13764
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Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
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Full Idea:
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? Are they non-truth-functional, like 'because' or 'before'? Do the values of A and B, in some cases, leave open the value of 'If A,B'?
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From:
Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
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A reaction:
I would say they are not truth-functional, because the 'if' asserts some further dependency relation that goes beyond the truth or falsity of A and B. Logical ifs, causal ifs, psychological ifs... The material conditional ⊃ is truth-functional.
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13765
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'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
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Full Idea:
If it were possible to have A true, B false, and If A,B true, it would be unsafe to infer B from A and If A,B: modus ponens would thus be invalid. Hence 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B).
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From:
Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
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A reaction:
This is a firm defence of part of the truth-functional view of conditionals, and seems unassailable. The other parts of the truth table are open to question, though, if A is false, or they are both true.
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8044
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Goffman sees the self as no more than a peg on which to hang roles we play [Goffman, by MacIntyre]
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Full Idea:
Erving Goffman has liquidated the self into its role-playing, arguing that the self is no more than 'a peg' on which the clothes of the role are hung.
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From:
report of Erving Goffman (Presentation of Self in Everyday Life [1959]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory Ch.3
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A reaction:
A rather unsympathetic expression of his view, but it seems to be a widely held view among students of sociology. But then sociologists are almost committed a priori to a social and relativist view of truth, persons, knowledge, religion etc.
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22808
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Liberalism is minimal government, or individual rights, or equality [Avineri/De-Shalit]
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Full Idea:
Liberalism has been defended as a theory of minimal government, or as a theory of basic individual rights, or as an egalitarian philosophy.
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From:
Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
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A reaction:
Minimal government tends towards anarchist liberalism, but then what grounds the right to be free of government? Presumably any sensible theory of rights has to be egalitarian. What could ground unequal rights?
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22806
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Communitarians avoid oppression for the common good, by means of small mediating communities [Avineri/De-Shalit]
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Full Idea:
Because of the mediating structures of small communities, communitarians are less fearful [than liberals] of the emergence of an oppressive government as a result of the politics of the common good.
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From:
Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
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A reaction:
A politics of the common good has an obvious implicit conservatism because the central consensus is always likely to disapprove of errant individuals, of all sorts. Only individual rights can block an oppressive government.
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22807
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If our values are given to us by society then we have no grounds to criticise them [Avineri/De-Shalit]
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Full Idea:
If communitarians are right that we are not free to choose, but rather that our values are determined by our community, the individualists say, then there is no reason to criticise the values of one's society.
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From:
Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
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A reaction:
This is an obvious challenge, but if one's concept of community is a forum for free debate then it can be overcome. There is no avoiding the fact, though, that a good community always needs a high degree of consensus.
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