34 ideas
14092 | Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen] |
Full Idea: Philosophers can sometimes be too fussy about the words they use, dismissing as 'unintelligible' or 'obscure' certain forms of language that are perfectly meaningful by ordinary standards, and which may be of some real use. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 01) | |
A reaction: Analytic philosophers are inclined to drop terms they can't formalise, but there is more to every concept than its formalisation (Frege's 'direction' for example). I want to rescue 'abstraction' and 'essence'. Rosen says distinguish, don't formalise. |
14100 | Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen] |
Full Idea: From the simple fact that '1' figures in the definition of '2', it does not follow that 1 is part of 2. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 10) | |
A reaction: He observes that quite independent things can be mentioned on the two sides of a definition, with no parthood relation. You begin to wonder what a definition really is. A causal chain? |
10170 | While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: While truth can be defined in a relative way, as truth in one particular model, a non-relative notion of truth is implied, as truth in all models. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4) | |
A reaction: [The article is actually discussing arithmetic] This idea strikes me as extremely important. True-in-all-models is usually taken to be tautological, but it does seem to give a more universal notion of truth. See semantic truth, Tarski, Davidson etc etc. |
10166 | ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: In standard ZFC ('Zermelo-Fraenkel with Choice') set theory we deal merely with pure sets, not with additional urelements. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2) | |
A reaction: The 'urelements' would the actual objects that are members of the sets, be they physical or abstract. This idea is crucial to understanding philosophy of mathematics, and especially logicism. Must the sets exist, just as the urelements do? |
10175 | Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: In second-order logic there are three kinds of variables, for objects, for functions, and for predicates or sets. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5) | |
A reaction: It is interesting that a predicate seems to be the same as a set, which begs rather a lot of questions. For those who dislike second-order logic, there seems nothing instrinsically wicked in having variables ranging over innumerable multi-order types. |
14096 | Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen] |
Full Idea: The failure of monotonicity is a general feature of explanatory relations. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 05) | |
A reaction: In other words, explanations can always shift in the light of new evidence. In principle this is right, but some explanations just seem permanent, like plate-tectonics as explanation for earthquakes. |
10165 | 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2) | |
A reaction: 'Analysis' began with the infinitesimal calculus, which later built on the concept of 'limit'. A continuum of numbers seems to be required to make that work. |
10174 | Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: The difficulties for a nominalistic mereological approach to arithmetic is that an infinity of physical objects are needed (space-time points? strokes?), and it must define functions, such as 'successor'. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4) | |
A reaction: Many ontologically austere accounts of arithmetic are faced with the problem of infinity. The obvious non-platonist response seems to be a modal or if-then approach. To postulate infinite abstract or physical entities so that we can add 3 and 2 is mad. |
10164 | Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: A common formulation of Peano Arithmetic uses 2nd-order logic, the constant '1', and a one-place function 's' ('successor'). Three axioms then give '1 is not a successor', 'different numbers have different successors', and induction. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2) | |
A reaction: This is 'second-order' Peano Arithmetic, though it is at least as common to formulate in first-order terms (only quantifying over objects, not over properties - as is done here in the induction axiom). I like the use of '1' as basic instead of '0'! |
10172 | Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: The merits of basing an account of mathematics on set theory are that it allows for a comprehensive unified treatment of many otherwise separate branches of mathematics, and that all assumption, including existence, are explicit in the axioms. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4) | |
A reaction: I am forming the impression that set-theory provides one rather good model (maybe the best available) for mathematics, but that doesn't mean that mathematics is set-theory. The best map of a landscape isn't a landscape. |
10167 | Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: Structuralism has emerged from the development of abstract algebra (such as group theory), the creation of axiom systems, the introduction of set theory, and Bourbaki's encyclopaedic survey of set theoretic structures. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2) | |
A reaction: In other words, mathematics has gradually risen from one level of abstraction to the next, so that mathematical entities like points and numbers receive less and less attention, with relationships becoming more prominent. |
10169 | Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: Relativist Structuralism simply picks one particular model of axiomatised arithmetic (i.e. one particular interpretation that satisfies the axioms), and then stipulates what the elements, functions and quantifiers refer to. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4) | |
A reaction: The point is that a successful model can be offered, and it doesn't matter which one, like having any sort of aeroplane, as long as it flies. I don't find this approach congenial, though having a model is good. What is the essence of flight? |
10179 | There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: The term 'structure' has two uses in the literature, what can be called 'particular structures' (which are particular relational systems), but also what can be called 'universal structures' - what particular systems share, or what they instantiate. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §6) | |
A reaction: This is a very helpful distinction, because it clarifies why (rather to my surprise) some structuralists turn out to be platonists in a new guise. Personal my interest in structuralism has been anti-platonist from the start. |
10181 | Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: According to 'pattern' structuralism, what we study are not the various particular isomorphic models of arithmetic, but something in addition to them: a corresponding pattern. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §7) | |
A reaction: Put like that, we have to feel a temptation to wield Ockham's Razor. It's bad enough trying to give the structure of all the isomorphic models, without seeking an even more abstract account of underlying patterns. But patterns connect to minds.. |
10182 | There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: There are four main variants of structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics - formalist structuralism, relativist structuralism, universalist structuralism (with modal variants), and pattern structuralism. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §9) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure where Chihara's later book fits into this, though it is at the nominalist end of the spectrum. Shapiro and Resnik do patterns (the latter more loosely); Hellman does modal universalism; Quine does the relativist version. Dedekind? |
10168 | Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: Formalist Structuralism endorses structural methodology in mathematics, but rejects semantic and metaphysical problems as either meaningless, or purely formal, or as inference relations. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §3) | |
A reaction: [very compressed] I find the third option fairly congenial, certainly in preference to rather platonist accounts of structuralism. One still needs to distinguish the mathematical from the non-mathematical in the inference relations. |
10178 | Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: It is tempting to take a modal turn, and quantify over all possible objects, because if there are only a finite number of actual objects, then there are no models (of the right sort) for Peano Arithmetic, and arithmetic is vacuously true. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5) | |
A reaction: [compressed; Geoffrey Hellman is the chief champion of this view] The article asks whether we are not still left with the puzzle of whether infinitely many objects are possible, instead of existent. |
10176 | Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: Universalist Structuralism is a semantic thesis, that an arithmetical statement asserts a universal if-then statement. We build an if-then statement (using quantifiers) into the structure, and we generalise away from any one particular model. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5) | |
A reaction: There remains the question of what is distinctively mathematical about the highly generalised network of inferences that is being described. Presumable the axioms capture that, but why those particular axioms? Russell is cited as an originator. |
10177 | Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: Universalist Structuralism is eliminativist about abstract objects, in a distinctive form. Instead of treating the base element (say '1') as an ambiguous referring expression (the Relativist approach), it is a variable which is quantified out. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5) | |
A reaction: I am a temperamental eliminativist on this front (and most others) so this is tempting. I am also in love with the concept of a 'variable', which I take to be utterly fundamental to all conceptual thought, even in animals, and not just a trick of algebra. |
10171 | The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: Relativist Structuralism must first assume the existence of an infinite set, otherwise there would be no model to pick, and arithmetical terms would have no reference. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4) | |
A reaction: See Idea 10169 for Relativist Structuralism. They point out that ZFC has an Axiom of Infinity. |
14097 | Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen] |
Full Idea: Our relation of 'in virtue of' is among facts or truths, whereas Fine's relation (if it is a relation at all) is a relation between a given truth and items whose natures ground that truth. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 07 n10) | |
A reaction: This disagreement between two key players in the current debate on grounding looks rather significant. I think I favour Fine's view, as it seems more naturalistic, and less likely to succumb to conventionalism. |
14095 | Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen] |
Full Idea: Facts are structured entities built up from worldly items rather as sentences are built up from words. They might be identified with Russellian propositions. They are individuated by their constituents and composition, and are fine-grained. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 04) | |
A reaction: I'm a little cautious about the emphasis on being sentence-like. We have Russell's continual warnings against imposing subject-predicate structure on things. I think we should happily talk about 'facts' in metaphysics. |
14093 | An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen] |
Full Idea: One intuitive gloss on 'intrinsic' property is that a property is intrinsic iff whether or not a thing has it depends entirely on how things stand with it and its parts, and not on its relation to some distinct thing. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 02) | |
A reaction: He offers this as a useful reward for reviving 'depends on' in metaphysical talk. The problem here would be to explain the 'thing' and its 'parts' without mentioning the target property. The thing certainly can't be a bundle of tropes. |
10173 | A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: One way for a nominalist to reject appeal to all abstract objects, including sets, is to only appeal to nominalistically acceptable objects, including mereological sums. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4) | |
A reaction: I'm suddenly thinking that this looks very interesting and might be the way to go. The issue seems to be whether mereological sums should be seen as constrained by nature, or whether they are unrestricted. See Mereology in Ontology...|Intrinsic Identity. |
12066 | Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt] |
Full Idea: The differences between Aristotelian essentialism and Kripke's essentialism are so fundamental and pervasive that it is a serious distortion of both views to think of essentialism as a single theory. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], Intro) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be very important, because there is a glib assumption that when essentialism is needed for modal logic, that we must immediately have embraced what Aristotle was saying. Aristotle was better than Kripke. |
12067 | An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt] |
Full Idea: An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition of the entity in question. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is a simple and necessity corrective to the simplistic idea that Aristotle thought that essences just were definitions. Aristotle believes in real essences, not linguistic essences. |
12082 | If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt] |
Full Idea: By holding that the most unified beings have essences in an unqualified sense, while allowing that other beings have them in a qualified sense - we can think of unity as a matter of degree. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 4.3) | |
A reaction: This is Witt's somewhat unorthodox view of how we should read Aristotle. I am sympathetic, if essences are really explanatory. That means they are unstable, and would indeed be likely to come in degrees. |
12089 | Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt] |
Full Idea: The central function of essence is to explain the actual existence of a unified substance. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 5 n1) | |
A reaction: She is offering an interpretation of Aristotle. Since existence is an active and not a passive matter, the identity of the entity will include its dispositions etc., I presume. |
12102 | Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt] |
Full Idea: The radical individuality of essential properties of origin makes them unsuitable for inclusion in an Aristotelian essence. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 6.2) | |
A reaction: Nevertheless, Aristotle believes in individual essences, though these seem to be fixed by definitions, which are composed of combinations of universals. The uniqueness is of the whole definition, not of its parts. |
14094 | The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen] |
Full Idea: Many of our best words in philosophy do not admit of definition, the notion of metaphysical 'necessity' being one pertinent example. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 03) | |
A reaction: Rosen is busy defending words in metaphysics which cannot be pinned down with logical rigour. We are allowed to write □ for 'necessary', and it is accepted by logicians as being stable in a language. |
14101 | Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen] |
Full Idea: Fine says a truth is necessary when it is a logical consequence of the essential truths, but maybe it is a consequence of the essential truths together with the basic grounding laws (the 'Moorean connections'). | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 13) | |
A reaction: I'm with Fine all the way here, as we really don't need to clog nature up with things called 'grounding laws', which are both obscure and inexplicable. Fine's story is the one for naturalistically inclined philosophers. |
14099 | 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen] |
Full Idea: It sounds right to say that Fred's being a bachelor consists in (reduces to) being an unmarried male, but slightly off to say that Fred's being an unmarried male consists in (or reduces to) being a bachelor. There is a corresponding explanatory asymmetry. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 10) | |
A reaction: This emerging understanding of the asymmetry of the idea shows that we are not just dealing with a simple semantic identity. Our concepts are richer than our language. He adds that a ball could be blue in virtue of being cerulean. |
12085 | Reality is directional [Witt] |
Full Idea: Reality is directional. | |
From: Charlotte Witt (Substance and Essence in Aristotle [1989], 4.5) | |
A reaction: [Plucked from context! She attributes the view to Aristotle] This slogan beautifully summarises the 'scientific essentialist' view of reality, based not on so-called 'laws', but on the active powers of the stuffs of reality. |
14098 | An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen] |
Full Idea: To be an acid just is to be a proton donor. | |
From: Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 10) | |
A reaction: My interest here is in whether we can say that we have found the 'essence' of an acid - so we want to know whether something 'deeper' explains the proton-donation. I suspect not. Being a proton donor happens to have a group of related consequences. |