Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conditionals', 'fragments/reports' and 'Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?'

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7 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals

13768	Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
	Full Idea: If your interest in logic is confined to applications to mathematics or other a priori matters, it is fine for validity to preserve certainty, ..but if you use conditionals when arguing about contingent matters, then great caution will be required.
	From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.2.1)

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional

13770	There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
	Full Idea: As well as conditional beliefs, there are conditional desires, hopes, fears etc. As well as conditional statements, there are conditional commands, questions, offers, promises, bets etc.
	From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.3.4)

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals

13764	Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
	Full Idea: Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? Are they non-truth-functional, like 'because' or 'before'? Do the values of A and B, in some cases, leave open the value of 'If A,B'?
	From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
	A reaction: I would say they are not truth-functional, because the 'if' asserts some further dependency relation that goes beyond the truth or falsity of A and B. Logical ifs, causal ifs, psychological ifs... The material conditional ⊃ is truth-functional.

13765	'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
	Full Idea: If it were possible to have A true, B false, and If A,B true, it would be unsafe to infer B from A and If A,B: modus ponens would thus be invalid. Hence 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B).
	From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
	A reaction: This is a firm defence of part of the truth-functional view of conditionals, and seems unassailable. The other parts of the truth table are open to question, though, if A is false, or they are both true.

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible

16473	Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths [Chalmers, by Stalnaker]
	Full Idea: Chalmers' 'modal rationalist' is one who identifies what is possible with what is conceivable; the central claim of the doctrine is that we have a priori access to modal truth.
	From: report of David J.Chalmers (Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? [2002]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 5
	A reaction: A helpful clarification, as I can now see how hopelessly and utterly wrong Chalmers is (about almost everything), and I find my confidence in any sort of genuine a priori knowledge (except of conceptual relations) dwindling by the minute.

19258	Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world [Chalmers, by Vaidya]
	Full Idea: For Chalmers, that water is XYZ is 'primary possible' (a priori, or conceptually), because it is true in some world considered as actual. It is 'secondary impossible', when it is evaluated from the Earth as actual.
	From: report of David J.Chalmers (Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? [2002]) by Anand Vaidya - Understanding and Essence Intro
	A reaction: [compressed] This is Chalmers' account of how we can know possibility from conceivability, via his two-dimensional semantics (see alphabetical themes).

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention

1556	By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias]
	Full Idea: I regard you all as relatives - by nature, not by convention. By nature like is akin to like, but convention is a tyrant over humankind and often constrains people to act contrary to nature.
	From: Hippias (fragments/reports [c.430 BCE]), quoted by Plato - Protagoras 337c8