13966
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Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames]
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Full Idea:
The golden age of analytic philosophy (mid 20th c) was when necessary, a priori and analytic were one, all possibility was linguistic possibility, and the linguistic turn gave philosophy a respectable subject matter (language), and precision and rigour.
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From:
Scott Soames (Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori [2006], p.166)
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A reaction:
Gently sarcastic, because Soames is part of the team who have put a bomb under this view, and quite right too. Personally I think the biggest enemy in all of this lot is not 'language' but 'rigour'. A will-o-the-wisp philosophers dream of.
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13974
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If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
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Full Idea:
If all of philosophy is the analysis of meaning, and meaning is fundamentally transparent to competent speakers, there is little room for philosophically significant explanations and theories, since they will be necessary or a priori, or both.
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From:
Scott Soames (Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori [2006], p.186)
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A reaction:
He cites the later Wittgenstein as having fallen into this trap. I suppose any area of life can have its specialists, but I take Shakespeare to be a greater master of English than any philosopher I have ever read.
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8921
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Structuralism is now common, studying relations, with no regard for what the objects might be [Hellman]
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Full Idea:
With developments in modern mathematics, structuralist ideas have become commonplace. We study 'abstract structures', having relations without regard to the objects. As Hilbert famously said, items of furniture would do.
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From:
Geoffrey Hellman (Structuralism [2007], §1)
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A reaction:
Hilbert is known as a Formalist, which suggests that modern Structuralism is a refined and more naturalist version of the rather austere formalist view. Presumably the sofa can't stand for six, so a structural definition of numbers is needed.
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13764
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Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
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Full Idea:
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? Are they non-truth-functional, like 'because' or 'before'? Do the values of A and B, in some cases, leave open the value of 'If A,B'?
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From:
Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
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A reaction:
I would say they are not truth-functional, because the 'if' asserts some further dependency relation that goes beyond the truth or falsity of A and B. Logical ifs, causal ifs, psychological ifs... The material conditional ⊃ is truth-functional.
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13765
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'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
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Full Idea:
If it were possible to have A true, B false, and If A,B true, it would be unsafe to infer B from A and If A,B: modus ponens would thus be invalid. Hence 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B).
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From:
Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
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A reaction:
This is a firm defence of part of the truth-functional view of conditionals, and seems unassailable. The other parts of the truth table are open to question, though, if A is false, or they are both true.
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13972
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Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
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Full Idea:
Two-dimensionalism is a fundamentally anti-Kripkean attempt to reinstate descriptivism about names and natural kind terms, to reconnect necessity and apriority to analyticity, and return philosophy to analytic paradigms of its golden age.
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From:
Scott Soames (Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori [2006], p.183)
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A reaction:
I presume this is right, and it is so frustrating that you need Soames to spell it out, when Chalmers is much more low-key. Philosophers hate telling you what their real game is. Why is that?
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