9 ideas
12427 | All of mathematics is properties of the whole numbers [Kronecker] |
Full Idea: All the results of significant mathematical research must ultimately be expressible in the simple forms of properties of whole numbers. | |
From: Leopold Kronecker (works [1885], Vol 3/274), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 09.5 | |
A reaction: I've always liked Kronecker's line, but I'm beginning to realise that his use of the word 'number' is simply out-of-date. Natural numbers have a special status, but not sufficient to support this claim. |
10091 | God made the integers, all the rest is the work of man [Kronecker] |
Full Idea: God made the integers, all the rest is the work of man. | |
From: Leopold Kronecker (works [1885]), quoted by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Intro | |
A reaction: This famous remark was first quoted in Kronecker's obituary. A response to Dedekind, it seems. See Idea 10090. Did he really mean that negative numbers were the work of God? We took a long time to spot them. |
8510 | 'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set [Williams,DC] |
Full Idea: 'Socrates is wise' means that the concurrence sum (Socrates) includes a trope which is a member of the similarity set (Wisdom). | |
From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.119) | |
A reaction: Resemblance has to be taken as a basic (and presumably unanalysable) concept, which invites Russell's objection (Idea 4441). |
8508 | A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence [Williams,DC] |
Full Idea: I shall divert the word 'trope' to stand for the abstract particular which is, so to speak, the occurrence of an essence. | |
From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.115) | |
A reaction: Thus tropes entered philosophical discussion. Presumably the precedent for an 'abstract particular' would be a particular occurrence of the number 7. |
8509 | A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections [Williams,DC] |
Full Idea: Any possible world, and hence, of course, this one, is completely constituted by its tropes and connections of location and similarity. | |
From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.116) | |
A reaction: Note that Williams regularly referred to possible worlds in 1953. This is a full-blooded trope theory, which asserts that objects are bundles of tropes, so that both particulars and universals are ontologically taken care of. |
13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington] |
Full Idea: If your interest in logic is confined to applications to mathematics or other a priori matters, it is fine for validity to preserve certainty, ..but if you use conditionals when arguing about contingent matters, then great caution will be required. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.2.1) |
13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington] |
Full Idea: As well as conditional beliefs, there are conditional desires, hopes, fears etc. As well as conditional statements, there are conditional commands, questions, offers, promises, bets etc. | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.3.4) |
13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington] |
Full Idea: Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? Are they non-truth-functional, like 'because' or 'before'? Do the values of A and B, in some cases, leave open the value of 'If A,B'? | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1) | |
A reaction: I would say they are not truth-functional, because the 'if' asserts some further dependency relation that goes beyond the truth or falsity of A and B. Logical ifs, causal ifs, psychological ifs... The material conditional ⊃ is truth-functional. |
13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington] |
Full Idea: If it were possible to have A true, B false, and If A,B true, it would be unsafe to infer B from A and If A,B: modus ponens would thus be invalid. Hence 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B). | |
From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1) | |
A reaction: This is a firm defence of part of the truth-functional view of conditionals, and seems unassailable. The other parts of the truth table are open to question, though, if A is false, or they are both true. |