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All the ideas for 'Conditionals', 'works' and 'Sources of Knowledge of Mathematics'

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7 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
7791 The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle]
     Full Idea: C.I.Lewis constructed five axiomatic systems of modal logic, and named them S1 to S5. It turns out that the simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is the same as Lewis's S5.
     From: report of C.I. Lewis (works [1935]) by Rod Girle - Modal Logics and Philosophy 2.1
     A reaction: Nathan Salmon ('Reference and Essence' 2nd ed) claims (on p.xvii) that "the correct modal logic is weaker than S5 and weaker even than S4". Which is the greater virtue, simplicity or weakness?
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
9545 Late in life Frege abandoned logicism, and saw the source of arithmetic as geometrical [Frege, by Chihara]
     Full Idea: Near the end of his life, Frege completely abandoned his logicism, and came to the conclusion that the source of our arithmetical knowledge is what he called 'the Geometrical Source of Knowledge'.
     From: report of Gottlob Frege (Sources of Knowledge of Mathematics [1922]) by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics Intro n3
     A reaction: We have, rather crucially, lost touch with the geometrical origins of arithmetic (such as 'square' numbers), which is good news for the practice of mathematics, but probably a disaster for the philosophy of the subject.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
11002 Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read]
     Full Idea: C.I.Lewis's S4 system develops a sense of necessity as 'provability' in some fairly informal sense.
     From: report of C.I. Lewis (works [1935]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch. 4
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
13768 Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
     Full Idea: If your interest in logic is confined to applications to mathematics or other a priori matters, it is fine for validity to preserve certainty, ..but if you use conditionals when arguing about contingent matters, then great caution will be required.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.2.1)
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
13770 There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
     Full Idea: As well as conditional beliefs, there are conditional desires, hopes, fears etc. As well as conditional statements, there are conditional commands, questions, offers, promises, bets etc.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.3.4)
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
13764 Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
     Full Idea: Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? Are they non-truth-functional, like 'because' or 'before'? Do the values of A and B, in some cases, leave open the value of 'If A,B'?
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
     A reaction: I would say they are not truth-functional, because the 'if' asserts some further dependency relation that goes beyond the truth or falsity of A and B. Logical ifs, causal ifs, psychological ifs... The material conditional ⊃ is truth-functional.
13765 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
     Full Idea: If it were possible to have A true, B false, and If A,B true, it would be unsafe to infer B from A and If A,B: modus ponens would thus be invalid. Hence 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B).
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
     A reaction: This is a firm defence of part of the truth-functional view of conditionals, and seems unassailable. The other parts of the truth table are open to question, though, if A is false, or they are both true.