17 ideas
7893 | Our life is the creation of our mind [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: What we are today comes from our thoughts of yesterday, and our present thoughts build our life of tomorrow: our life is the creation of our mind. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §1.1) | |
A reaction: I may adopt this as a second epigraph for the database. This idea records the subjective view, which now comes up against evolutionary psychology. Maybe philosophy is opposed to science, because it is committed to exploring the subjective view? |
13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington] |
Full Idea: If your interest in logic is confined to applications to mathematics or other a priori matters, it is fine for validity to preserve certainty, ..but if you use conditionals when arguing about contingent matters, then great caution will be required. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.2.1) |
13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington] |
Full Idea: As well as conditional beliefs, there are conditional desires, hopes, fears etc. As well as conditional statements, there are conditional commands, questions, offers, promises, bets etc. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.3.4) |
13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington] |
Full Idea: Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? Are they non-truth-functional, like 'because' or 'before'? Do the values of A and B, in some cases, leave open the value of 'If A,B'? | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1) | |
A reaction: I would say they are not truth-functional, because the 'if' asserts some further dependency relation that goes beyond the truth or falsity of A and B. Logical ifs, causal ifs, psychological ifs... The material conditional ⊃ is truth-functional. |
13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington] |
Full Idea: If it were possible to have A true, B false, and If A,B true, it would be unsafe to infer B from A and If A,B: modus ponens would thus be invalid. Hence 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B). | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1) | |
A reaction: This is a firm defence of part of the truth-functional view of conditionals, and seems unassailable. The other parts of the truth table are open to question, though, if A is false, or they are both true. |
12899 | The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I allow knowledge without belief, as in the case of the timid student who knows the answer but has no confidence that he has it right, and so does not believe what he knows. | |
From: David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996], p.429) | |
A reaction: [He cites Woozley 1953 for the timid student] I don't accept this example (since my views on knowledge are rather traditional, I find). Why would the student give that answer if they didn't believe it? Sustained timid correctness never happens. |
12897 | To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis] |
Full Idea: If you claim that S knows that P, and yet grant that S cannot eliminate a certain possibility of not-P, it certainly seems as if you have granted that S does not after all know that P. To speak of fallible knowledge just sounds contradictory. | |
From: David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996], p.419) | |
A reaction: Starting from this point, fallibilism seems to be a rather bold move. The only sensible response seems to be to relax the requirement that not-P must be eliminable. Best: in one epistemic context P, in another not-P. |
7898 | The world is just the illusion of an appearance [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: When a man considers this world as a bubble of froth, and as the illusion of an appearance, then the king of death has no power over him. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §13.170) | |
A reaction: Strictly, of course, this says you can 'consider' things this way. Perhaps we could substitute 'pretends', but the world's great religions don't go in for that sort of thing. Berkeley would be shocked to learn he was approaching Buddhism. |
12898 | Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I don't agree that the mark of knowledge is justification, first because justification isn't sufficient - your true opinion that you will lose the lottery isn't knowledge, whatever the odds; and also not necessary - for what supports perception or memory? | |
From: David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996]) | |
A reaction: I don't think I agree. The point about the lottery is that an overwhelming reason will never get you to knowing that you won't win. But good reasons are coherent, not statistical. If perceptions are dubious, justification must be available. |
12895 | Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: The context-sensitivity of 'knows' is a function of contextual restrictions on the domain of quantification. | |
From: report of David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996]) by Stewart Cohen - Contextualism Defended p.68 | |
A reaction: I think the shifting 'domain of quantification' is one of the most interesting features of ordinary talk. Or, more plainly. 'what are you actually talking about?' is the key question in any fruitful dialogue. Sophisticated speakers tacitly shift domain. |
19562 | We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: S knows P if S's evidence eliminates every alternative. But the nature of the alternatives depends on context. So for Lewis, the context sensitivity of 'knows' is a function of contextual restrictions ln the domain of quantification. | |
From: report of David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996]) by Stewart Cohen - Contextualism Defended (and reply) 1 | |
A reaction: A typical modern attempt to 'regiment' a loose term like 'context'. That said, I like the idea. I'm struck by how the domain varies during a conversation (as in 'what we are talking about'). Domains standardly contain 'objects', though. |
7894 | Hate is conquered by love [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: Hate is not conquered by hate: hate is conquered by love. This is the law eternal. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §1.5) | |
A reaction: [N.B. This thought was not invented by Jesus] The challenge to this view might be the tit-for-tat strategy of game theory, which says that hate is actually conquered by a combination of hate and love, judiciously applied. |
7899 | Even divine pleasure will not satisfy the wise, as it is insatiable, and leads to pain [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: Since a shower of gold coins could not satisfy craving desires and the end of all pleasure is pain, how could a wise man find satisfaction even in the pleasures of the gods? | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §14.186) | |
A reaction: I'm never sure how so many ancient thinkers arrived at this implausible view. They seem to think that no one knows when to stop, and that every drink leads to hangover. What is actually wrong with moderate sensible pleasure? |
7897 | The wise gradually fill with good, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: The falling of drops of water will in time fill a water-jar. Even so the wise man becomes full of good, although he gather it little by little. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §9.122) | |
A reaction: Again, this is like Aristotle's proposal of how to educate people in virtue. In my experience, there is no guarantee that small acts of politeness and charity will eventually guarantee goodness of character. Thought is also needed. |
7896 | The foolish gradually fill with evil, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: The falling of drops of water will in time fill a water-jar. Even so the foolish man becomes full of evil, although he gather it little by little. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §9.121) | |
A reaction: This coincides closely with Aristotle's view of moral education. Maybe a wise man can maintain one small vice. Not all slopes are slippery. |
7895 | Don't befriend fools; either find superior friends, or travel alone [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: If on the great journey of life a man cannot find one who is better or at least as good as himself, let him joyfully travel alone: a fool cannot help him on his journey. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §5.61) | |
A reaction: This is a slightly disturbing aspect of Buddhism, possibly leading to contradiction. It urges friendship and love, but the finest people will have virtually no friends, and solitude is presented as a finer state than friendship. |
7900 | Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks: these three steps lead you to the gods | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §17.224) | |
A reaction: I don't recall either the Old or New Testament, or the Koran, placing great emphasis on speaking the truth. The injunction to give is not so simple. Give to greedy children, to alcoholics, to criminals, to the rich, to fools, to yourself? |