Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conditionals', 'The Strangest Man' and 'Certain Physical Essays'

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9 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals

13768	Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
	Full Idea: If your interest in logic is confined to applications to mathematics or other a priori matters, it is fine for validity to preserve certainty, ..but if you use conditionals when arguing about contingent matters, then great caution will be required.
	From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.2.1)

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional

13770	There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
	Full Idea: As well as conditional beliefs, there are conditional desires, hopes, fears etc. As well as conditional statements, there are conditional commands, questions, offers, promises, bets etc.
	From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.3.4)

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals

13764	Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
	Full Idea: Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? Are they non-truth-functional, like 'because' or 'before'? Do the values of A and B, in some cases, leave open the value of 'If A,B'?
	From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
	A reaction: I would say they are not truth-functional, because the 'if' asserts some further dependency relation that goes beyond the truth or falsity of A and B. Logical ifs, causal ifs, psychological ifs... The material conditional ⊃ is truth-functional.

13765	'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
	Full Idea: If it were possible to have A true, B false, and If A,B true, it would be unsafe to infer B from A and If A,B: modus ponens would thus be invalid. Hence 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B).
	From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
	A reaction: This is a firm defence of part of the truth-functional view of conditionals, and seems unassailable. The other parts of the truth table are open to question, though, if A is false, or they are both true.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation

16736	Explanation is generally to deduce it from something better known, which comes in degrees [Boyle]
	Full Idea: Generally speaking, to render a reason of an effect or phenomenon is to deduce it from something else in nature more known than itself, and consequently there may be diverse kinds of degrees of explication of the same thing.
	From: Robert Boyle (Certain Physical Essays [1672], II:21), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.4
	A reaction: There is a picture of a real explanatory structure to nature, from which we pick bits that interest us for entirely pragmatic reasons. Boyle and I are as one on this matter.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation

16737	The best explanations get down to primary basics, but others go less deep [Boyle]
	Full Idea: Explications be most satisfactory that show how the effect is produced by the more primitive affects of matter (bulk, shape and motion) but are not to be despised that deduce them from more familiar qualities such as heat, weight, fluidity, fermentation.
	From: Robert Boyle (Certain Physical Essays [1672], II:22), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.4
	A reaction: [Compressed, and continued from Idea 16736] So there is a causal structure, and the best explanations go to the bottom of it, but lesser explanations only go half way down. So a very skimpy explanation ('dormative power') is still an explanation.

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity

21236	Instead of gravitational force, we now have a pervasive gravitational field [Farmelo]
	Full Idea: Physics replaced the notion that bodies exert gravitational force on each other by the more effective picture that the bodies in the universe give rise to a pervasive gravitational field which exerts a force on each particle.
	From: Graham Farmelo (The Strangest Man [2009], 08)
	A reaction: This still uses the word 'force'. I sometimes get the impression that gravity is the curvature of space, but gravity needs more. Which direction along the curvature are particles attracted? The bottom line is the power of the bodies.

27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics

21235	The Schrödinger waves are just the maths of transforming energy values to positions [Farmelo]
	Full Idea: Dirac showed that the Schrödinger waves were simply the mathematical quantities involved in transforming the description of a quantum based on its energy values to one based on possible values of its position.
	From: Graham Farmelo (The Strangest Man [2009], 08)
	A reaction: Does this eliminate actual physical 'waves' from the theory?

27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / c. Particle properties

21234	Experiments show that fundamental particles of one type are identical [Farmelo]
	Full Idea: It is an established experimental fact ...that every single fundamental particle in the universe is the same and identical to all other particles of the same type.
	From: Graham Farmelo (The Strangest Man [2009], 07)
	A reaction: A loud groan is heard from the tomb of Leibniz. I'm unclear how experiments can establish this. If electrons have internal structure (which is not ruled out) then uniformity is highly unlikely.