7720
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Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
A problem for resemblance nominalism is that in saying that two particulars 'resemble' one another, it is necessary to specify in what respect they do so (e.g. colour, shape, size), and this threatens to reintroduce what appears to be talk of universals.
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From:
E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
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A reaction:
We see resemblance between faces instantly, long before we can specify the 'respects' of the resemblance. This supports the Humean hard-wired view of resemblance, rather than some appeal to Platonic universals.
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8147
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We have an apparent and a true self; only the second one exists, and we must seek to know it [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
There are two selves, the apparent self, and the real Self. Of these it is the real Self (Atman), and he alone, who must be felt as truly existing. To the man who has felt him as truly existing he reveals his innermost nature.
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Katha')
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A reaction:
A central Hindu doctrine against which Buddhism rebelled, by denying the self altogether. I prefer the Hindu view. A desire to abandon the self just seems to be a desire for death. Knowledge of our essential self is more interesting. But see Idea 2932!
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7714
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Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
There is the question of the identity of a person over or across time ('diachronic' personal identity), and there is also the question of what makes for personal identity at a time ('synchronic' personal identity).
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From:
E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.5)
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A reaction:
This seems to me to be the first and most important distinction in the philosophy of personal identity, and they regularly get run together. Locke, for example, has an account of synchronic identity, which is often ignored. It applies to objects too.
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7715
|
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
'Mentalese' would be neither conventional nor a means of public communication so that even to call it a language is seriously misleading.
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From:
E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
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A reaction:
It is, however, supposed to contain symbolic representations which are then used as tokens for computation, so it seems close to a language, if (for example) symbolic logic or mathematics were accepted as languages. But who understands it?
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8155
|
Without speech we cannot know right/wrong, true/false, good/bad, or pleasant/unpleasant [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
If there were no speech, neither right nor wrong would be known, neither the true nor the false, neither the good nor the bad, neither the pleasant nor the unpleasant.
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Chandogya')
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A reaction:
This could stand as the epigraph for the whole of modern philosophy of language. However, the text goes on to say that mind is higher than speech. The test question is the mental capabilities of animals. Do they 'know' pleasure, or truth?
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20024
|
Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
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Full Idea:
Later Davidson dropped his reductive treatment of intentions (in terms of 'pro-attitudes' and other beliefs), and accepted that intentions are irreducible, and distinct from pro-attitudes.
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From:
report of Donald Davidson (Intending [1978]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 2
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A reaction:
Only a philosopher would say that intentions cannot be reduced to something else. Since I have a very physicalist view of the mind, I incline to reduce them to powers and dispositions of physical matter.
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8153
|
By knowing one piece of clay or gold, you know all of clay or gold [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
By knowing one lump of clay, all things made of clay are known; by knowing a nugget of gold, all things made of gold are known.
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Chandogya')
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A reaction:
I can't think of a better basic definition of a natural kind. There is an inductive assumption, of course, which hits trouble when you meet fool's gold, or two different sorts of jade. But the concept of a natural kind is no more than this.
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8154
|
Originally there must have been just Existence, which could not come from non-existence [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
In the beginning there was Existence, One only, without a second. Some say that in the beginning there was non-existence only, and that out of that the universe was born. But how could such a thing be? How could existence be born of non-existence?
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Chandogya')
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A reaction:
A very rare instance of an argument in the Upanishads, arising out of a disagreement. The monotheistic religions have preferred to make God the eternal element, presumably because that raises his status, but is also explains the start as a decision.
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8148
|
Brahma, supreme god and protector of the universe, arose from the ocean of existence [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
Out of the infinite ocean of existence arose Brahma, first-born and foremost among the gods. From him sprang the universe, and he became its protector.
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Mundaka')
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A reaction:
Brahma does not have eternal (or necessary) existence. Could Brahma cease to exist? I suppose we cannot ask what caused the appearance of Brahma? Is it part of a plan, or just luck, or some sort of necessity?
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8152
|
Earth, food, fire, sun are all forms of Brahman [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
Earth, food, fire, sun - all these that you worship - are forms of Brahman.
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Chandogya')
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A reaction:
In 'Taittiriya' food is named as the "chief of all things". Pantheism seems to arise from a desire that one's god should have every conceivable good, so in addition to power and knowledge, your god must keep you warm and healthy.
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8156
|
The gods are not worshipped for their own sake, but for the sake of the Self [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
It is not for the sake of the gods, my beloved, that the gods are worshipped, but for the sake of the Self (Atman).
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|
From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Brihadaranyaka')
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|
A reaction:
There is an uneasy selfish streak in all religions, which conflicts with their exhorations to altruism, and to the love of the gods. It also occurs in the exhortation of Socrates to be virtuous. 'Pure' altruism seems only to arise in the 18th century.
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8157
|
A man with desires is continually reborn, until his desires are stilled [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
A man acts according to desires; after death he reaps the harvest of his deeds, and returns again to the world of action. Thus he who has desires continues subject to rebirth, but he in who desire is stilled suffers no rebirth.
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Brihadaranyaka')
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A reaction:
I greatly prefer the Stoic idea (Idea 3066) that we should live according to nature, to this perverse longing to completely destroy our own nature and become something we are not. Play the cards you are dealt, which include desires.
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8150
|
The immortal Self and the sad individual self are like two golden birds perched on one tree [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
Like two birds of golden plumage, the individual self and the immortal Self perch on the branches of the same tree. The individual self, deluded by forgetfulness of his identity with the divine self, bewildered by his ego, grieves and is sad.
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Mundaka')
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A reaction:
Hinduism gives a much clearer and bolder picture of the soul than Christianity does. I don't see much consolation in the immortality of the wonderful Self, if my individual self is doomed to misery and extinction. Which one is me?
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