Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to 'Essays on Actions and Events'', 'Structure and Nature' and 'Action, Intention and Reason'

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6 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
10242 I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately [Quine]
     Full Idea: My own line is a yet more sweeping structuralism (than David Lewis's account of classes), applying to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately.
     From: Willard Quine (Structure and Nature [1992], p.6), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 4.9
     A reaction: Shapiro calls this 'breathtaking', and retreats from it, but it is something like my own view, starting from Mill's pebbles and working up.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
10243 My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine]
     Full Idea: My tentative ontology continues to consist of quarks and their compounds, also classes of such things, classes of such classes, and so on.
     From: Willard Quine (Structure and Nature [1992], p.9), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 4.9
     A reaction: I would call this the Hierarchy of Abstraction (just coined it - what do you think?). Unlike Quine, I don't see why its ontology should include things called 'sets' in addition to the things that make them up.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
6383 Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The concept of cause is what holds together our picture of the universe, a picture that would otherwise disintegrate into a diptych of the mental and the physical.
     From: Donald Davidson (Intro to 'Essays on Actions and Events' [1980], p.xi)
     A reaction: Davidson seems to be the one who put mental causation at the centre of philosophy. By then denying that there are any 'psycho-physical' laws, he seems to me to have re-opened the metaphysical gap he says he was trying to close.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
6385 The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson]
     Full Idea: I defend my causal view of action by arguing that a reason that is causally strongest need not be a reason deemed by the actor to provide the strongest (best) grounds for acting.
     From: Donald Davidson (Intro to 'Essays on Actions and Events' [1980], p.xii)
     A reaction: If I smoke a cigarette against my better judgement, it is not clear to me how the desire to smoke it, which overcomes my judgement not to smoke it, counts as the causally strongest 'reason'. We seem to have two different senses of 'reason' here.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
6384 The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson]
     Full Idea: My thesis is that the ordinary notion of cause is essential to understanding what it is to act with a reason, to have an intention to act, to be an agent, to act counter to one's own best judgement, or to act freely.
     From: Donald Davidson (Intro to 'Essays on Actions and Events' [1980], p.xi)
     A reaction: I cautiously agree, particularly with idea that causation is essential to acting as an agent. Since I believe 'free will' to be a complete delusion, that part of his thesis doesn't interest me. The hard part is understanding acting for a reason.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20064 Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: An action for a reason is one that is, in a special way, under the control of reason. It is a response to, not a mere effect of, a reason.
     From: Robert Audi (Action, Intention and Reason [1992], p.177), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 6 'Alien'
     A reaction: This modifies Davidson's 'reasons are causes'. Audi has a deviant causal chain which causes trouble for his idea, but Stout says he is right to focus on causal 'processes' (an Aristotelian idea) rather than causal 'chains'.