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45 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 1. History of Ideas
Our knowledge starts in theology, passes through metaphysics, and ends in positivism [Comte]
     Full Idea: Our principal conceptions, each branch of our knowledge, passes in succession through three different theoretical states: the theological or fictitious state, the metaphysical or abstract state, and the scientific or positive state.
     From: Auguste Comte (Intro to Positive Philosophy [1830], Ch.1)
     A reaction: See Idea 5077 for the abstraction step. The idea that there is a 'law' here, as Comte thinks, is daft, but something of what he describes is undeniable. I suspect, though, that science rests on abstractions, so the last part is wrong.
All ideas must be understood historically [Comte]
     Full Idea: No idea can be properly understood apart from its history.
     From: Auguste Comte (Intro to Positive Philosophy [1830], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This is somewhat dubious. Comte is preparing the ground for asserting positivism by rejecting out-of-date theology and metaphysics. The history is revealing, but can be misleading, when a meaning shifts. Try 'object' in logic.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Metaphysics is just the oversubtle qualification of abstract names for phenomena [Comte]
     Full Idea: The development of positivism was caused by the concept of metaphysical agents gradually becoming so empty through oversubtle qualification that all right-minded persons considered them to be only the abstract names of the phenomena in question.
     From: Auguste Comte (Intro to Positive Philosophy [1830], Ch.1)
     A reaction: I have quite a lot of sympathy with this thesis, but not couched in this negative way. I take abstraction to be essential to scientific thought, and wisdom to occur amongst the higher reaches of the abstractions.
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
Positivism gives up absolute truth, and seeks phenomenal laws, by reason and observation [Comte]
     Full Idea: In the positive state, the human mind, recognizing the impossibility of obtaining absolute truth, gives up the search for hidden and final causes. It endeavours to discover, by well-combined reasoning and observation, the actual laws of phenomena.
     From: Auguste Comte (Intro to Positive Philosophy [1830], Ch.1)
     A reaction: [compressed] Positivism attempted to turn the Humean regularity view of laws into a semi-religion. It is striking how pessimistic Comte was (as was Hume) about the chances of science revealing deep explanations. He would be astoundeds.
Positivism is the final state of human intelligence [Comte]
     Full Idea: The positive philosophy represents the true final state of human intelligence.
     From: Auguste Comte (Intro to Positive Philosophy [1830], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This is the sort of remark which made Comte notorious, and it looks a bit extravagant now, but the debate about his view is still ongoing. I am certainly sympathetic to his general drift.
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Science can drown in detail, so we need broad scientists (to keep out the metaphysicians) [Comte]
     Full Idea: Getting lost in a mass of detail is the weak side of positivism, where partisans of theology and metaphysics may attack with some hope of success. ...We must train scientists who will consider all the different branches of positive science.
     From: Auguste Comte (Intro to Positive Philosophy [1830], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This would be Comte's answer now to those who claim there is still a role for metaphysics within the scientific world view. I would say that metaphysics not only takes an overview, but also deals with higher generalisations than Comte's general scientist.
Only positivist philosophy can terminate modern social crises [Comte]
     Full Idea: We may look upon the positive philosophy as constituting the only solid basis for the social reorganisation that must terminate the crisis in which the most civilized nations have found themselves for so long.
     From: Auguste Comte (Intro to Positive Philosophy [1830], Ch.1)
     A reaction: He is proposing not only to use positivist methods to solve social problems (he coined the word 'sociology'), but is also proposing that positivism itself should act as the unifying belief-system for future society. Science will be our religion.
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: While truth can be defined in a relative way, as truth in one particular model, a non-relative notion of truth is implied, as truth in all models.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4)
     A reaction: [The article is actually discussing arithmetic] This idea strikes me as extremely important. True-in-all-models is usually taken to be tautological, but it does seem to give a more universal notion of truth. See semantic truth, Tarski, Davidson etc etc.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: In standard ZFC ('Zermelo-Fraenkel with Choice') set theory we deal merely with pure sets, not with additional urelements.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2)
     A reaction: The 'urelements' would the actual objects that are members of the sets, be they physical or abstract. This idea is crucial to understanding philosophy of mathematics, and especially logicism. Must the sets exist, just as the urelements do?
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: In second-order logic there are three kinds of variables, for objects, for functions, and for predicates or sets.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5)
     A reaction: It is interesting that a predicate seems to be the same as a set, which begs rather a lot of questions. For those who dislike second-order logic, there seems nothing instrinsically wicked in having variables ranging over innumerable multi-order types.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2)
     A reaction: 'Analysis' began with the infinitesimal calculus, which later built on the concept of 'limit'. A continuum of numbers seems to be required to make that work.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: The difficulties for a nominalistic mereological approach to arithmetic is that an infinity of physical objects are needed (space-time points? strokes?), and it must define functions, such as 'successor'.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4)
     A reaction: Many ontologically austere accounts of arithmetic are faced with the problem of infinity. The obvious non-platonist response seems to be a modal or if-then approach. To postulate infinite abstract or physical entities so that we can add 3 and 2 is mad.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: A common formulation of Peano Arithmetic uses 2nd-order logic, the constant '1', and a one-place function 's' ('successor'). Three axioms then give '1 is not a successor', 'different numbers have different successors', and induction.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2)
     A reaction: This is 'second-order' Peano Arithmetic, though it is at least as common to formulate in first-order terms (only quantifying over objects, not over properties - as is done here in the induction axiom). I like the use of '1' as basic instead of '0'!
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: The merits of basing an account of mathematics on set theory are that it allows for a comprehensive unified treatment of many otherwise separate branches of mathematics, and that all assumption, including existence, are explicit in the axioms.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4)
     A reaction: I am forming the impression that set-theory provides one rather good model (maybe the best available) for mathematics, but that doesn't mean that mathematics is set-theory. The best map of a landscape isn't a landscape.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: Structuralism has emerged from the development of abstract algebra (such as group theory), the creation of axiom systems, the introduction of set theory, and Bourbaki's encyclopaedic survey of set theoretic structures.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2)
     A reaction: In other words, mathematics has gradually risen from one level of abstraction to the next, so that mathematical entities like points and numbers receive less and less attention, with relationships becoming more prominent.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: Relativist Structuralism simply picks one particular model of axiomatised arithmetic (i.e. one particular interpretation that satisfies the axioms), and then stipulates what the elements, functions and quantifiers refer to.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4)
     A reaction: The point is that a successful model can be offered, and it doesn't matter which one, like having any sort of aeroplane, as long as it flies. I don't find this approach congenial, though having a model is good. What is the essence of flight?
There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: The term 'structure' has two uses in the literature, what can be called 'particular structures' (which are particular relational systems), but also what can be called 'universal structures' - what particular systems share, or what they instantiate.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §6)
     A reaction: This is a very helpful distinction, because it clarifies why (rather to my surprise) some structuralists turn out to be platonists in a new guise. Personal my interest in structuralism has been anti-platonist from the start.
Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: According to 'pattern' structuralism, what we study are not the various particular isomorphic models of arithmetic, but something in addition to them: a corresponding pattern.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §7)
     A reaction: Put like that, we have to feel a temptation to wield Ockham's Razor. It's bad enough trying to give the structure of all the isomorphic models, without seeking an even more abstract account of underlying patterns. But patterns connect to minds..
There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: There are four main variants of structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics - formalist structuralism, relativist structuralism, universalist structuralism (with modal variants), and pattern structuralism.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §9)
     A reaction: I'm not sure where Chihara's later book fits into this, though it is at the nominalist end of the spectrum. Shapiro and Resnik do patterns (the latter more loosely); Hellman does modal universalism; Quine does the relativist version. Dedekind?
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: Formalist Structuralism endorses structural methodology in mathematics, but rejects semantic and metaphysical problems as either meaningless, or purely formal, or as inference relations.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §3)
     A reaction: [very compressed] I find the third option fairly congenial, certainly in preference to rather platonist accounts of structuralism. One still needs to distinguish the mathematical from the non-mathematical in the inference relations.
Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: It is tempting to take a modal turn, and quantify over all possible objects, because if there are only a finite number of actual objects, then there are no models (of the right sort) for Peano Arithmetic, and arithmetic is vacuously true.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5)
     A reaction: [compressed; Geoffrey Hellman is the chief champion of this view] The article asks whether we are not still left with the puzzle of whether infinitely many objects are possible, instead of existent.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: Universalist Structuralism is a semantic thesis, that an arithmetical statement asserts a universal if-then statement. We build an if-then statement (using quantifiers) into the structure, and we generalise away from any one particular model.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5)
     A reaction: There remains the question of what is distinctively mathematical about the highly generalised network of inferences that is being described. Presumable the axioms capture that, but why those particular axioms? Russell is cited as an originator.
Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: Universalist Structuralism is eliminativist about abstract objects, in a distinctive form. Instead of treating the base element (say '1') as an ambiguous referring expression (the Relativist approach), it is a variable which is quantified out.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5)
     A reaction: I am a temperamental eliminativist on this front (and most others) so this is tempting. I am also in love with the concept of a 'variable', which I take to be utterly fundamental to all conceptual thought, even in animals, and not just a trick of algebra.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: Relativist Structuralism must first assume the existence of an infinite set, otherwise there would be no model to pick, and arithmetical terms would have no reference.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4)
     A reaction: See Idea 10169 for Relativist Structuralism. They point out that ZFC has an Axiom of Infinity.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: One way for a nominalist to reject appeal to all abstract objects, including sets, is to only appeal to nominalistically acceptable objects, including mereological sums.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4)
     A reaction: I'm suddenly thinking that this looks very interesting and might be the way to go. The issue seems to be whether mereological sums should be seen as constrained by nature, or whether they are unrestricted. See Mereology in Ontology...|Intrinsic Identity.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
All real knowledge rests on observed facts [Comte]
     Full Idea: All competent thinkers agree with Bacon that there can be no real knowledge except that which rests upon observed facts.
     From: Auguste Comte (Intro to Positive Philosophy [1830], Ch.1)
     A reaction: Are there any unobservable facts? If so, can we know them? The only plausible route is to add 'best explanation' to the positivist armoury. With positivism, empiricism became - for a while - a quasi-religion.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
We must observe in order to form theories, but connected observations need prior theories [Comte]
     Full Idea: There is a difficulty: the human mind had to observe in order to form real theories; and yet it had to form theories of some sort before it could apply itself to a connected series of observations.
     From: Auguste Comte (Intro to Positive Philosophy [1830], Ch.1)
     A reaction: Comte's view is that we get started by forming a silly theory (religion), and then refine the theory once the observations get going. Note that Comte has sort of anticipated the Quine-Duhem thesis.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Positivism explains facts by connecting particular phenomena with general facts [Comte]
     Full Idea: In positivism the explanation of facts consists only in the connection established between different particular phenomena and some general facts, the number of which the progress of science tends more and more to diminish.
     From: Auguste Comte (Intro to Positive Philosophy [1830], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This seems to be the ancestor of Hempel's more precisely formulated 'covering law' account, which became very fashionably, and now seems fairly discredited. It is just a fancy version of Humeanism about laws.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Introspection is pure illusion; we can obviously observe everything except ourselves [Comte]
     Full Idea: The pretended direct contemplation of the mind by itself is a pure illusion. ...It is clear that, by an inevitable necessity, the human mind can observe all phenomena directly, except its own.
     From: Auguste Comte (Intro to Positive Philosophy [1830], Ch.1)
     A reaction: I recently heard of a university psychology department which was seeking skilled introspectors to help with their researches. I take introspection to be very difficult, but partially possible. Read Proust.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Freedom to live according to our own conception of the good is the ultimate value [Nozick, by Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: Nozick says that the freedom to lead our lives in accordance with our own conception of the good is the ultimate value, so important that it cannot be sacrificed for other social ideals (e.g. equality of opportunity).
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.2.b.ii
     A reaction: Clearly this ultimate value will not apply to children, so this view needs a sharp dislocation between children and adults. But some adults need a lot of looking after. Maybe we ALL need looking after (by one another)?
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
If an experience machine gives you any experience you want, should you hook up for life? [Nozick]
     Full Idea: Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired ...such as writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. ...Should you plug into this machine for life?
     From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], 3 'Experience')
     A reaction: A classic though experiment which crystalises a major problem with hedonistic utilitarianism. My addition is a machine which maximises the pleasure of my family and friends, to save me the bother of doing it.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
A minimal state should protect, but a state forcing us to do more is unjustified [Nozick]
     Full Idea: A minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; any more extensive state will violate persons' rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified.
     From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], Pref)
     A reaction: This has some plausibility for a huge modern state, where we don't know one another, but it would be a ridiculous attitude in a traditional village.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Individual rights are so strong that the state and its officials must be very limited in power [Nozick]
     Full Idea: Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do.
     From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], Pref)
     A reaction: This claim appears to be an axiom, but I'm not sure that the notion of 'rights' make any sense unless someone is granting the rights, where the someone is either a strong individual, or the community (perhaps represented by the state).
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
States can't enforce mutual aid on citizens, or interfere for their own good [Nozick]
     Full Idea: A state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purposes of getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for their own good or protection.
     From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], Pref)
     A reaction: You certainly can't apply these principles to children, so becoming an 'adult' seems to be a very profound step in Nozick's account. At what age must we stop interfering with people for their own good. If the state is prohibited, are neighbours also?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
My Anarchy, State and Utopia neglected our formal social ties and concerns [Nozick on Nozick]
     Full Idea: The political philosophy represented in Anarchy, State and Utopia ignored the importance of joint and official symbolic statement and expression of our social ties and concern, and hence (I have written) is inadequate.
     From: comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.32) by Robert Nozick - The Nature of Rationality p.32
     A reaction: In other words, it was far too individualistic, and neglected community, even though it has become the sacred text for libertarian individualism. Do any Nozick fans care about this recantation?
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
If people hold things legitimately, just distribution is simply the result of free exchanges [Nozick, by Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: If we assume that everyone is entitled to the goods they currently possess (their 'holdings'), then a just distribution is simply whatever distribution results from people's free exchanges.
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.1.b
     A reaction: If people's current 'legitimate' holdings are hugely unequal, it seems very unlikely that the ensuing exchanges will be 'free' in the way that Nozick envisages.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Property is legitimate by initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, or rectification of injustice [Nozick, by Swift]
     Full Idea: Nozick identified three ways in which people can acquire a legitimate property holding: initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, and rectification (of unjust transfers).
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 1 'Nozick'
     A reaction: I think it is a delusion to look for justice in the ownership of property. You can't claim justice for buying property if the money to do it was acquired unjustly. And what rights over those who live on the land come with the 'ownership'?
Nozick assumes initial holdings include property rights, but we can challenge that [Kymlicka on Nozick]
     Full Idea: Nozick assumes that the initial distribution of holdings includes full property-rights over them, ..but our preferred theory may not involve distributing such particular rights to particular people. ...The legitimacy of such rights is what is in question.
     From: comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.1.c
     A reaction: [somewhat compressed] All of these political philosophies seem to have questionable values (such as freedom or equality) built into their initial assumptions.
How did the private property get started? If violence was involved, we can redistribute it [Kymlicka on Nozick]
     Full Idea: How did these natural resources, which were not initially owned by anyone, come to be part of someone's private property? ...The fact that the initial acquisition often involved force means there is no moral objection to redistributing existing wealth.
     From: comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.2.b
     A reaction: [He cites G.A. Cphen 1988 for the second point] Put like this, Nozick's theory just looks like the sort of propaganda which is typically put out by the winners. Is there an implicit threat of violent resistance in his advocacy of individual rights?
Can I come to own the sea, by mixing my private tomato juice with it? [Nozick]
     Full Idea: If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea?
     From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.175)
     A reaction: This is a reductio of Locke's claim that I can own land by 'mixing' my labour with it. At first glance, mixing something with something would seem to have nothing to do with ownership.
If property is only initially acquired by denying the rights of others, Nozick can't get started [Kymlicka on Nozick]
     Full Idea: If there is no way that people can appropriate unowned resources for themselves without denying other people's claim to equal consideration, then Nozick's right of transfer never gets off the ground.
     From: comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.2.b.i
     A reaction: The actual history of these things is too complex to judge. Early peoples desperately wanted a lord to rule over them, and their lord's ownership of the land implied the people's right to live there. See Anglo-Saxon poetry.
Unowned things may be permanently acquired, if it doesn't worsen the position of other people [Nozick]
     Full Idea: One may acquire a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing, as long as the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is not thereby worsened.
     From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.178), quoted by G.A. Cohen - Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? 2
     A reaction: Cohen attacks this vigorously. His main point is that Nozick has a very narrow view of what the acquisition should be compared with. There are many alternatives. Does being made unable to improve something 'worsen' a person's condition?
Maybe land was originally collectively owned, rather than unowned? [Cohen,GA on Nozick]
     Full Idea: Why should we not regard land as originally collectively owned rather than, as Nozick takes for granted, owned by no one?
     From: comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.178) by G.A. Cohen - Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? 2
     A reaction: Did native Americans and Australians collectively own the land? Lots of peoples, I suspect, don't privately own anything, because the very concept has never occured to them (and they have no legal system).
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
The search for first or final causes is futile [Comte]
     Full Idea: We regard the search after what are called causes, whether first or final, as absolutely inaccessible and unmeaning.
     From: Auguste Comte (Intro to Positive Philosophy [1830], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This remark lies behind Russell's rejection of the notion of cause in scientific thinking. Personally it seems to me indispensable, even if we accept that the pursuit of 'final' causes is fairly hopeless. We don't know where the quest will lead.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
We can never know origins, purposes or inner natures [Comte]
     Full Idea: The inner nature of objects, or the origin and purpose of all phenomena, are the most insoluble questions.
     From: Auguste Comte (Intro to Positive Philosophy [1830], Ch.1)
     A reaction: I take it that this Humean pessimism about science ever penetrating below the surface is precisely what is challenged by modern science, and that 'scientific essentialism' is catching up with what has happened. 'Inner' is knowable, bottom level isn't.