Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Three Varieties of Knowledge', 'Fallibilism' and 'The Second Coming'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophers should interpret the world, by expressing its possibilities [Berardi]
     Full Idea: The philosopher's task is to interpret the world, that is, to capture its tendency and above all to enunciate the possibilities inscribed therein. …The politician's eye does not see the possible, being attracted instead by the probable.
     From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], How to)
     A reaction: An inspiring idea! He is rejecting Marx's aim of changing the world, which had 'catastrophic' results. But I love his view of interpretation as spotting tendencies and possibilities. This fits my preferred ontology of dispositions and powers.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The source of the concept of objective truth is interpersonal communication.
     From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209)
     A reaction: This is a distinctively Davidsonian idea, arising out of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument. We could go a step further, and just say that 'objectivity is a social concept'. Davidson more or less pleads guilty to pragmatism in this essay.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Nothingness only exists in consciousness [Berardi]
     Full Idea: Consciousness is the only place where nothingness exists.
     From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], II 'Expanding')
     A reaction: Not sure about this, but an interesting remark from someone with a Hegelian background. We certainly have a concept of nothingness (a mental file of it, even).
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Having a belief demands in addition appreciating the contrast between true belief and false, between appearance and reality, mere seeming and being.
     From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209)
     A reaction: This sets the bar very high for belief (never mind knowledge), and seems to imply that animals don't have beliefs. How should we describe their cognitive states then? I would say these criteria only apply to actual knowledge.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Fallibilism is consistent with dogmatism or scepticism, and is not alternative to them [Dougherty]
     Full Idea: There has been a tendency to treat fallibilism as an alternative to either dogmatism or scepticism. ...But it is much better to think of fallibilism as consistent with either dogmatism or skepticism.
     From: Trent Dougherty (Fallibilism [2011], 'Closure')
     A reaction: It seems perfectly reasonably to describe oneself as a 'fallibilist dogmatist' (perhaps from the Pope?), or a 'fallibilist sceptic' (perhaps from Peter Unger?), so this idea sounds correct.
It is best to see the fallibility in the reasons, rather than in the agents or the knowledge [Dougherty]
     Full Idea: It seems best to take fallible reasons as the basic notion of fallibilism. So fallible knowers are agents who know what they know on the basis of fallible reasons. Fallible knowledge will be knowledge on basis of fallible reasons.
     From: Trent Dougherty (Fallibilism [2011], 'Cognates')
     A reaction: This is because an ideal knower would be compelled by the evidence, so if fallibilism is universal it must reside in the evidence and not in the knower (bottom p.131).
We can't normally say that we know something 'but it might be false' [Dougherty]
     Full Idea: It will ordinarily be conversationally inappropriate to say 'I know that p, but p might be false' even if it is true, since this would mislead an interlocutor to infer that that possibility was an epistemically significant one.
     From: Trent Dougherty (Fallibilism [2011], 'Epistemic')
     A reaction: This seems to imply hypocrisy when a fallibilist philosopher claims (in non-philosophical company) to know something. Fair enough. Philosophers are in a permanent state of hypocrisy about what they are really thinking. That's the fun of it.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson]
     Full Idea: An entity is objective in so far as it is intersubjective.
     From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]), quoted by Martin Kusch - Knowledge by Agreement Ch.10
     A reaction: This thought baffled me until I saw it in the context of socialised epistemology. Effectively objectivity is subsumed under justification, which in turn is seen in a social context, not private to individuals.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson]
     Full Idea: If the mental states of others are known only through their behavioral and other outward manifestations, while this is not true of our own mental states, why should we think our own mental states are anything like those of others?
     From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.207)
     A reaction: His point is that if you seriously doubt other minds, you should follow through on the implications. But that is to treat it as a theory about other minds, rather an a sceptical worry. Descartes didn't walk into walls while writing Meditation 1.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett]
     Full Idea: Davidson argues that knowledge of other minds presupposes knowledge of one's own mind, and that there is no knowledge of other minds without knowledge of the external world.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]) by Michael Dummett - Common Sense and Physics Ch.10
     A reaction: Davidson't argument is actually hard to swallow because it is so long and complex. Compressing the point makes it begin to sound like a variant of the argument from analogy.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
The delusion of free will brings a sense of guilt [Berardi]
     Full Idea: A sense of guilt is linked to the delusion of free will.
     From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], How to)
     A reaction: I agree that free will is a delusion, but I'm not sure about this. Clearly if you think you are 'ultimately' responsible for all of your actions this will increase guilt, but belief in free will is compatible with various excuses for actions.
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Until a baseline has been established by communication with someone else, there is no point is saying one's own thoughts have a propositional content. Hence knowledge of another mind is essential all thought and all knowledge.
     From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.213)
     A reaction: This really is building a skyscraper on the slightly shaky claims of the Private Language Argument (e.g. Idea 4158). Animals are so important in discussions of this kind. Is an albatross more or less devoid of thought and belief?
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Concerning charity, the Principle of Coherence seeks logical consistency in the thought of the speaker, and the Principle of Correspondence seeks a similar response to features of the world to that of an interpreter. The speaker has logic and true belief.
     From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.211)
     A reaction: Davidson adds a Kantian commitment to pure and universal reason to the very sceptical framework created by Quine. I agree with Davidson, but it seems more like faith than like an argument or an empirical observation.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
American white men trusted the philosophy of winning, and then discovered losing [Berardi]
     Full Idea: American white men trusted the promises of neoliberal selfishness, they trusted the philosophy of winning, then discovered losing.
     From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Fascism')
     A reaction: The most pernicious terminology in the English-speaking world is the labelling of people as 'winners' and 'losers'. We celebrate the one winner, and ignore everyone else. Celebrity, excessive wealth, honourable titles.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
Community is now a nostalgic memory, which no longer exists [Berardi]
     Full Idea: Community is only a nostalgic memory of a past condition of belonging that exists no longer. Regret, not a living experience.
     From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Fascism')
     A reaction: It is hard to disagree with this. Local heroes in my town make lovely efforts to improve the place (with flowers, sculptures) but most of us don't know who they are. Capitalist competition erodes community.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Communism failed to unite western workers with the oppressed of the south [Berardi]
     Full Idea: Communist internationalism was the only attempt to reconcile the workers of the West and the oppressed population of the Global South, and this attempt failed.
     From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Hundred')
     A reaction: It was unfortunate that communism was launched in Russia, which we now see (in 2023) as poisoned by imperialist ambitions, and quite unsuited to international idealism. The Chinese are notably active in Africa.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
The economy has replaced medieval theocracy at the centre of our society [Berardi]
     Full Idea: The economy has progressively acquired the central place in the system of knowledge and research. Re-enacting the privilege of theocracy in the Middle Ages.
     From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Knowledge')
     A reaction: Illuminating. This is indeed how the economy is treated, centring on Gross National Product (no matter how distributed), and economic league tables. Is it even a quasi-religion?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
Western workers turn to nationalism, to avert the effects of globalisation [Berardi]
     Full Idea: Western workers are following nationalist agendas in order to avert the effects of globalization, and resorting to nationalist and racist forms of identification.
     From: Franco 'Bifo' Berardi (The Second Coming [2019], I 'Hundred')
     A reaction: By 'globalisation' must be meant the impersonal work and exploitation that results from huge ruthless anonymous companies. People barely know who they are working for, so it can't give them an identity.