Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conditionals', 'Categories, Classification, Cogn. Anthropology' and 'Whose Justice? Which Rationality?'

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7 ideas

7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Several words may label a category; one word can name several categories; some categories lack words [Ellen]
     Full Idea: Words are not always a good guide to the existence of categories: there may be several words which label the same categories (synonyms). and the same word can be used for quite different ideas. Some categories may exist without being labelled.
     From: Roy Ellen (Categories, Classification, Cogn. Anthropology [2006], I)
     A reaction: This is the sort of point which seems obvious to anyone outside philosophy, but which philosophers seem to find difficult to accept. Philosophers should pay much more attention to animals, and to illiterate peoples. Varieties of rice can lack labels.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
     Full Idea: If your interest in logic is confined to applications to mathematics or other a priori matters, it is fine for validity to preserve certainty, ..but if you use conditionals when arguing about contingent matters, then great caution will be required.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.2.1)
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
     Full Idea: As well as conditional beliefs, there are conditional desires, hopes, fears etc. As well as conditional statements, there are conditional commands, questions, offers, promises, bets etc.
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.3.4)
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
     Full Idea: Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? Are they non-truth-functional, like 'because' or 'before'? Do the values of A and B, in some cases, leave open the value of 'If A,B'?
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
     A reaction: I would say they are not truth-functional, because the 'if' asserts some further dependency relation that goes beyond the truth or falsity of A and B. Logical ifs, causal ifs, psychological ifs... The material conditional ⊃ is truth-functional.
'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
     Full Idea: If it were possible to have A true, B false, and If A,B true, it would be unsafe to infer B from A and If A,B: modus ponens would thus be invalid. Hence 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B).
     From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
     A reaction: This is a firm defence of part of the truth-functional view of conditionals, and seems unassailable. The other parts of the truth table are open to question, though, if A is false, or they are both true.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Relativism can be seen as about the rationality of different cultural traditions [MacIntyre, by Kusch]
     Full Idea: MacIntyre formulates relativism in terms of rationality rather than truth or objectivity. Things are rational relative to some particular tradition, but not rational as such.
     From: report of Alasdair MacIntyre (Whose Justice? Which Rationality? [1988], p.352) by Martin Kusch - Knowledge by Agreement Ch.19
     A reaction: Personally I had always taken it to be about truth, and I expect any account of rationality to be founded on a notion of truth. There can clearly be cultural traditions of evidence, and possibly even of logic (though I doubt it).
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Liberals debate how conservative or radical to be, but don't question their basics [MacIntyre]
     Full Idea: Contemporary debates within modern political systems are almost exclusively between conservative liberals, liberal liberals, and radical liberals. There is little place for the criticism of the system itself.
     From: Alasdair MacIntyre (Whose Justice? Which Rationality? [1988]), quoted by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 01
     A reaction: [No page number given] Kekes seems to be more authoritarian, and MacIntyre is a communitarian (which can be rather authoritarian). I'm dubious about both.