Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Freedom to Act', 'On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma' and 'talk'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
10152 Set theory and logic are fairy tales, but still worth studying [Tarski]
     Full Idea: People have asked me, 'How can you, a nominalist, do work in set theory and in logic, which are theories about things you do not believe in?' ...I believe that there is a value even in fairy tales and the study of fairy tales.
     From: Alfred Tarski (talk [1965]), quoted by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic
     A reaction: This is obviously an oversimplification. I don't think for a moment that Tarski literally believed that the study of fairy tales had as much value as the study of logic. Why do we have this particular logic, and not some other?
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
10151 I am a deeply convinced nominalist [Tarski]
     Full Idea: I am a nominalist. This is a very deep conviction of mine. ...I am a tortured nominalist.
     From: Alfred Tarski (talk [1965]), quoted by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Int I
     A reaction: I too am of the nominalist persuasion, but I don't feel justified in such a strong commitment.
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
19045 Translation is too flimsy a notion to support theories of cultural incommensurability [Quine]
     Full Idea: Translation is a flimsy notion, unfit to bear the weight of the theories of cultural incommensurability that Davidson effectively and justly criticises.
     From: Willard Quine (On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma [1981], p.42)
     A reaction: I presume he means that a claim to accurately translate something is false, because there is no clear idea of what a good translation looks like it. I just don't believe him. The practice of daily life belies Quine's theories on this.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
19698 Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta]
     Full Idea: A 'deviant causal chain' is when an agent has a reason for performing an action, and for the reason to cause the performance, without that being the reason for which the agent performed it.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Freedom to Act [1973]) by Ram Neta - The Basing Relation II
     A reaction: Davidson's thesis is that 'reasons are causes'. This was a problem he faced. I think this discussion is now obscured by the complex and multi-layered account of action which is emerging from neuroscience.