115 ideas
| 3722 | Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics doesn't let itself be held back by anything empirical, and indeed goes right to Ideas, where examples themselves fail. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 412.36) |
| 3738 | The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Rational nature separates itself out from all other things by the fact that it sets itself an end. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 437.82) |
| 8721 | An 'impredicative' definition seems circular, because it uses the term being defined [Friend] |
| Full Idea: An 'impredicative' definition is one that uses the terms being defined in order to give the definition; in some way the definition is then circular. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], Glossary) | |
| A reaction: There has been a big controversy in the philosophy of mathematics over these. Shapiro gives the definition of 'village idiot' (which probably mentions 'village') as an example. |
| 8680 | Classical definitions attempt to refer, but intuitionist/constructivist definitions actually create objects [Friend] |
| Full Idea: In classical logic definitions are thought of as revealing our attempts to refer to objects, ...but for intuitionist or constructivist logics, if our definitions do not uniquely characterize an object, we are not entitled to discuss the object. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: In defining a chess piece we are obviously creating. In defining a 'tree' we are trying to respond to fact, but the borderlines are vague. Philosophical life would be easier if we were allowed a mixture of creation and fact - so let's have that. |
| 3678 | Reductio ad absurdum proves an idea by showing that its denial produces contradiction [Friend] |
| Full Idea: Reductio ad absurdum arguments are ones that start by denying what one wants to prove. We then prove a contradiction from this 'denied' idea and more reasonable ideas in one's theory, showing that we were wrong in denying what we wanted to prove. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: This is a mathematical definition, which rests on logical contradiction, but in ordinary life (and philosophy) it would be enough to show that denial led to absurdity, rather than actual contradiction. |
| 8705 | Anti-realists see truth as our servant, and epistemically contrained [Friend] |
| Full Idea: For the anti-realist, truth belongs to us, it is our servant, and as such, it must be 'epistemically constrained'. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: Put as clearly as this, it strikes me as being utterly and spectacularly wrong, a complete failure to grasp the elementary meaning of a concept etc. etc. If we aren't the servants of truth then we jolly we ought to be. Truth is above us. |
| 8713 | In classical/realist logic the connectives are defined by truth-tables [Friend] |
| Full Idea: In the classical or realist view of logic the meaning of abstract symbols for logical connectives is given by the truth-tables for the symbol. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007]) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is realist because it connects them to 'truth', but only if that involves a fairly 'realist' view of truth. You could, of course, translate 'true' and 'false' in the table to empty (formalist) symbols such a 0 and 1. Logic is electronics. |
| 8708 | Double negation elimination is not valid in intuitionist logic [Friend] |
| Full Idea: In intuitionist logic, if we do not know that we do not know A, it does not follow that we know A, so the inference (and, in general, double negation elimination) is not intuitionistically valid. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 5.2) | |
| A reaction: That inference had better not be valid in any logic! I am unaware of not knowing the birthday of someone I have never heard of. Propositional attitudes such as 'know' are notoriously difficult to explain in formal logic. |
| 8694 | Free logic was developed for fictional or non-existent objects [Friend] |
| Full Idea: Free logic is especially designed to help regiment our reasoning about fictional objects, or nonexistent objects of some sort. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 3.7) | |
| A reaction: This makes it sound marginal, but I wonder whether existential commitment shouldn't be eliminated from all logic. Why do fictional objects need a different logic? What logic should we use for Robin Hood, if we aren't sure whether or not he is real? |
| 8665 | A 'proper subset' of A contains only members of A, but not all of them [Friend] |
| Full Idea: A 'subset' of A is a set containing only members of A, and a 'proper subset' is one that does not contain all the members of A. Note that the empty set is a subset of every set, but it is not a member of every set. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: Is it the same empty set in each case? 'No pens' is a subset of 'pens', but is it a subset of 'paper'? Idea 8219 should be borne in mind when discussing such things, though I am not saying I agree with it. |
| 8672 | A 'powerset' is all the subsets of a set [Friend] |
| Full Idea: The 'powerset' of a set is a set made up of all the subsets of a set. For example, the powerset of {3,7,9} is {null, {3}, {7}, {9}, {3,7}, {3,9}, {7,9}, {3,7,9}}. Taking the powerset of an infinite set gets us from one infinite cardinality to the next. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: Note that the null (empty) set occurs once, but not in the combinations. I begin to have queasy sympathies with the constructivist view of mathematics at this point, since no one has the time, space or energy to 'take' an infinite powerset. |
| 8677 | Set theory makes a minimum ontological claim, that the empty set exists [Friend] |
| Full Idea: As a realist choice of what is basic in mathematics, set theory is rather clever, because it only makes a very simple ontological claim: that, independent of us, there exists the empty set. The whole hierarchy of finite and infinite sets then follows. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: Even so, for non-logicians the existence of the empty set is rather counterintuitive. "There was nobody on the road, so I overtook him". See Ideas 7035 and 8322. You might work back to the empty set, but how do you start from it? |
| 8666 | Infinite sets correspond one-to-one with a subset [Friend] |
| Full Idea: Two sets are the same size if they can be placed in one-to-one correspondence. But even numbers have one-to-one correspondence with the natural numbers. So a set is infinite if it has one-one correspondence with a proper subset. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: Dedekind's definition. We can match 1 with 2, 2 with 4, 3 with 6, 4 with 8, etc. Logicians seem happy to give as a definition anything which fixes the target uniquely, even if it doesn't give the essence. See Frege on 0 and 1, Ideas 8653/4. |
| 8682 | Major set theories differ in their axioms, and also over the additional axioms of choice and infinity [Friend] |
| Full Idea: Zermelo-Fraenkel and Gödel-Bernays set theory differ over the notions of ordinal construction and over the notion of class, among other things. Then there are optional axioms which can be attached, such as the axiom of choice and the axiom of infinity. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 2.6) | |
| A reaction: This summarises the reasons why we cannot just talk about 'set theory' as if it was a single concept. The philosophical interest I would take to be found in disentangling the ontological commitments of each version. |
| 8709 | The law of excluded middle is syntactic; it just says A or not-A, not whether they are true or false [Friend] |
| Full Idea: The law of excluded middle is purely syntactic: it says for any well-formed formula A, either A or not-A. It is not a semantic law; it does not say that either A is true or A is false. The semantic version (true or false) is the law of bivalence. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 5.2) | |
| A reaction: No wonder these two are confusing, sufficiently so for a lot of professional philosophers to blur the distinction. Presumably the 'or' is exclusive. So A-and-not-A is a contradiction; but how do you explain a contradiction without mentioning truth? |
| 8711 | Intuitionists read the universal quantifier as "we have a procedure for checking every..." [Friend] |
| Full Idea: In the intuitionist version of quantification, the universal quantifier (normally read as "all") is understood as "we have a procedure for checking every" or "we have checked every". | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 5.5) | |
| A reaction: It seems better to describe this as 'verificationist' (or, as Dummett prefers, 'justificationist'). Intuition suggests an ability to 'see' beyond the evidence. It strikes me as bizarre to say that you can't discuss things you can't check. |
| 8675 | Paradoxes can be solved by talking more loosely of 'classes' instead of 'sets' [Friend] |
| Full Idea: The realist meets the Burali-Forti paradox by saying that all the ordinals are a 'class', not a set. A proper class is what we discuss when we say "all" the so-and-sos when they cannot be reached by normal set-construction. Grammar is their only limit. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: This strategy would be useful for Class Nominalism, which tries to define properties in terms of classes, but gets tangled in paradoxes. But why bother with strict sets if easy-going classes will do just as well? Descartes's Dream: everything is rational. |
| 8674 | The Burali-Forti paradox asks whether the set of all ordinals is itself an ordinal [Friend] |
| Full Idea: The Burali-Forti paradox says that if ordinals are defined by 'gathering' all their predecessors with the empty set, then is the set of all ordinals an ordinal? It is created the same way, so it should be a further member of this 'complete' set! | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: This is an example (along with Russell's more famous paradox) of the problems that began to appear in set theory in the early twentieth century. See Idea 8675 for a modern solution. |
| 8667 | The 'integers' are the positive and negative natural numbers, plus zero [Friend] |
| Full Idea: The set of 'integers' is all of the negative natural numbers, and zero, together with the positive natural numbers. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: Zero always looks like a misfit at this party. Credit and debit explain positive and negative nicely, but what is the difference between having no money, and money being irrelevant? I can be 'broke', but can the North Pole be broke? |
| 8668 | The 'rational' numbers are those representable as fractions [Friend] |
| Full Idea: The 'rational' numbers are all those that can be represented in the form m/n (i.e. as fractions), where m and n are natural numbers different from zero. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: Pythagoreans needed numbers to stop there, in order to represent the whole of reality numerically. See irrational numbers for the ensuing disaster. How can a universe with a finite number of particles contain numbers that are not 'rational'? |
| 8670 | A number is 'irrational' if it cannot be represented as a fraction [Friend] |
| Full Idea: A number is 'irrational' just in case it cannot be represented as a fraction. An irrational number has an infinite non-repeating decimal expansion. Famous examples are pi and e. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: There must be an infinite number of irrational numbers. You could, for example, take the expansion of pi, and change just one digit to produce a new irrational number, and pi has an infinity of digits to tinker with. |
| 8661 | The natural numbers are primitive, and the ordinals are up one level of abstraction [Friend] |
| Full Idea: The natural numbers are quite primitive, and are what we first learn about. The order of objects (the 'ordinals') is one level of abstraction up from the natural numbers: we impose an order on objects. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: Note the talk of 'levels of abstraction'. So is there a first level of abstraction? Dedekind disagrees with Friend (Idea 7524). I would say that natural numbers are abstracted from something, but I'm not sure what. See Structuralism in maths. |
| 8664 | Cardinal numbers answer 'how many?', with the order being irrelevant [Friend] |
| Full Idea: The 'cardinal' numbers answer the question 'How many?'; the order of presentation of the objects being counted as immaterial. Def: the cardinality of a set is the number of members of the set. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: If one asks whether cardinals or ordinals are logically prior (see Ideas 7524 and 8661), I am inclined to answer 'neither'. Presenting them as answers to the questions 'how many?' and 'which comes first?' is illuminating. |
| 8671 | The 'real' numbers (rationals and irrationals combined) is the Continuum, which has no gaps [Friend] |
| Full Idea: The set of 'real' numbers, which consists of the rational numbers and the irrational numbers together, represents "the continuum", since it is like a smooth line which has no gaps (unlike the rational numbers, which have the irrationals missing). | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: The Continuum is the perfect abstract object, because a series of abstractions has arrived at a vast limit in its nature. It still has dizzying infinities contained within it, and at either end of the line. It makes you feel humble. |
| 8663 | Raising omega to successive powers of omega reveal an infinity of infinities [Friend] |
| Full Idea: After the multiples of omega, we can successively raise omega to powers of omega, and after that is done an infinite number of times we arrive at a new limit ordinal, which is called 'epsilon'. We have an infinite number of infinite ordinals. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: When most people are dumbstruck by the idea of a single infinity, Cantor unleashes an infinity of infinities, which must be the highest into the stratosphere of abstract thought that any human being has ever gone. |
| 8662 | The first limit ordinal is omega (greater, but without predecessor), and the second is twice-omega [Friend] |
| Full Idea: The first 'limit ordinal' is called 'omega', which is ordinal because it is greater than other numbers, but it has no immediate predecessor. But it has successors, and after all of those we come to twice-omega, which is the next limit ordinal. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: This is the gateway to Cantor's paradise of infinities, which Hilbert loved and defended. Who could resist the pleasure of being totally boggled (like Aristotle) by a concept such as infinity, only to have someone draw a map of it? See 8663 for sequel. |
| 8669 | Between any two rational numbers there is an infinite number of rational numbers [Friend] |
| Full Idea: Since between any two rational numbers there is an infinite number of rational numbers, we could consider that we have infinity in three dimensions: positive numbers, negative numbers, and the 'depth' of infinite numbers between any rational numbers. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: This is before we even reach Cantor's staggering infinities (Ideas 8662 and 8663), which presumably reside at the outer reaches of all three of these dimensions of infinity. The 'deep' infinities come from fractions with huge denominators. |
| 8676 | Is mathematics based on sets, types, categories, models or topology? [Friend] |
| Full Idea: Successful competing founding disciplines in mathematics include: the various set theories, type theory, category theory, model theory and topology. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: Or none of the above? Set theories are very popular. Type theory is, apparently, discredited. Shapiro has a version of structuralism based on model theory (which sound promising). Topology is the one that intrigues me... |
| 8678 | Most mathematical theories can be translated into the language of set theory [Friend] |
| Full Idea: Most of mathematics can be faithfully redescribed by classical (realist) set theory. More precisely, we can translate other mathematical theories - such as group theory, analysis, calculus, arithmetic, geometry and so on - into the language of set theory. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: This is why most mathematicians seem to regard set theory as foundational. We could also translate football matches into the language of atomic physics. |
| 8701 | The number 8 in isolation from the other numbers is of no interest [Friend] |
| Full Idea: There is no interest for the mathematician in studying the number 8 in isolation from the other numbers. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 4.4) | |
| A reaction: This is a crucial and simple point (arising during a discussion of Shapiro's structuralism). Most things are interesting in themselves, as well as for their relationships, but mathematical 'objects' just are relationships. |
| 8702 | In structuralism the number 8 is not quite the same in different structures, only equivalent [Friend] |
| Full Idea: Structuralists give a historical account of why the 'same' number occupies different structures. Numbers are equivalent rather than identical. 8 is the immediate predecessor of 9 in the whole numbers, but in the rationals 9 has no predecessor. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 4.4) | |
| A reaction: I don't become a different person if I move from a detached house to a terraced house. This suggests that 8 can't be entirely defined by its relations, and yet it is hard to see what its intrinsic nature could be, apart from the units which compose it. |
| 8699 | Are structures 'ante rem' (before reality), or are they 'in re' (grounded in physics)? [Friend] |
| Full Idea: Structuralists disagree over whether objects in structures are 'ante rem' (before reality, existing independently of whether the objects exist) or 'in re' (in reality, grounded in the real world, usually in our theories of physics). | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 4.4) | |
| A reaction: Shapiro holds the first view, Hellman and Resnik the second. The first view sounds too platonist and ontologically extravagant; the second sounds too contingent and limited. The correct account is somewhere in abstractions from the real. |
| 8696 | Structuralist says maths concerns concepts about base objects, not base objects themselves [Friend] |
| Full Idea: According to the structuralist, mathematicians study the concepts (objects of study) such as variable, greater, real, add, similar, infinite set, which are one level of abstraction up from prima facie base objects such as numbers, shapes and lines. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: This still seems to imply an ontology in which numbers, shapes and lines exist. I would have thought you could eliminate the 'base objects', and just say that the concepts are one level of abstraction up from the physical world. |
| 8695 | Structuralism focuses on relations, predicates and functions, with objects being inessential [Friend] |
| Full Idea: Structuralism says we study whole structures: objects together with their predicates, relations that bear between them, and functions that take us from one domain of objects to a range of other objects. The objects can even be eliminated. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: The unity of object and predicate is a Quinean idea. The idea that objects are inessential is the dramatic move. To me the proposal has very strong intuitive appeal. 'Eight' is meaningless out of context. Ordinality precedes cardinality? Ideas 7524/8661. |
| 8700 | 'In re' structuralism says that the process of abstraction is pattern-spotting [Friend] |
| Full Idea: In the 'in re' version of mathematical structuralism, pattern-spotting is the process of abstraction. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 4.4) | |
| A reaction: This might work for non-mathematical abstraction as well, if we are allowed to spot patterns within sensual experience, and patterns within abstractions. Properties are causal patterns in the world? No - properties cause patterns. |
| 8681 | The big problem for platonists is epistemic: how do we perceive, intuit, know or detect mathematical facts? [Friend] |
| Full Idea: The main philosophical problem with the position of platonism or realism is the epistemic problem: of explaining what perception or intuition consists in; how it is possible that we should accurately detect whatever it is we are realists about. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 2.5) | |
| A reaction: The best bet, I suppose, is that the mind directly perceives concepts just as eyes perceive the physical (see Idea 8679), but it strikes me as implausible. If we have to come up with a special mental faculty for an area of knowledge, we are in trouble. |
| 8712 | Mathematics should be treated as true whenever it is indispensable to our best physical theory [Friend] |
| Full Idea: Central to naturalism about mathematics are 'indispensability arguments', to the effect that some part of mathematics is indispensable to our best physical theory, and therefore we ought to take that part of mathematics to be true. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 6.1) | |
| A reaction: Quine and Putnam hold this view; Field challenges it. It has the odd consequence that the dispensable parts (if they can be identified!) do not need to be treated as true (even though they might follow logically from the dispensable parts!). Wrong! |
| 8716 | Formalism is unconstrained, so cannot indicate importance, or directions for research [Friend] |
| Full Idea: There are not enough constraints in the Formalist view of mathematics, so there is no way to select a direction for trying to develop mathematics. There is no part of mathematics that is more important than another. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 6.6) | |
| A reaction: One might reply that an area of maths could be 'important' if lots of other areas depended on it, and big developments would ripple big changes through the interior of the subject. Formalism does, though, seem to reduce maths to a game. |
| 8706 | Constructivism rejects too much mathematics [Friend] |
| Full Idea: Too much of mathematics is rejected by the constructivist. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: This was Hilbert's view. This seems to be generally true of verificationism. My favourite example is that legitimate speculations can be labelled as meaningless. |
| 8707 | Intuitionists typically retain bivalence but reject the law of excluded middle [Friend] |
| Full Idea: An intuitionist typically retains bivalence, but rejects the law of excluded middle. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 5.2) | |
| A reaction: The idea would be to say that only T and F are available as truth-values, but failing to be T does not ensure being F, but merely not-T. 'Unproven' is not-T, but may not be F. |
| 8704 | Structuralists call a mathematical 'object' simply a 'place in a structure' [Friend] |
| Full Idea: What the mathematician labels an 'object' in her discipline, is called 'a place in a structure' by the structuralist. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 4.5) | |
| A reaction: This is a strategy for dispersing the idea of an object in the world of thought, parallel to attempts to eliminate them from physical ontology (e.g. Idea 614). |
| 13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington] |
| Full Idea: If your interest in logic is confined to applications to mathematics or other a priori matters, it is fine for validity to preserve certainty, ..but if you use conditionals when arguing about contingent matters, then great caution will be required. | |
| From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.2.1) |
| 13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington] |
| Full Idea: As well as conditional beliefs, there are conditional desires, hopes, fears etc. As well as conditional statements, there are conditional commands, questions, offers, promises, bets etc. | |
| From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.3.4) |
| 13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington] |
| Full Idea: Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? Are they non-truth-functional, like 'because' or 'before'? Do the values of A and B, in some cases, leave open the value of 'If A,B'? | |
| From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1) | |
| A reaction: I would say they are not truth-functional, because the 'if' asserts some further dependency relation that goes beyond the truth or falsity of A and B. Logical ifs, causal ifs, psychological ifs... The material conditional ⊃ is truth-functional. |
| 13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington] |
| Full Idea: If it were possible to have A true, B false, and If A,B true, it would be unsafe to infer B from A and If A,B: modus ponens would thus be invalid. Hence 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B). | |
| From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1) | |
| A reaction: This is a firm defence of part of the truth-functional view of conditionals, and seems unassailable. The other parts of the truth table are open to question, though, if A is false, or they are both true. |
| 3726 | The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant] |
| Full Idea: With the categorical imperative or law of morality we have a very serious difficulty, because it is a synthetic a priori practical proposition. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 420.50) |
| 3739 | Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings so far as they are rational. Freedom would then be the property this causality has of being able to work independently of determination by alien causes. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 446.97) |
| 3741 | We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant] |
| Full Idea: We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 456.115) |
| 3740 | We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant] |
| Full Idea: We cannot possibly conceive of a reason as being consciously directed from outside in regard to its judgements. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 448.101) |
| 5296 | Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Kant made the materially motivated determinations of the will of the French bourgeois into pure self-determinations of the "free will", of the will in and for itself. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by K Marx / F Engels - The German Ideology §II | |
| A reaction: This is the social determinism of Marx and Engels. Most commentators would say that Kant was taking the idea of "free will" from religion rather than politics, but presumably Marx would merely reply "same thing!" |
| 8685 | Studying biology presumes the laws of chemistry, and it could never contradict them [Friend] |
| Full Idea: In the hierarchy of reduction, when we investigate questions in biology, we have to assume the laws of chemistry but not of economics. We could never find a law of biology that contradicted something in physics or in chemistry. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: This spells out the idea that there is a direction of dependence between aspects of the world, though we should be cautious of talking about 'levels' (see Idea 7003). We cannot choose the direction in which reduction must go. |
| 24011 | Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Kant thinks emotions can't contribute to moral worth because emotions are too capricious, they are too passive, and they are fortuitously distributed by nature. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Bernard Williams - Morality and the emotions p.226 | |
| A reaction: [compressed] If, like Kant, you want morality to be concerned with rational principles, then you will want morality to be clear, stable and consistent - which emotions are not. I'm with Williams on this one. |
| 8688 | Concepts can be presented extensionally (as objects) or intensionally (as a characterization) [Friend] |
| Full Idea: The extensional presentation of a concept is just a list of the objects falling under the concept. In contrast, an intensional presentation of a concept gives a characterization of the concept, which allows us to pick out which objects fall under it. | |
| From: Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 3.4) | |
| A reaction: Logicians seem to favour the extensional view, because (in the standard view) sets are defined simply by their members, so concepts can be explained using sets. I take this to be a mistake. The intensional view seems obviously prior. |
| 5074 | Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant united the two ideas of virtue (as being and as doing) into the idea of a law that is founded not upon faith but upon reason. Thus in one stroke he united the seemingly irreconcilable philosophical and religious ethics, preserving the best of both. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Richard Taylor - Virtue Ethics: an Introduction Ch.8 | |
| A reaction: An interesting analysis that sounds exactly right. Taylor's point is that Kant subjects himself to an authority, when the underpinnings of the authority are no longer there. There is a religious strand in the altruistic requirements of utilitarianism too. |
| 8024 | The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| Full Idea: As to what activities we ought to engage in, what ends we should pursue, the categorical imperative seems to be silent. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: I think this is the fatal objection to Kant's view. He says, for example, that promise-breaking is inconsistent with a belief that promises are good, but who said promises are good? No ethical system can get started without values. |
| 22390 | Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant was a psychological hedonist about all actions except those done for the sake of the moral law, and this faulty theory of human nature prevented him from seeing that moral virtue might be compatible with the rejection of the categorical imperative. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Philippa Foot - Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives p.165 | |
| A reaction: Nice. Kant wasn't unusual in his view, which seems standard in the Renaissance and Enlightenment. Aristotle understood that it is human nature, on the whole, to want to be a good citizen, since we are social beings. |
| 9750 | We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| Full Idea: We are limited to pursuits which are acceptable from the standpoint of others; ..hence we can't value just anything, and there are things which we must value. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' x | |
| A reaction: This at least moves towards greater objectivity, compared with Idea 9749, but it now seems deeply conservative. Our values become lowest common denominator. We need space for the Nietzschean moral hero, who creates new values. |
| 20160 | Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant grossly inflated the importance of the human dimension of value in which moral considerations are indeed overriding. He unjustifiably denied the perfectly reasonable contributions of the cultural and personal dimensions to human well-being. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by John Kekes - The Human Condition 05.5 | |
| A reaction: Excellent to see someone talking about the ultimate values that reside behind Kant's theory. Without such assumptions his theory is, frankly, ridiculous (as Mill explained). |
| 9749 | Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| Full Idea: According to Kant, we confer value on the objects of our rational choices. ..When we choose things because they are important to us we are taking ourselves to be important. Hence our humanity is a source of value. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' ix | |
| A reaction: He's trying to filter to out our gormless choices with the word 'rational', but it is common sense that I may choose things despite thinking they have little value, like watching soap opera. A more objective account of value seems needed. See 9750! |
| 7671 | Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin] |
| Full Idea: Kant's fundamental sermon is that a value is made a value (or, at least, a duty) by human choice and not by some intrinsic quality in itself, out there. Values are what humans freely choose to live, fight and die for. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: If this is right, then it would appear that the great Kant is the father of relativism, which wouldn't please him. However, his whole system rests on what is consistent and rational, and that seems to a value that is above our choices. |
| 3720 | We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant] |
| Full Idea: We are pleased to flatter ourselves with the false claim to a nobler motive, but in fact we can never, even by the most strenuous self-examination, get to the bottom of our secret impulsions. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 407.26) | |
| A reaction: Sounds more like Nietzsche than Kant. If some impulsions are totally hidden from us, then they are presumably irrelevant to any rational or moral thinking. Look at the deeds. |
| 3717 | Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 401.16 n) | |
| A reaction: Presumably simple love of someone or something could achieve this, without the addition of reverence. I'm suspicious of this idea, because some dreadful people have commanded reverence. |
| 3712 | A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 394.3) | |
| A reaction: This invites the obvious objection of the well-meaning fool, who causes misery despite meaning well. I firmly hold the view that what matters is what we do, not what we intend. |
| 3725 | The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant] |
| Full Idea: What is essentially good in an action consists in the mental disposition, let the consequences be what they may. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 416.43) | |
| A reaction: Dreadful idea. I always claim that consequences are relevant in Kant, in formulating and choosing maxims for action, but this idea seems to refute my view. This is a slogan for the Spanish Inquisition. |
| 3733 | The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The 'golden rule' is merely derivative from our principle, but it cannot be a universal law since it isn't the ground of duties to oneself or others (since it implies a breakable contract). | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 430.68 n) |
| 3736 | Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A morally good attitude of mind (or virtue) claims the intrinsic value of dignity, because it affords a rational being a share in the making of universal law, which therefore fits him to be a member in a possible kingdom of ends. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 435.79) |
| 3544 | Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas] |
| Full Idea: Kant thinks that if virtue becomes a stable disposition of the person, then it turns into a rigid mechanical habit, with respect to which the person is passive, and thus not fully morally accountable. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.1 |
| 7674 | Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin] |
| Full Idea: For Kant, generosity is a vice, because it is a form of condescension and patronage, and pity is detestable, because it entails a superiority on the part of the pitier, which Kant stoutly denied. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism | |
| A reaction: An interesting view, but being too proud to receive help from friends strikes me as a greater vice. How can friendship and community be built, if we do not rush to help one another when needed? The virtue is generosity without condescension. |
| 21029 | Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel] |
| Full Idea: Kantian respect is unlike love. It's unlike sympathy. It's unlike solidarity or fellow feeling. ...Kantian respect is for humanity as such, for a rational capacity that resides, undifferentiated, in all of us. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Michael J. Sandel - Justice: What's the right thing to do? 05 | |
| A reaction: Why is it 'undifferentiated'? If reason is the source of the respect, why don't greater powers of reason command greater respect? The nice thing is that the rejected versions involve bias, but Kant's version does not. |
| 7105 | If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman] |
| Full Idea: It has been argued that by 'maxim' Kant does not mean a specific intention for some discrete act, but the underlying intention by which the agent orchestrates his numerous more specific intentions, ...which leads to a virtue reading of Kant. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Daniel Statman - Introduction to Virtue Ethics §7 | |
| A reaction: Kant admired virtue of character, and would want to fit it into the framework of his moral duties. Nevertheless a virtue would often seem to be beyond words, and principles seem to crumble in the face of complex cases. |
| 7625 | We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant] |
| Full Idea: We can reverse the terms of the comparison and ask not how rational is goodness, but why is it good to be rational? | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Hilary Putnam - Reason, Truth and History | |
| A reaction: [Putnam doesn't mention Kant]. This seems to me to be the biggest question for Kant. See Idea 1403. The main point of tbe romantic movement, I take it, is that purely rational living does not bring happiness or fulfilment. |
| 3710 | The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant] |
| Full Idea: It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 393.1) | |
| A reaction: This is precisely the thought of Epictetus, that the will is the source of goodness, because morality resides in choices (as opposed to character, or states of affairs). |
| 3737 | The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The will is absolutely good if it cannot be evil - that is, if its maxim, when made into a universal law, can never be in conflict with itself. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 437.81) |
| 3715 | Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Agreeable results could be brought about by other causes;…therefore nothing but the idea of the law in itself, which is present only in a rational being, can constitute that pre-eminent good which we call moral. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 401.15) |
| 20715 | It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The first proposition of morality is that to have moral worth an action must be done from duty. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], p.19), quoted by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'Religion' | |
| A reaction: [p.19 in Beck tr] In Aristotle's account these are 'controlled' actions [enkrateia], which are a step below virtuous actions, which combine reason and pleasure. |
| 4024 | Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality essentially in terms of each other. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §20.2 | |
| A reaction: An interesting comment on the modern tendency to overvalue freedom at the expense of the other civic virtues. |
| 3735 | Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Man is subject only to laws which are made by himself and yet are universal. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 432.73) |
| 3718 | Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant] |
| Full Idea: To tell the truth for the sake of duty is something entirely different from doing so out of concern for inconvenient results. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 402.18) |
| 3723 | There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant] |
| Full Idea: For the divine or holy will there are no imperatives: 'I ought' is here out of place, because 'I will' is already of itself necessarily in harmony with the law. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 414.39) |
| 3714 | Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant] |
| Full Idea: An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which it is decided upon. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 399.13) |
| 5295 | Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Kant was satisfied with "good will" alone, even if it remained entirely without result. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by K Marx / F Engels - The German Ideology §II | |
| A reaction: Kant is obviously a million miles away from Marxist pragmatism. And yet the members of the revolutionary class can only be identified and endorsed if they show a particular kind of will. |
| 6695 | Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham] |
| Full Idea: An implausible and uncomfortable conclusion to be drawn from Kant's conception of morality is that we must attribute high moral worth to deeply unattractive human lives. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Gordon Graham - Eight Theories of Ethics Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Graham quotes a loathsome character from a Victorian novel, who coldly 'does her duty'. Indeed it might be that a robot could be programmed with the categorical imperative (though it would need a table of values first). Virtue theory is the answer. |
| 8028 | Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Anyone educated into the Kantian notion of duty will (so far) have been educated into easy conformism with authority. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: The Nazi Eichmann cited Kant at his trial for mass murder. I'm not sure the criticism is fair. There are surely times when the categorical imperative will go quite contrary to what the irrational authorities are implementing? |
| 3724 | A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 414.39) |
| 8026 | Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| Full Idea: With sufficient ingenuity, almost every precept can be consistently universalized. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: A concise statement of J.S.Mill's point (Idea 3762). The point is that Kant seems to allow burglary, as long as you don't complain when you are burgled. What sort of maxim would a suicidal mass murderer being willing to universalize? |
| 15673 | The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson] |
| Full Idea: Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative is supposed to capture the widespread intuition that one ought not to make an exception of oneself. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.6:83 | |
| A reaction: Interesting. I always take the plain English version to be 'what if everybody did that?' Suppose I were to forgive everyone, except myself? |
| 8068 | Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant's rule about universalisable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by G.E.M. Anscombe - Modern Moral Philosophy p.176 | |
| A reaction: This is one of the key objections to Kant (along with his need for preliminary values). One man's 'terrorist' is another man's 'freedom fighter'. The charge adds up to Nietzsche's view, that Kant could never shake off his very conventional prejudices. |
| 8025 | The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| Full Idea: The doctrine of the categorical imperative provides me with a test for rejecting proposed maxims; it does not tell me whence I am to derive the maxims which first provide the need for a test. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: Nice objection. 'What if we all stood on one leg for an hour (in this crisis)?' Question for Kant: what sort of maxims should we consider, when faced with a dilemma. Mill will obviously suggest happiness as a target. Good of society? My own good? |
| 8027 | I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| Full Idea: If we enquire whether I can consistently universalize the maxim 'I may break my promises only when.....', the gap can be filled by a description devised so that it will apply to my present circumstances, but to very few others. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: Another good objection to Kant. There is just a huge problem with how you state the maxim under discussion. One man's 'terrorist' is another man's 'freedom fighter'. 'Do everything possible to implement the will of God'. |
| 3728 | Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Kant's four illustrations of the Categorical Imperative are: the contradiction of suicide, the contradiction of false promises, the contradiction of neglecting your talents, and the contradiction of neglecting charity. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 422.53) by PG - Db (ideas) |
| 22008 | Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], AA429 p.96), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 02 | |
| A reaction: This sets up the Kingdom of Ends. Note that this does not prohibit using people as a means. It just asks you to respect waiters and shop assistants. It seems to say you should not treat 'your own person' merely as a means. Prostitution? |
| 3719 | If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant] |
| Full Idea: I can indeed will to lie, but I can by no means will a universal law of lying; for by such a law there could properly be no promises at all. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 403.19) |
| 3762 | Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any logical or physical impossibility in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by John Stuart Mill - Utilitarianism Ch.1 |
| 4413 | The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant] |
| Full Idea: The categorical imperative smells of cruelty. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - On the Genealogy of Morals II.§6 | |
| A reaction: I presume this is because it is so pure and impersonal. Seems harsh. Nowadays we don't think pure just has to be cruel, but Nietzsche may have assumed it had to be. |
| 3716 | Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant] |
| Full Idea: I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 402.17) |
| 3727 | Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The universal imperative may also run as follows: 'Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature'. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 421.52) |
| 22009 | Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Morality consists in the relation of all action to the making of laws whereby alone a kingdom of ends is possible. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], AA434 p.102), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 02 | |
| A reaction: Each individual gives themselves a law in the categorical imperative. Presumably the kingdom of ends is the convergence of these laws, because the categorical imperative has to be rational. |
| 22050 | The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie] |
| Full Idea: Kant does not dictate what the maxim (the principle) of my action should be, and this is the crux. The individual has to decide the basis for their actions, rather than have it imposed on them, which differentiates us from the world of nature. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Andrew Bowie - German Philosophy: a very short introduction 1 | |
| A reaction: Apparenty this inspired the Romantic era (the Age of Freedom?) just as much as the French Revolution. It is the chief doctrine of extreme individualism - except that the maxim chosen should be one on which rational beings should agree. |
| 6694 | Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of another always as an end and never as a means only. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]), quoted by Gordon Graham - Eight Theories of Ethics Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Does this really mean that I can't just negligently buy a newspaper without making an effort to respect its seller? How do I ensure that I treat myself as an end, and don't slip into treating myself as a means? What would that be like? Prostitution? |
| 3731 | Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Rational nature exists as an end in itself; this is the way in which a man necessarily conceives his own existence. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 429.66) |
| 4345 | For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Kant, we may suppose, would say that if a man were 'cold in temperament and indifferent to the sufferings of others', he would still find in himself a source that would enable him to do what is benevolent. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: This identifies a strong appeal of Kant's theory - that whether we are morally good should not be a matter of luck in our upbringing or natural temperament. How is the vicious person to be saved, if not by reason? |
| 4251 | If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant] |
| Full Idea: The Kantian view of what is important is that people should give moral considerations the highest deliberative priority, which Hegel attacked because it gives moral thought no content. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.10 | |
| A reaction: Interesting. This points towards empathy and compassion as motivators, rather than reason, because there is some content to the morality, which calls out to us. |
| 16004 | If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant thought that man is his own law - he binds himself under the law which he gives himself. This is how lawlessness or experimentation is established. This is no more rigorously earnest than Sancho Panza's self-administered blows to his own ass. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Søren Kierkegaard - The Journals of Kierkegaard JP-I, 188 | |
| A reaction: It really is tempting to go easy on yourself rather than on others. Kant had the right ideas, but human beings aren't as disciplined as the categorical imperative requires. [SY] |
| 3711 | Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition of our very worthiness to be happy. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 393.2) |
| 3713 | The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Since reason has been imparted to us as a practical power, which thus influences the will, its true function must be to produce a will which is good. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 396.7) |
| 3729 | Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Inclinations, as a source of needs, are so far from having an absolute value to make them desirable for their own sake that it must rather be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 428.65) |
| 4344 | Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant] |
| Full Idea: There are many spirits of so sympathetic a temper that they find an inner pleasure in spreading happiness around them. ..I maintain that an action of this kind, however right and amiable it may be, has still no genuinely moral worth. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], p.66) | |
| A reaction: We understand what he means (that principle is everything), but this still seems a big hole in his account, one which drives us to Aristotle's sensible views about what a nice person is really like. |
| 3732 | Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A violator of the rights of man intends to use the person of others merely as a means, not considering that they should be used only as beings who must themselves be able to share in the end of the very same action. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 430.68) |
| 7670 | Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin] |
| Full Idea: Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: This is central to the idea of Kant as the main father of liberalism, the idea that every individual deserves respect, and hence has rights. The idea would also be a crucial element in Europe turning against slavery. |
| 7591 | Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant is often held to have completed a task begun by Grotius, giving a basis for natural law which does not invoke the will of God, but rather commands God himself to obedience. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Roger Scruton - A Dictionary of Political Thought 'Kant' | |
| A reaction: This project, if successful, would clinch the naturalistic response to the Euthyphro Question (Ideas 336 and 337). It is a key issue for atheists, who generally wish to deny that their lack of religion leads inevitably to amorality. |
| 7673 | Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin] |
| Full Idea: Kant believed in retributive punishment, because he thought that a man would prefer being sent to prison to going to hospital. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: That is, even criminals welcome the dignity of being treated as if they are actually responsible for their deeds, and are not just victims of inner forces. Criminals demand free will! Truth is best, though; many of them are not responsible at all. |
| 3730 | Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature have, if they are non-rational beings, only a relative value as means and are consequently called 'things' (rather than 'persons'). | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 428.65) | |
| A reaction: Ugh. Is there nothing in between 'persons' and 'things'? How about a deeply comatose human, or an embryo? It is a gross distortion to think of a chimpanzee as a 'thing'. |
| 3721 | We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Where do we get the concept of God as the highest good? Solely from the idea of moral perfection, which reason traces a priori. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 408.29) |
| 8046 | We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre] |
| Full Idea: On Kant's view it never follows that we ought to do what God commands, for we would have to know that we always ought to do what God commands, but that would need a standard of moral judgement independent of God's commands. God's commands are redundant. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a very powerful argument, even an undeniable one. How could you accept any authority if you didn't have some standards for accepting it, even if the standard was just to be awestruck by someone's charisma and will-power? |
| 20714 | God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: Kant speaks of God not as something known or proved to exist by virtue of rational argument, but as a postulate of moral reflection (that is, of 'practical reason'). | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'Morality' | |
| A reaction: Presumably it is a necessary postulate, which makes this a transcendental argument, surely? |