Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conditionals', 'Review of 'Aenesidemus'' and 'Two letters on mind'

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8 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Incorporeal substances are powers or forces [Descartes, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: In one of his last letters Descartes describes incorporeal substances as 'powers or forces'.
     From: report of René Descartes (Two letters on mind [1649], Feb 1649) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.4
     A reaction: Only a glimmer, but I really like this idea. (Ellis flirts with it somewhere). Minds are deeply and intrinsically active things. Try ceasing to think for five minutes. Apparently 12th century Cistercian authors were keen on the idea.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
     Full Idea: If your interest in logic is confined to applications to mathematics or other a priori matters, it is fine for validity to preserve certainty, ..but if you use conditionals when arguing about contingent matters, then great caution will be required.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.2.1)
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
     Full Idea: As well as conditional beliefs, there are conditional desires, hopes, fears etc. As well as conditional statements, there are conditional commands, questions, offers, promises, bets etc.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.3.4)
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
     Full Idea: Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? Are they non-truth-functional, like 'because' or 'before'? Do the values of A and B, in some cases, leave open the value of 'If A,B'?
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
     A reaction: I would say they are not truth-functional, because the 'if' asserts some further dependency relation that goes beyond the truth or falsity of A and B. Logical ifs, causal ifs, psychological ifs... The material conditional ⊃ is truth-functional.
'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
     Full Idea: If it were possible to have A true, B false, and If A,B true, it would be unsafe to infer B from A and If A,B: modus ponens would thus be invalid. Hence 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B).
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
     A reaction: This is a firm defence of part of the truth-functional view of conditionals, and seems unassailable. The other parts of the truth table are open to question, though, if A is false, or they are both true.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Mental presentation are not empirical, but concern the strivings of the self [Fichte]
     Full Idea: The intelligence has as the object of its presentation not an empirical perception, but rather only the necessary striving of the self.
     From: Johann Fichte (Review of 'Aenesidemus' [1792], Wks I:22), quoted by Ludwig Siep - Fichte p.62
     A reaction: The embodiment of Fichte's idealism. The 'striving' is the spontaneous application of concepts described the Kant. Kant looks outwards, but Fichte sees only the striving.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
The thing-in-itself is an empty dream [Fichte, by Pinkard]
     Full Idea: Fichte said that the thing-in-itself (which both Reinhold and Schulze accepted) is only "a piece of whimsy, a pipe-dream, a non-thought".
     From: report of Johann Fichte (Review of 'Aenesidemus' [1792]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 05
     A reaction: This seems to be a key moment in German philosophy, and the first step towards the idealist interpretation of Kant.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Impenetrability only belongs to the essence of extension [Descartes]
     Full Idea: It is demonstrated that impenetrability belongs to the essence of extension and not to the essence of any other thing.
     From: René Descartes (Two letters on mind [1649], More, Apr 1649), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 15.5
     A reaction: I'm not sure that I understand how pure extension can be impenetrable.