12 ideas
| 4045 | Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman] |
| Full Idea: It has been proposed (on the basis of observations) that young children have three innate principles of counting - one-to-one correspondence of number to item, stable order for numbers, and cardinality (which labels the nth item counted). | |
| From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.60) | |
| A reaction: I like the idea of observed patterns as central (which is the one-to-one principle). But the other two principles are plausible, and show why pure empiricism won't work. |
| 4044 | Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman] |
| Full Idea: Rats can determine the number of times they have pressed a lever up to at least twenty-four presses,…and can consistently turn down the fifth tunnel on the left in a maze. | |
| From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.58) | |
| A reaction: This seems to encourage an empirical view of maths (pattern recognition?) rather than a Platonic one. Or numbers are innate in rat brains? |
| 4048 | Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman] |
| Full Idea: Infant behaviour implies inbuilt ontological categories of thing, place, event, path, action, sound, manner, amount and number. ...There is an algebra of relationships between them. | |
| From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.109) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. We would expect the categories in infant brains to have instrumental value, but we don't have to accept them as true. Adults (even Aristotle) are big infants. |
| 13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington] |
| Full Idea: If your interest in logic is confined to applications to mathematics or other a priori matters, it is fine for validity to preserve certainty, ..but if you use conditionals when arguing about contingent matters, then great caution will be required. | |
| From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.2.1) |
| 13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington] |
| Full Idea: As well as conditional beliefs, there are conditional desires, hopes, fears etc. As well as conditional statements, there are conditional commands, questions, offers, promises, bets etc. | |
| From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.3.4) |
| 13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington] |
| Full Idea: Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? Are they non-truth-functional, like 'because' or 'before'? Do the values of A and B, in some cases, leave open the value of 'If A,B'? | |
| From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1) | |
| A reaction: I would say they are not truth-functional, because the 'if' asserts some further dependency relation that goes beyond the truth or falsity of A and B. Logical ifs, causal ifs, psychological ifs... The material conditional ⊃ is truth-functional. |
| 13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington] |
| Full Idea: If it were possible to have A true, B false, and If A,B true, it would be unsafe to infer B from A and If A,B: modus ponens would thus be invalid. Hence 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B). | |
| From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1) | |
| A reaction: This is a firm defence of part of the truth-functional view of conditionals, and seems unassailable. The other parts of the truth table are open to question, though, if A is false, or they are both true. |
| 4043 | Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman] |
| Full Idea: An elephant may be fully represented by nine primitive shapes ('geons'), but it may require as few as three geons in appropriate relations to be correctly identified. | |
| From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.7) | |
| A reaction: Encouraging the idea of the mind as a maker of maps and models |
| 4049 | The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman] |
| Full Idea: A unique yellow experience may be evoked with monochrome light of 580nm, or a mixture of 540nm and 670nm. ..Our interpretation of colour experience is a highly idiosyncratic artefact of our visual system. | |
| From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.117) | |
| A reaction: This confirms what I have always thought - that colour (as qualia) is strictly a feature of minds, not of the world. |
| 4047 | Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman] |
| Full Idea: Gestalt psychology claims that there are at least four unlearned factors in perceptual grouping - the principles of proximity (close things), of similarity, of good continuation (extending lines in a smooth course), and closure (which completes figures). | |
| From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.103) | |
| A reaction: This offers a bridge between Hume's associationism and rationalist claims of innate ideas |
| 14790 | 'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: The first starting of a hypothesis and the entertaining of it …is an inferential step which I propose to call 'abduction'. This will include a preference for any one hypothesis over others which would equally explain the facts. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Abduction and Induction [1901], I) | |
| A reaction: I take there to be no more important function within human thought than the procedure by which we give preference to one particular explanation. It only makes sense, I think, if we take it as part of a coherence theory of justification. |
| 14791 | Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: It is of the nature of abduction to involve an original suggestion; while typical induction has no originality in it, but only tests a suggestion already made. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Abduction and Induction [1901], I) | |
| A reaction: Peirce's 'abduction' is not, then, just the choice of a best explanation. He came up with the idea because he was keen to capture the creative and imaginative character of rational thought. |