Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conditionals', 'Virtue Theory and Abortion' and 'Goodness and Choice'

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7 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
13768 Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
     Full Idea: If your interest in logic is confined to applications to mathematics or other a priori matters, it is fine for validity to preserve certainty, ..but if you use conditionals when arguing about contingent matters, then great caution will be required.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.2.1)
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
13770 There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
     Full Idea: As well as conditional beliefs, there are conditional desires, hopes, fears etc. As well as conditional statements, there are conditional commands, questions, offers, promises, bets etc.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.3.4)
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
13764 Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
     Full Idea: Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? Are they non-truth-functional, like 'because' or 'before'? Do the values of A and B, in some cases, leave open the value of 'If A,B'?
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
     A reaction: I would say they are not truth-functional, because the 'if' asserts some further dependency relation that goes beyond the truth or falsity of A and B. Logical ifs, causal ifs, psychological ifs... The material conditional ⊃ is truth-functional.
13765 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
     Full Idea: If it were possible to have A true, B false, and If A,B true, it would be unsafe to infer B from A and If A,B: modus ponens would thus be invalid. Hence 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B).
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
     A reaction: This is a firm defence of part of the truth-functional view of conditionals, and seems unassailable. The other parts of the truth table are open to question, though, if A is false, or they are both true.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
22381 Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities [Foot]
     Full Idea: Being a good father, or daughter, or friend seems to depend on one's intentions, rather than on such things as cleverness and strength.
     From: Philippa Foot (Goodness and Choice [1961], p.138)
     A reaction: Not sure about that. In wartime a good father might need to be actually brave, and in times of hardship be actually economically successful. 'He meant well, but he was a hopeless father'?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
20195 Eudaimonia first; virtue is a trait which promotes it; right acts are what virtues produce [Hursthouse, by Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Hursthouse defines a virtue as a trait humans need to flourish or live well, ...so 'eudaimonia' is conceptually foundational, the concept of virtue is then derived, and the concept of a right act is derived from that.
     From: report of Rosalind Hursthouse (Virtue Theory and Abortion [1992], p.226) by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind II.1
     A reaction: Zagzebski is mapping different types of virtue theory. The purest theories say that virtue is intrinsically good. The others seem to be instrumental, in varying degrees. Zagzebski makes good motivations prior.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
22380 Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function [Foot]
     Full Idea: The word 'knife' names an object in respect of its function. That is not to say (simply) that it names an object which has a function, but also that the function is involved in the meaning of the word.
     From: Philippa Foot (Goodness and Choice [1961], p.134)
     A reaction: It seems faintly possible that someone (a child, perhaps) could know the word and recognise the object, but not know what the object is for. Ditto with other things which have functional names.