8 ideas
| 16567 | Scientists know everything about nothing, philosophers nothing about everything [Sagan,D] |
| Full Idea: The scientist learns more and more about less and less, until she knows everything about nothing, whereas a philosopher learns less and less about more and more until he knows nothing about everything. | |
| From: Dorion Sagan (Cosmic Apprentice [2013]) | |
| A reaction: [Came via Twitter] Not sure if this is true, but it is too nice to miss. |
| 15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: To define theoretical terms might be to show how to do without them, but it is better to say that it shows there is no good reason to want to do without them. | |
| From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], Intro) |
| 15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: A logically determinate name is one which names the same thing in every possible world. | |
| From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], III) | |
| A reaction: This appears to be rigid designation, before Kripke introduced the new word. |
| 15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation. | |
| From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], V) |
| 15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: If we specify a theory with all of its terms, and then replace all of those terms with variables, we can then say that some n-tuples of entities can satisfy this formula. This Ramsey sentence then says the theory is realised, without specifying by what. | |
| From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], II) | |
| A reaction: [I have compressed Lewis, and cut out the symbolism] |
| 15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: I contend that there is a general method for defining newly introduced terms in a scientific theory, one which uses only the old terms we understood beforehand. | |
| From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Lewis is game is to provide bridge laws for a reductive account of nature, without having to introduce something entirely new to achieve it. The idea of bridge laws in scientific theory is less in favour these days. |
| 15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: A uniquely realised theory is, other things being equal, certainly more satisfactory than a multiply realised theory. We should insist on unique realisation as a standard of correctness unless it is a standard too high to be met. | |
| From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], III) | |
| A reaction: The point is that rewriting a theory as Ramsey sentences just says there is at least one realisation, and so it doesn't meet the highest standards for scientific theories. The influence of set-theoretic model theory is obvious in this approach. |
| 7006 | Observing irrelevant items supports both 'all x are y' and 'all x are non-y', revealing its absurdity [Schofield,J] |
| Full Idea: Although Hempel's raven paradox produces an absurdity of irrelevant observations, we can ignore it because (unlike good observations) observing a white handbag supports the contradictions of 'ravens are black' and 'ravens are non-black'. | |
| From: Jonathan Schofield (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: The idea of 'eliminating it from our enquiries' cannot be totally irrational (e.g. in detective work), but it is only seriously sensible in a restricted domain (such as a country house) |