24 ideas
19588 | The highest aim of philosophy is to combine all philosophies into a unity [Novalis] |
Full Idea: He attains the maximum of a philosopher who combines all philosophies into a single philosophy | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 31) | |
A reaction: I have found the epigraph for my big book! Recently a few narrowly analytical philosophers have attempted big books about everything (Sider, Heil, Chalmers), and they get a huge round of applause from me. |
19598 | Philosophy relies on our whole system of learning, and can thus never be complete [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Now all learning is connected - thus philosophy will never be complete. Only in the complete system of all learning will philosophy be truly visible. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 39) | |
A reaction: Philosophy is evidently the unifying subject, which reveals the point of all the other subjects. It matches my maxim that 'science is the servant of philosophy'. |
19586 | Philosophers feed on problems, hoping they are digestible, and spiced with paradox [Novalis] |
Full Idea: The philosopher lives on problems as the human being does on food. An insoluble problem is an indigestible food. What spice is to food, the paradoxical is to problems. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 09) | |
A reaction: Novalis would presumably have disliked Hegel's dialectic, where the best food seems to be the indigestible. |
19587 | Philosophy aims to produce a priori an absolute and artistic world system [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Philosophy ...is the art of producing all our conceptions according to an absolute, artistic idea and of developing the thought of a world system a priori out of the depths of our spirit. | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 19) | |
A reaction: A lovely statement of the dream of building world systems by pure thought - embodying perfectly the view of philosophy despised by logical positivists and modern logical metaphysicians. The Novalis view will never die! I like 'artistic'. |
10170 | While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: While truth can be defined in a relative way, as truth in one particular model, a non-relative notion of truth is implied, as truth in all models. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4) | |
A reaction: [The article is actually discussing arithmetic] This idea strikes me as extremely important. True-in-all-models is usually taken to be tautological, but it does seem to give a more universal notion of truth. See semantic truth, Tarski, Davidson etc etc. |
10166 | ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: In standard ZFC ('Zermelo-Fraenkel with Choice') set theory we deal merely with pure sets, not with additional urelements. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2) | |
A reaction: The 'urelements' would the actual objects that are members of the sets, be they physical or abstract. This idea is crucial to understanding philosophy of mathematics, and especially logicism. Must the sets exist, just as the urelements do? |
19597 | Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Ought not logic, the theory of relations, be applied to mathematics? | |
From: Novalis (Logological Fragments II [1798], 38) | |
A reaction: Bolzano was 19 when his was written. I presume Novalis would have been excited by set theory (even though he was a hyper-romantic). |
10175 | Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: In second-order logic there are three kinds of variables, for objects, for functions, and for predicates or sets. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5) | |
A reaction: It is interesting that a predicate seems to be the same as a set, which begs rather a lot of questions. For those who dislike second-order logic, there seems nothing instrinsically wicked in having variables ranging over innumerable multi-order types. |
10165 | 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2) | |
A reaction: 'Analysis' began with the infinitesimal calculus, which later built on the concept of 'limit'. A continuum of numbers seems to be required to make that work. |
10174 | Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: The difficulties for a nominalistic mereological approach to arithmetic is that an infinity of physical objects are needed (space-time points? strokes?), and it must define functions, such as 'successor'. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4) | |
A reaction: Many ontologically austere accounts of arithmetic are faced with the problem of infinity. The obvious non-platonist response seems to be a modal or if-then approach. To postulate infinite abstract or physical entities so that we can add 3 and 2 is mad. |
10164 | Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: A common formulation of Peano Arithmetic uses 2nd-order logic, the constant '1', and a one-place function 's' ('successor'). Three axioms then give '1 is not a successor', 'different numbers have different successors', and induction. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2) | |
A reaction: This is 'second-order' Peano Arithmetic, though it is at least as common to formulate in first-order terms (only quantifying over objects, not over properties - as is done here in the induction axiom). I like the use of '1' as basic instead of '0'! |
10172 | Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: The merits of basing an account of mathematics on set theory are that it allows for a comprehensive unified treatment of many otherwise separate branches of mathematics, and that all assumption, including existence, are explicit in the axioms. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4) | |
A reaction: I am forming the impression that set-theory provides one rather good model (maybe the best available) for mathematics, but that doesn't mean that mathematics is set-theory. The best map of a landscape isn't a landscape. |
10167 | Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: Structuralism has emerged from the development of abstract algebra (such as group theory), the creation of axiom systems, the introduction of set theory, and Bourbaki's encyclopaedic survey of set theoretic structures. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2) | |
A reaction: In other words, mathematics has gradually risen from one level of abstraction to the next, so that mathematical entities like points and numbers receive less and less attention, with relationships becoming more prominent. |
10169 | Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: Relativist Structuralism simply picks one particular model of axiomatised arithmetic (i.e. one particular interpretation that satisfies the axioms), and then stipulates what the elements, functions and quantifiers refer to. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4) | |
A reaction: The point is that a successful model can be offered, and it doesn't matter which one, like having any sort of aeroplane, as long as it flies. I don't find this approach congenial, though having a model is good. What is the essence of flight? |
10179 | There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: The term 'structure' has two uses in the literature, what can be called 'particular structures' (which are particular relational systems), but also what can be called 'universal structures' - what particular systems share, or what they instantiate. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §6) | |
A reaction: This is a very helpful distinction, because it clarifies why (rather to my surprise) some structuralists turn out to be platonists in a new guise. Personal my interest in structuralism has been anti-platonist from the start. |
10181 | Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: According to 'pattern' structuralism, what we study are not the various particular isomorphic models of arithmetic, but something in addition to them: a corresponding pattern. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §7) | |
A reaction: Put like that, we have to feel a temptation to wield Ockham's Razor. It's bad enough trying to give the structure of all the isomorphic models, without seeking an even more abstract account of underlying patterns. But patterns connect to minds.. |
10182 | There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: There are four main variants of structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics - formalist structuralism, relativist structuralism, universalist structuralism (with modal variants), and pattern structuralism. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §9) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure where Chihara's later book fits into this, though it is at the nominalist end of the spectrum. Shapiro and Resnik do patterns (the latter more loosely); Hellman does modal universalism; Quine does the relativist version. Dedekind? |
10168 | Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: Formalist Structuralism endorses structural methodology in mathematics, but rejects semantic and metaphysical problems as either meaningless, or purely formal, or as inference relations. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §3) | |
A reaction: [very compressed] I find the third option fairly congenial, certainly in preference to rather platonist accounts of structuralism. One still needs to distinguish the mathematical from the non-mathematical in the inference relations. |
10178 | Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: It is tempting to take a modal turn, and quantify over all possible objects, because if there are only a finite number of actual objects, then there are no models (of the right sort) for Peano Arithmetic, and arithmetic is vacuously true. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5) | |
A reaction: [compressed; Geoffrey Hellman is the chief champion of this view] The article asks whether we are not still left with the puzzle of whether infinitely many objects are possible, instead of existent. |
10176 | Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: Universalist Structuralism is a semantic thesis, that an arithmetical statement asserts a universal if-then statement. We build an if-then statement (using quantifiers) into the structure, and we generalise away from any one particular model. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5) | |
A reaction: There remains the question of what is distinctively mathematical about the highly generalised network of inferences that is being described. Presumable the axioms capture that, but why those particular axioms? Russell is cited as an originator. |
10177 | Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: Universalist Structuralism is eliminativist about abstract objects, in a distinctive form. Instead of treating the base element (say '1') as an ambiguous referring expression (the Relativist approach), it is a variable which is quantified out. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5) | |
A reaction: I am a temperamental eliminativist on this front (and most others) so this is tempting. I am also in love with the concept of a 'variable', which I take to be utterly fundamental to all conceptual thought, even in animals, and not just a trick of algebra. |
10171 | The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: Relativist Structuralism must first assume the existence of an infinite set, otherwise there would be no model to pick, and arithmetical terms would have no reference. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4) | |
A reaction: See Idea 10169 for Relativist Structuralism. They point out that ZFC has an Axiom of Infinity. |
22297 | Dummett saw realism as acceptance of bivalence, rather than of mind-independent entities [Dummett, by Potter] |
Full Idea: Dummett aimed to characterise realism in terms not of the mind-independence of the entities but of the validity of bivalence for sentences referring to them. | |
From: report of Michael Dummett (Realism [1982]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 21 'Lang' | |
A reaction: Hence he called himself a 'philosopher of language', rather than a 'philosopher of thought'. Philosophers of language are more likely to end up as anti-realists, I suspect. |
10173 | A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price] |
Full Idea: One way for a nominalist to reject appeal to all abstract objects, including sets, is to only appeal to nominalistically acceptable objects, including mereological sums. | |
From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4) | |
A reaction: I'm suddenly thinking that this looks very interesting and might be the way to go. The issue seems to be whether mereological sums should be seen as constrained by nature, or whether they are unrestricted. See Mereology in Ontology...|Intrinsic Identity. |