritarian leaders in modern times. |
23394 | If people regarded other states as they did their own, they would never attack them [Mozi] |
Full Idea: If people regarded other people's states in the same way that they regard their own, who then would incite their own state to attack that of another? | |
From: Mozi (The Mozi [c.440 BCE], 16), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 4.I | |
A reaction: A nice case of the application of golden rule thinking to states, instead of to individuals. I can't see Putin (in 2022) being impressed by 'how would you like it if another country invaded Russia?'. The Golden Rule is an analogy argument. |
23396 | Mozi condemns partiality, which is the cause of all the great harms in the world [Mozi] |
Full Idea: It is those who are partial in their dealings with others who are the real cause of all the great harms in the world. That is why our teacher Mozi says 'I condemn partiality'. | |
From: Mozi (The Mozi [c.440 BCE], 16), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 4.II | |
A reaction: This is morality as the rule of law, rather than as the result of human affections. He is on the same wavelength as Kant. Mozi was criticising Confucius, who favoured family over strangers. |
23397 | Those who are against impartiality still prefer impartial protectors [Mozi] |
Full Idea: Even though one may not advocate impartiality, one would certainly want to entrust one's family to the person who is impartial. | |
From: Mozi (The Mozi [c.440 BCE], 16), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 4.II | |
A reaction: In the modern world his example would be the police, so he effectively he wants the impartiality of the law. But who wants legal impartiality within the affairs of a family? |
20659 | Space and its contents seem to be one stuff - so space is the only existing thing [Wolfram] |
Full Idea: It seems plausible that both space and its contents should somehow be made of the same stuff - so that in a sense space becomes the only thing in the universe. | |
From: Stephen Wolfram (A New Kind of Science [2002], p.474), quoted by Peter Watson - Convergence 17 'Philosophy' | |
A reaction: I presume the concept of a 'field' is what makes this idea possible. |