Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conditionals', 'The Pragmatist Account of Truth' and 'Demonstratives'

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9 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction

22642	Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James]
	Full Idea: After man's interest in breathing freely, the greatest of all his interests (because it never fluctuates or remits….) is his interest in consistency, in feeling that what he now thinks goes with what he thinks on other occasions.
	From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Seventh')
	A reaction: People notoriously contradict themselves all the time, but I suspect that it is when they get out of their depth in complexities such as politics. They probably achieve great consistency within their own expertise, and in common knowledge.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths

22641	Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James]
	Full Idea: Realities are not true, they are; and beliefs are true of them.
	From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth')
	A reaction: At last, a remark by James about truth which I really like. For 'realities' I would use the word 'facts'.

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals

13768	Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
	Full Idea: If your interest in logic is confined to applications to mathematics or other a priori matters, it is fine for validity to preserve certainty, ..but if you use conditionals when arguing about contingent matters, then great caution will be required.
	From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.2.1)

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional

13770	There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
	Full Idea: As well as conditional beliefs, there are conditional desires, hopes, fears etc. As well as conditional statements, there are conditional commands, questions, offers, promises, bets etc.
	From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.3.4)

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals

13764	Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
	Full Idea: Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? Are they non-truth-functional, like 'because' or 'before'? Do the values of A and B, in some cases, leave open the value of 'If A,B'?
	From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
	A reaction: I would say they are not truth-functional, because the 'if' asserts some further dependency relation that goes beyond the truth or falsity of A and B. Logical ifs, causal ifs, psychological ifs... The material conditional ⊃ is truth-functional.

13765	'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
	Full Idea: If it were possible to have A true, B false, and If A,B true, it would be unsafe to infer B from A and If A,B: modus ponens would thus be invalid. Hence 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B).
	From: Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.1)
	A reaction: This is a firm defence of part of the truth-functional view of conditionals, and seems unassailable. The other parts of the truth table are open to question, though, if A is false, or they are both true.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism

22640	We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James]
	Full Idea: We find satisfaction in consistency between the present idea and the entire rest of our mental equipment, including the whole order of our sensations, and that of our intuitions of likeness and difference, and our whole stock previously acquired truths.
	From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth')
	A reaction: I like this, apart from the idea that the criterion of good coherence seems to be subjective 'satisfaction'. We should ask why some large set of beliefs is coherent. I assume nature is coherent, and truth is the best explanation of our coherence about it.

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics

14894	Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
	Full Idea: Kaplan distinguished two different semantic features of indexical expressions: a 'character' that captures the standing meaning of the expression, and a 'content' that consists of their truth-conditional contribution in particular contexts.
	From: report of David Kaplan (Demonstratives [1989]) by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 1
	A reaction: This seems so clearly right that there isn't much to dispute. You can't understand the word 'I' or 'now' if you don't understand both its general purpose, and what it is doing in a particular utterance. But will this generalise to other semantics?

14700	'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter]
	Full Idea: Kaplan sees two aspects of meaning, the 'content', reflecting a thing's modal profile, which is modelled by standard possible worlds semantics, and 'character', giving rules for different contexts. Proper names have constant character; indexicals vary.
	From: report of David Kaplan (Demonstratives [1989]) by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 1.1.1
	A reaction: This gives rise to 2-D matrices for representing meaning, and the possible worlds are used twice, for evaluating meaning and then for evaluating context of use. I've always been struck by the two-dimensional semantics of passwords.