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23392
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The Dao (Way) first means the road, and comes to mean the right way to live [Norden]
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Full Idea:
The 'Dao' (tr 'Way) has five meanings: 1) path or road, 2) mode of doing something, 3) account of how to do something, 4) the right way to live, and 5) the ultimate metaphysical entity responsible for nature, and how it should be.
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From:
Bryan van Norden (Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy [2011], 1.III)
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A reaction:
[compressed] So it is essentially metaphorical, just like the English 'way to do a thing'. Number 5 seems a rather large leap from the others, and most discussion seems to centre on number 4. The Chinese hoped for consensus on the Dao.
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23408
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The hermeneutic circle is either within the text, or between text and biased reader [Norden]
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Full Idea:
The first type of hermeneutic circle operates inside the text, studying relationships between sentences. …The second type is between the text and the reader, …who brings assumptions about what it means.
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From:
Bryan van Norden (Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy [2011], App A.I)
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A reaction:
The first kind is an essential aspect of reading well. Readers are biased, but I get very tired of those who do nothing but search for bias, and ignore the truth a text has to offer. If everything is bias, intellectual life is dead.
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13764
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Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
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Full Idea:
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? Are they non-truth-functional, like 'because' or 'before'? Do the values of A and B, in some cases, leave open the value of 'If A,B'?
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From:
Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
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A reaction:
I would say they are not truth-functional, because the 'if' asserts some further dependency relation that goes beyond the truth or falsity of A and B. Logical ifs, causal ifs, psychological ifs... The material conditional ⊃ is truth-functional.
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13765
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'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
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Full Idea:
If it were possible to have A true, B false, and If A,B true, it would be unsafe to infer B from A and If A,B: modus ponens would thus be invalid. Hence 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B).
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From:
Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
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A reaction:
This is a firm defence of part of the truth-functional view of conditionals, and seems unassailable. The other parts of the truth table are open to question, though, if A is false, or they are both true.
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16975
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Essences are used to explain natural kinds, modality, and causal powers [Tahko]
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Full Idea:
Essences are supposed to do a lot of explanatory work: natural kinds can be identified in terms of their essences, metaphysical modality can be reduced to essence, the causal power of objects can be explained with the help of essence.
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From:
Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 1)
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A reaction:
Natural kinds and modality are OK with me, but I'm dubious about the third one. If an essence explains something's causal powers, I have no idea what an essence might be. Essence are largely characterised in terms of causal powers.
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16977
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If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko]
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Full Idea:
If essence is conceived in terms of modality and the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, it seems that the laws of nature constitute essentialist knowledge, so the discovery of essences is mostly due to scientists.
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From:
Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 2.1)
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A reaction:
This seems muddled to me. The idea that the laws themselves are essences is way off target. No one thinks all knowledge of necessities is essentialist. Mumford, for example, doesn't even believe in laws.
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