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57 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
The Scientific Revolution was the discovery of our own ignorance [Harari]
     Full Idea: The great discovery of the Scientific Revolution was that humans do not know the answers to their most important question.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 14 'Ignoramus')
     A reaction: I think of that revolution as raising the bar in epistemology, but this idea gives a motivation for doing so. Why the discovery then, and not before?
For millenia people didn't know how to convert one type of energy into another [Harari]
     Full Idea: For millenia people didn't know how to convert one type of energy into another, …and the only machine capable of performing energy conversion was the body.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 17 'Intro')
     A reaction: Hence the huge and revolutionary importance of the steam engine and the electricity generator.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: What is it that is susceptible of truth or falsity? The answers suggested constitute a bewildering variety: sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgments, propositions, statements.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 01)
     A reaction: Carwright's answer is 'statements', which seem to be the same as propositions.
Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: The current fashion among logicians of taking sentences to be the bearers of truth and falsity indicates less an agreement on philosophical theory than a desire for rigor and smoothness in calculative practice.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 01)
     A reaction: A remark close to my heart. Propositions are rejected first because language offers hope of answers, then because they seem metaphysically odd, and finally because you can't pin them down rigorously. But the blighters won't lie down and die.
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: While truth can be defined in a relative way, as truth in one particular model, a non-relative notion of truth is implied, as truth in all models.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4)
     A reaction: [The article is actually discussing arithmetic] This idea strikes me as extremely important. True-in-all-models is usually taken to be tautological, but it does seem to give a more universal notion of truth. See semantic truth, Tarski, Davidson etc etc.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: In standard ZFC ('Zermelo-Fraenkel with Choice') set theory we deal merely with pure sets, not with additional urelements.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2)
     A reaction: The 'urelements' would the actual objects that are members of the sets, be they physical or abstract. This idea is crucial to understanding philosophy of mathematics, and especially logicism. Must the sets exist, just as the urelements do?
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: In second-order logic there are three kinds of variables, for objects, for functions, and for predicates or sets.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5)
     A reaction: It is interesting that a predicate seems to be the same as a set, which begs rather a lot of questions. For those who dislike second-order logic, there seems nothing instrinsically wicked in having variables ranging over innumerable multi-order types.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2)
     A reaction: 'Analysis' began with the infinitesimal calculus, which later built on the concept of 'limit'. A continuum of numbers seems to be required to make that work.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: The difficulties for a nominalistic mereological approach to arithmetic is that an infinity of physical objects are needed (space-time points? strokes?), and it must define functions, such as 'successor'.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4)
     A reaction: Many ontologically austere accounts of arithmetic are faced with the problem of infinity. The obvious non-platonist response seems to be a modal or if-then approach. To postulate infinite abstract or physical entities so that we can add 3 and 2 is mad.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: A common formulation of Peano Arithmetic uses 2nd-order logic, the constant '1', and a one-place function 's' ('successor'). Three axioms then give '1 is not a successor', 'different numbers have different successors', and induction.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2)
     A reaction: This is 'second-order' Peano Arithmetic, though it is at least as common to formulate in first-order terms (only quantifying over objects, not over properties - as is done here in the induction axiom). I like the use of '1' as basic instead of '0'!
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: The merits of basing an account of mathematics on set theory are that it allows for a comprehensive unified treatment of many otherwise separate branches of mathematics, and that all assumption, including existence, are explicit in the axioms.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4)
     A reaction: I am forming the impression that set-theory provides one rather good model (maybe the best available) for mathematics, but that doesn't mean that mathematics is set-theory. The best map of a landscape isn't a landscape.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: Structuralism has emerged from the development of abstract algebra (such as group theory), the creation of axiom systems, the introduction of set theory, and Bourbaki's encyclopaedic survey of set theoretic structures.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2)
     A reaction: In other words, mathematics has gradually risen from one level of abstraction to the next, so that mathematical entities like points and numbers receive less and less attention, with relationships becoming more prominent.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: Relativist Structuralism simply picks one particular model of axiomatised arithmetic (i.e. one particular interpretation that satisfies the axioms), and then stipulates what the elements, functions and quantifiers refer to.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4)
     A reaction: The point is that a successful model can be offered, and it doesn't matter which one, like having any sort of aeroplane, as long as it flies. I don't find this approach congenial, though having a model is good. What is the essence of flight?
There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: The term 'structure' has two uses in the literature, what can be called 'particular structures' (which are particular relational systems), but also what can be called 'universal structures' - what particular systems share, or what they instantiate.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §6)
     A reaction: This is a very helpful distinction, because it clarifies why (rather to my surprise) some structuralists turn out to be platonists in a new guise. Personal my interest in structuralism has been anti-platonist from the start.
Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: According to 'pattern' structuralism, what we study are not the various particular isomorphic models of arithmetic, but something in addition to them: a corresponding pattern.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §7)
     A reaction: Put like that, we have to feel a temptation to wield Ockham's Razor. It's bad enough trying to give the structure of all the isomorphic models, without seeking an even more abstract account of underlying patterns. But patterns connect to minds..
There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: There are four main variants of structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics - formalist structuralism, relativist structuralism, universalist structuralism (with modal variants), and pattern structuralism.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §9)
     A reaction: I'm not sure where Chihara's later book fits into this, though it is at the nominalist end of the spectrum. Shapiro and Resnik do patterns (the latter more loosely); Hellman does modal universalism; Quine does the relativist version. Dedekind?
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: Formalist Structuralism endorses structural methodology in mathematics, but rejects semantic and metaphysical problems as either meaningless, or purely formal, or as inference relations.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §3)
     A reaction: [very compressed] I find the third option fairly congenial, certainly in preference to rather platonist accounts of structuralism. One still needs to distinguish the mathematical from the non-mathematical in the inference relations.
Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: It is tempting to take a modal turn, and quantify over all possible objects, because if there are only a finite number of actual objects, then there are no models (of the right sort) for Peano Arithmetic, and arithmetic is vacuously true.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5)
     A reaction: [compressed; Geoffrey Hellman is the chief champion of this view] The article asks whether we are not still left with the puzzle of whether infinitely many objects are possible, instead of existent.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: Universalist Structuralism is a semantic thesis, that an arithmetical statement asserts a universal if-then statement. We build an if-then statement (using quantifiers) into the structure, and we generalise away from any one particular model.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5)
     A reaction: There remains the question of what is distinctively mathematical about the highly generalised network of inferences that is being described. Presumable the axioms capture that, but why those particular axioms? Russell is cited as an originator.
Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: Universalist Structuralism is eliminativist about abstract objects, in a distinctive form. Instead of treating the base element (say '1') as an ambiguous referring expression (the Relativist approach), it is a variable which is quantified out.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5)
     A reaction: I am a temperamental eliminativist on this front (and most others) so this is tempting. I am also in love with the concept of a 'variable', which I take to be utterly fundamental to all conceptual thought, even in animals, and not just a trick of algebra.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: Relativist Structuralism must first assume the existence of an infinite set, otherwise there would be no model to pick, and arithmetical terms would have no reference.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4)
     A reaction: See Idea 10169 for Relativist Structuralism. They point out that ZFC has an Axiom of Infinity.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price]
     Full Idea: One way for a nominalist to reject appeal to all abstract objects, including sets, is to only appeal to nominalistically acceptable objects, including mereological sums.
     From: E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4)
     A reaction: I'm suddenly thinking that this looks very interesting and might be the way to go. The issue seems to be whether mereological sums should be seen as constrained by nature, or whether they are unrestricted. See Mereology in Ontology...|Intrinsic Identity.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: We cannot take a token of a word to be an occurrence of it. Suppose there is exactly one occurrence of the word 'etherized' in the whole of English poetry? Exactly one 'token'? This sort of occurrence is like the occurrence of a number in a sequence.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], Add 2)
     A reaction: This remark is in an addendum to his paper, criticising his own lax use of the idea of 'token' in the actual paper. The example nicely shows that the type/token distinction isn't neat and tidy - though I consider it very useful.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: It does have to be acknowledged, I think, that every statement whatever is such that there is no one meaning which any sentence used to assert it must have.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 11)
     A reaction: This feels to me like a Gricean move - that what we are really interested in is communicating one mental state to another mental state, and there are all sorts of tools that can do that one job.
People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: No one ever asserts the meaning of the words he utters.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 12)
     A reaction: Cartwright is using this point to drive a wedge between sentence meaning and the assertion made by the utterance. Hence he defends propositions. Presumably people utilise word-meanings, rather than asserting them. Meanings (not words) are tools.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: We need to distinguish 1) what is asserted, 2) that assertion, 3) asserting something, 4) what is predicated, 5) what is uttered, 6) that utterance, 7) uttering something, 8) the utterance token, and 9) the meaning.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 05-06)
     A reaction: [summary of his overall analysis in the paper] It is amazingly hard to offer a critical assessment of this sort of analysis, but it gives you a foot in the door for thinking about the issues with increasing clarity.
'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: A person who utters 'It's raining' one day does not normally make the same statement as one who utters it the next. But these variations are not accompanied by corresponding changes of meaning. The words 'It's raining' retain the same meaning throughout.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 10)
     A reaction: This is important, because it shows that a proposition is not just the mental shadow behind a sentence, or a mental shadow awaiting a sentence. Unlike a sentence, a proposition can (and possibly must) include its own context. Very interesting!
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: We do sometimes say of something to which we have referred that it is true (or false). Are we not ordinarily doing just this when we utter such sentences as 'That's true' and 'What he said was false'?
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 03)
     A reaction: This supports propositions, but doesn't clinch the matter. One could interpret this phenomenon as always being (implicitly) the reference of one sentence to another. However, I remember what he said, but I can't remember how he said it.
To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: In order to assert that p it is not necessary to utter exactly those words. ...Clearly, also, in order to assert that p, it is not sufficient to utter the words that were actually uttered.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 07)
     A reaction: I take the first point to be completely obvious (you can assert one thing with various wordings), and the second seems right after a little thought (the words could be vague, ambiguous, inaccurate, contextual)
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: Whereas what is asserted can be said to be accurate, exaggerated, unfounded, overdrawn, probable, improbable, plausible, true, or false, none of these can be said of the meaning of a sentence.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 12)
     A reaction: That fairly firmly kicks into touch the idea that the assertion is the same as the meaning of the sentence.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Money does produce happiness, but only up to a point [Harari]
     Full Idea: An interesting conclusion (from questionnaires) is that money does indeed bring happiness. But only up to a point, and beyond that point it has little significance.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 19 'Counting')
     A reaction: The question is whether that flattening-off point is relative to those around us, or absolute, according to the needs of living. Though these two may not be separate.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
If a group is bound by gossip, the natural size is 150 people [Harari]
     Full Idea: Sociological research has shown that the maximum 'natural' size of a group bound by gossip is about 150 individuals.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 02 'Legend')
     A reaction: On the other hand, most of us can learn the names of a group of about 450. Maybe the 'known' group and the 'gossip' group are equally significant. Not much use for a modern state, but of interest to communitarians.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / a. Human population
Since 1500 human population has increased fourteenfold, and consumption far more [Harari]
     Full Idea: In the year 1500 there were about 500 million Homo sapiens in the world. Today there are 7 billion. …Human population has increased fourteenfold, our production 240-fold, and energy consumption 115-fold.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 14 'Discovery')
     A reaction: We really need to grasp how extraordinary this is.
People 300m tons; domesticated animals 700m tons; larger wild animals 100m tons [Harari]
     Full Idea: The combined mass of homo sapiens is about 300 million tons; the mass of all domesticated farmyard animals is about 700 million tons; the mass of the surviving larger wild animals (from porcupines up) is less than 100 million tons.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 18 'Permanent')
     A reaction: These really are figures that deserve much wider currency. Every school entrance hall needs a board with a few of the basic dramatic statistics about human life on Earth.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The Nazi aim was to encourage progressive evolution, and avoid degeneration [Harari]
     Full Idea: The main ambition of the Nazis was to protect humankind from degeneration and encourage its progressive evolution. …Given the state of scientific knowledge in 1933, Nazi beliefs were hardly outside the pale.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'Worship')
     A reaction: It still sounds a fairly worthy ambition, close to the heart of educationalists everywhere. The problems start with the definition of 'degeneration' and 'progress'.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
We stabilise societies with dogmas, either of dubious science, or of non-scientific values [Harari]
     Full Idea: Modern attempts to stabilise the sociopolitical order either declare a scientific theory (such as racial theories for Nazis, or economic ones for Communists) to be an absolute truths, or declare non-scientific dogmas (such as liberal values)
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 14 'Ignoramus')
     A reaction: [compressed]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
The state fostered individualism, to break the power of family and community [Harari]
     Full Idea: States and markets use their growing power to weaken the bonds of family and community. They made an offer that couldn't be refused - 'become individuals' (over marriage, jobs and residence). The 'romantic individual' is not a rebel against the state.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 18 'Collapse')
     A reaction: [compressed] See the film 'Breaking the Waves'. An interesting slant on the Romantic movement. See Wordsworth's 'Michael'. Capitalism needs shoppers with their own money, and a mobile workforce.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
In 1750 losing your family and community meant death [Harari]
     Full Idea: A person who lost her family and community around 1750 was as good as dead.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 18 'Collapse')
     A reaction: This is a very good advert for liberal individualism, and marks the downside of 'too much community'.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
The sacred command of capitalism is that profits must be used to increase production [Harari]
     Full Idea: In the new capitalist creed, the first and most sacred commandment is: The profits of production must be reinvested in increasing production.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 16 'Growing')
     A reaction: In this sense, capitalism is less greedy than its predecessors. 17th century aristocratic monopolists simply spent the profits of their activities. See the gorgeous clothes then (and pyramids and palaces), and the quiet suits of capitalists.
The main rule of capitalism is that all other goods depend on economic growth [Harari]
     Full Idea: The principle tenet of capitalism is that economic growth is the supreme good, or at least a proxy for it, because justice, freedom, and even happiness all depend on economic growth.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 16 'Growing')
     A reaction: In this respect, the main opponent of captitalism is green politics, rather than marxism.
The progress of capitalism depends entirely on the new discoveries and gadgets of science [Harari]
     Full Idea: The history of capitalism is unintelligible without taking science into account. …The human economy has managed to keep on going only thanks to the fact that scientists come up with a new discovery or gadget every few years.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 16 'Growing')
     A reaction: For example, the desperate but unconvincing attempts to persuade us of the novelty of new models of car. Built-in obsolescence is needed once a design becomes static.
In capitalism the rich invest, and the rest of us go shopping [Harari]
     Full Idea: The supreme commandment of the rich is 'invest!', and the supreme commandment of the rest of us is 'buy!'
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 17 'Age')
     A reaction: Hence not only do the rich get much richer, while most of us remain roughly where we were, but there is a huge gulf between the investors and the non-investors. Encouraging small investors is a step forward.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
No market is free of political bias, and markets need protection of their freedoms [Harari]
     Full Idea: There is no such thing as a market free of all political bias, …and markets by themselves offer no protection against fraud, theft and violence.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 16 'Cult')
     A reaction: Is this in theory, or in practice? In Sicily the free market has been a tool of the mafia.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom may work against us, as individuals can choose to leave, and make fewer commitments [Harari]
     Full Idea: The freedom we value so highly may work against us. We can choose our spouses, friends and neighbours, but they can choose to leave us. With the individual wielding unprecedented power to decide her own path, we find it ever harder to make commitments.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 19 'Counting')
     A reaction: This is the worry of the communitarian. I take freedom to be a great social virtue - but an overrated one.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
Real peace is the implausibility of war (and not just its absence) [Harari]
     Full Idea: Real peace is not the mere absence of war. Real peace is the implausibility of war.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 18 'Pax')
     A reaction: I have a nasty feeling that war only becomes implausible because it hasn't happened for a long time. War looked implausible for Britain in 1890. War certainly now looks implausible in western Europe.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
Financing is increasingly through credit rather than taxes; people prefer investing to taxation [Harari]
     Full Idea: The European conquest of the world was increasingly financed through credit rather than taxes. …Nobody wants to pay taxes, but everyone is happy to invest.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 16 'Columbus')
     A reaction: This is presumably the mechanism that drives the unstoppable increase of the gulf between the rich and the poor in modern times. With investment, the rich get richer.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
The more you know about history, the harder it becomes to explain [Harari]
     Full Idea: A distinguishing mark of history is that the better you know a historical period, the harder it becomes to explain why things happened one way and not another.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 13 'Hindsight')
     A reaction: Presumaby that means it resembles statistics. Each individual reading is perplexing, but some patterns emerge on the large scale.
History teaches us that the present was not inevitable, and shows us the possibilities [Harari]
     Full Idea: We study history not to know the future but to widen our horizons, to understand that our present situation is neither natural nor inevitable, and the we consequently have many more possibilities before us than we can imagine.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 13 'Hindsight')
     A reaction: On the whole winners forget history, and losers are branded through and through with it. If you don't know history, you can never understand the latter group.
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 1. Monotheism
In order to explain both order and evil, a single evil creator is best, but no one favours that [Harari]
     Full Idea: Monotheism explains order but not evil, and dualist religion explains evil but not order. One logical solution is a single omnipotent God who created the universe, and is evil - but nobody in history has had much stomach for that belief.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'Battle')
     A reaction: Eh? Is there not also good, which also needs explaining? And there is some chaos to be explained too. Hume offers the best explanations. An inexperienced god, a team of squabbling gods, a god with shifting moods…. Study the facts first.
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 1. Animism
Animism is belief that every part of nature is aware and feeling, and can communicate [Harari]
     Full Idea: Animism is the belief that almost every place, every animal, every plant and every natural phenomenon has awareness and feelings, and can communicated direct with humans.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 03 'Talking')
     A reaction: So does this count as a 'supernatural' belief system? It seems not, if the awareness is integral to the natural feature, and dies with it. Panpsychism is not supernatural either. A problem for anyone trying to define Naturalism.
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
Most polytheist recognise one supreme power or law, behind the various gods [Harari]
     Full Idea: Polytheism does not necessarily dispute the existence of a single power or law governing the entire universe. Most poytheist and even animist religions recognised such a supreme power that stands behind all the different gods, demons and holy rocks.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'Benefits')
     A reaction: Presumably this one supreme power was always taken to be too remote for communication or worship. Are the other gods seen as slaves, or friends, or ambassadors of the Supreme One?
Polytheism is open-minded, and rarely persecutes opponents [Harari]
     Full Idea: Polytheism is inherently open-minded, and rarely persecutes 'heretics' and 'infidels'.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'Benefits')
     A reaction: The Old Testament tells of the Jews turning on local pagans, and India was presumably tolerant Hindus encountering less tolerant Muslims. Then there's Christians in Africa. Dreadful bunch, the monotheists. Romans killed very few Christians.
Mythologies are usual contracts with the gods, exchanging devotion for control of nature [Harari]
     Full Idea: Much of ancient mythology is a legal contract in which humans promise everlasting devotion to the gods in exchange for mastery over plants and animals.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'Silencing')
     A reaction: [He cites the first book of Genesis] So how readily do you swith allegiance, if someone else's gods are more successful? Why be loyal a loser. It should be like shopping - but I bet it wasn't.
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 4. Dualist Religion
Dualist religions see everything as a battleground of good and evil forces [Harari]
     Full Idea: Polytheism gave birth to monotheism, and to dualistic religions. Dualism explains that the entire universe is a battleground between good and evil forces, and everything that happens is part of that struggle.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'Battle')
     A reaction: Presumably we are supposed to support the good guys, so the gods are not equals. God v Satan seems the right model, but Satan has to be beyond God's control, or else the problem of evil has to be solved. Empedocles held something like this.
Dualist religions say the cosmos is a battleground, so can’t explain its order [Harari]
     Full Idea: Dualist religions solve the problem of evil, but are unnerved by the Problem of Order. …If Good and Evil battle for control of the world, who enforces the laws governing this cosmic war?
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'Battle')
     A reaction: You might explain it if one side was persistently winning, which is roughly God v Satan.
Manichaeans and Gnostics: good made spirit, evil made flesh [Harari]
     Full Idea: Manichaeans and Gnostics argued that the good god created the spirit and the soul, whereas matter and bodes are the creation of the evil god.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'Battle')
     A reaction: Hm. What motivated the evil god to do that? The evil god's achievement looks a lot more impressive.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 1. Monotheistic Religion
Monotheism appeared in Egypt in 1350 BCE, when the god Aten was declared supreme [Harari]
     Full Idea: The first monotheist religion known to us appeared in Egypt c.1350 BCE, when Pharaoh Akenaten declared that one of minor deities of the Egyptian pantheon, the god Aten, was in fact the supreme power ruling the universe.
     From: Yuval Noah Harari (Sapiens: brief history of humankind [2014], 12 'God')
     A reaction: Zeus seems to have started like a tribal chief, and eventually turned into something like God.