13764
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Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
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Full Idea:
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? Are they non-truth-functional, like 'because' or 'before'? Do the values of A and B, in some cases, leave open the value of 'If A,B'?
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From:
Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
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A reaction:
I would say they are not truth-functional, because the 'if' asserts some further dependency relation that goes beyond the truth or falsity of A and B. Logical ifs, causal ifs, psychological ifs... The material conditional ⊃ is truth-functional.
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13765
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'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
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Full Idea:
If it were possible to have A true, B false, and If A,B true, it would be unsafe to infer B from A and If A,B: modus ponens would thus be invalid. Hence 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B).
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From:
Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
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A reaction:
This is a firm defence of part of the truth-functional view of conditionals, and seems unassailable. The other parts of the truth table are open to question, though, if A is false, or they are both true.
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13048
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Good explications are exact, fruitful, simple and similar to the explicandum [Carnap, by Salmon]
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Full Idea:
Carnap's four criteria for giving a good explication are similarity to the explicandum, exactness, fruitfulness and simplicity.
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From:
report of Rudolph Carnap (Logical Foundations of Probability [1950], Ch.1) by Wesley Salmon - Four Decades of Scientific Explanation 0.1
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A reaction:
[compressed] Salmon's view is that this represents the old attitude, that the contribution of philosophy to explanation is the clarification of the key concepts. Carnap is, of course, a logical empiricist.
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11945
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In addition to laws, God must also create appropriate natures for things [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
It isn't sufficient to say that God has made a general law, for in addition to the decree there has also to be a natural way of carrying it out. It is necessary, that is, that what happens should be explicable in terms of the God-given nature of things.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letter to the Editor about Bayle [1698], p.205)
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A reaction:
Thus Leibniz is an ancestor of scientific essentialism, but he was too frightened to take the next step, which is to see that once God has endowed the natures, he doesn't need to wield his laws as well. The natures will do the whole job.
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