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15590
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It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Once Frege had provided a clear syntactic account of variables and once Tarski had supplemented this with a rigorous semantic account, it would appear that there was nothing more of significance to be said.
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1)
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A reaction:
He later remarks that there are now three semantic accounts: the Tarskian, the instantial, and the algebraic [see xref ideas]. He offers a fourth account in his Semantic Relationism. This grows from his puzzles about variables.
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15591
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In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
When we consider the semantic role of 'x' and 'y' in two distinct expressions x>0 and y>0, their semantic roles seems the same. But in the same expression, such as x>y, their roles seem to be different.
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.A)
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A reaction:
[compressed] This new puzzle about variables leads Fine to say that the semantics of variables, and other expressions, is not intrinsic to them, but depends on their external relations. Variables denote any term - unless another variable got there first.
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13764
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Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
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Full Idea:
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? Are they non-truth-functional, like 'because' or 'before'? Do the values of A and B, in some cases, leave open the value of 'If A,B'?
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From:
Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
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A reaction:
I would say they are not truth-functional, because the 'if' asserts some further dependency relation that goes beyond the truth or falsity of A and B. Logical ifs, causal ifs, psychological ifs... The material conditional ⊃ is truth-functional.
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13765
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'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
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Full Idea:
If it were possible to have A true, B false, and If A,B true, it would be unsafe to infer B from A and If A,B: modus ponens would thus be invalid. Hence 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B).
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From:
Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
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A reaction:
This is a firm defence of part of the truth-functional view of conditionals, and seems unassailable. The other parts of the truth table are open to question, though, if A is false, or they are both true.
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15602
|
Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Mental files should be seen as a device for keeping track of when objects are coordinated (represented as-the-same) and, rather than understand coordination in terms of mental files, we should understand mental files in terms of coordination.
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 3.A)
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A reaction:
Personally I think that the metaphor of a 'label' is much closer to the situation than that of a 'file'. Thus my concept of Cicero is labelled 'Tully', 'Roman', 'orator', 'philosophical example'... My problem is to distinguish the concept from its labels.
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15589
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The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
For holists a proper theory will be broadly inferential, while for their opponents it will be representational in character, describing relations between expressions and reality. Representational semantics is atomist, holist semantics inferential.
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Intro)
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A reaction:
Fine presents these as the two main schools in semantics. His own theory then proposes a more holistic version of the Representational view. He seeks the advantages of Frege's position, but without 'sense'.
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15598
|
We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
A 'semantics' is a body of semantic facts, and a 'semantic theory' is a body of semantic truths. The natural order is a theory being understood as truths, which state facts. Davidson, alas, reversed this order, with facts understood through theories.
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.C)
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A reaction:
[compressed; he cites Davidson 1967, and calls it 'one of the most unfortunate tendencies in modern philosophy of language, ..as if chemistry were understood in terms of formulae rather than chemical facts'].
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15600
|
Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
The standard referentialist semantics for a language with names is that the semantic value of the name is the object, the content of a predicate is a property, and the content of a logical connective is an operation on propositions.
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.F)
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A reaction:
My particular bęte noire is the idea that every predicate names a property. It is the tyranny of having to have a comprehensive semantic theory that drives this implausible picture. And I don't see how an object can be a semantic value…
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15601
|
Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Fregeans emphasise an orientation towards the speaker: possession of sense makes language meaningful, and language relates to the world through sense. For the Referentialist its representational relationships make it meaningful, and relate it to the world
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.G)
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A reaction:
The Referentialist approach is for Kripkean fans of direct reference, rather than the Fregean reference through descriptions. I am inclined to favour the old-fashioned, deeply discredited, much mocked Fregean approach.
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22754
|
Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it [Sext.Empiricus]
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Full Idea:
Asserting that the good is 'the useful', or 'what is choiceworthy for its own sake', or 'that which contributes to happiness', does not teach us what good is but states its accidental property.
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From:
Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.35)
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A reaction:
This seems to be a pretty accurate statement of Moore's famous Open Question argument. I read it in an Aristotelian way - that that quest is always for the essential nature of the thing itself, not for its role or function or use.
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22755
|
Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone [Sext.Empiricus]
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Full Idea:
Just as fire which is warmth-giving by nature warms all men, and does not chill some of them, so what is good by nature ought to be good for all, and not good for some but not good for others.
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From:
Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.69)
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A reaction:
This is going to confine the naturally good to the basics of life, which we all share. Is a love of chess a natural good? It seems to capture an aspect of human nature, without appealing to everyone. Sextus says nothing is good for everyone.
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22756
|
If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it [Sext.Empiricus]
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Full Idea:
If the desire for wealth or health is desirable, we ought not to purse wealth or health, lest by acquiring them we cease to desire them any longer.
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From:
Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.81)
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A reaction:
He is investigating whether desires can be desirable, and if so which ones. Roots of this are in Plato's 'Gorgias' on drinking water. Similar to 'if compassion is the highest good then we need lots of suffering'. Desire must be a means, not an end.
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