34 ideas
501 | Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: In power of persuasion, reasoning is far stronger than gold. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B051), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.04.12 |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A problem for resemblance nominalism is that in saying that two particulars 'resemble' one another, it is necessary to specify in what respect they do so (e.g. colour, shape, size), and this threatens to reintroduce what appears to be talk of universals. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: We see resemblance between faces instantly, long before we can specify the 'respects' of the resemblance. This supports the Humean hard-wired view of resemblance, rather than some appeal to Platonic universals. |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Later philosophers emphasised different strands of Aristotle's concept of substances: Leibniz (in his theory of monads) emphasised their unity; Spinoza emphasised their ontological independence; Locke emphasised their role in relation to qualities. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Note that this Aristotelian idea had not been jettisoned in the late seventeenth century, unlike other Aristotelianisms. I think it is only with the success of atomism in chemistry that the idea of substance is forced to recede. |
9089 | Knowledge is a quality existing subjectively in the soul [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Knowledge is a certain quality which exists in the soul as its subject ('existens subiective in anima'). | |
From: William of Ockham (Expositio super viii libros [1340], Prologue) | |
A reaction: One might say here that knowledge is a property, and so it might not be susceptible to further analysis. It invites the question of how you could know by introspection that you have got it, which would be an extreme internalist view. |
9091 | Sometimes 'knowledge' just concerns the conclusion, sometimes the whole demonstration [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Sometimes 'knowledge' means evident cognition of the conclusion alone, sometimes of the demonstration as a whole. | |
From: William of Ockham (Expositio super viii libros [1340], Prologue) | |
A reaction: 'Demonstration' will be something like Greek 'logos' - full understanding, ability to explain and give reasons. William is certainly right about normal usage. I know the answer in a quiz, without any requirement for justifications. |
9090 | Knowledge is certain cognition of something that is true [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Knowledge is certain cognition of something that is true. | |
From: William of Ockham (Expositio super viii libros [1340], Prologue) | |
A reaction: This view has problems. William is not facing up to the sceptical questions which can shake any degree of certainty, and also that someone who lacked self-confidence might know many things while always feeling uncertain about them. 'Cognition' must go! |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
Full Idea: According to one school of thought, perception is simply a mode of belief-acquisition,and there is no reason to suppose that any element of sensation is literally involved in perception. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Blindsight would be an obvious supporting case for this view. I think this point is crucial in understanding what is wrong with Jackson's 'knowledge argument' (involving Mary, see Idea 7377). Sensation gives knowledge, so it can't be knowledge. |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Only a causal theory of perception will respect the facts of physiology and physics ...meaning a theory which maintains that for a subject to perceive a physical object the subject should enjoy some appropriate perceptual experience caused by the object. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: If I hallucinate an object, then presumably I am not allowed to say that I 'perceive' it, but that seems to make the causal theory an idle tautology. If we are in virtual reality then there aren't any objects. |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
Full Idea: There is the question of the identity of a person over or across time ('diachronic' personal identity), and there is also the question of what makes for personal identity at a time ('synchronic' personal identity). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be the first and most important distinction in the philosophy of personal identity, and they regularly get run together. Locke, for example, has an account of synchronic identity, which is often ignored. It applies to objects too. |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
Full Idea: 'Mentalese' would be neither conventional nor a means of public communication so that even to call it a language is seriously misleading. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: It is, however, supposed to contain symbolic representations which are then used as tokens for computation, so it seems close to a language, if (for example) symbolic logic or mathematics were accepted as languages. But who understands it? |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If meaning is a private mental picture, what does 'the cat is NOT on the mat' mean, and how does it differ from 'the dog is not on the mat?'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Not insurmountable. We picture an empty mat, combined with a cat (or whatever) located somewhere else. A mental 'picture' of something shouldn't be contrued as a single image in a neat black frame. |
514 | Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Physical beauty is merely animal unless intelligence be present. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B105) |
525 | Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Do not say or do what is base, even when you are alone. Learn to feel shame in your own eyes much more than before others. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B244), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.31.7 | |
A reaction: I like this. How you think and behave when unobserved is the true test of who you are. Feeling shame at a very private failing is an interesting phenomenon. |
502 | Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Good breeding in cattle depends on physical health, but in men on a well-formed character. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B057), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.29.18 | |
A reaction: In our ultra-democratic age (supposedly) it is heresy to talk about good breeding, or some people being superior to others. But surely people should aim to improve their characters? |
507 | Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B073), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.5.23 | |
A reaction: Is it possible to love something without seeing it as beautiful? A badly crippled dog, for example. If not, that seems to reveal something about beauty. |
521 | We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: One should choose not every pleasure, but only that concerned with the beautiful. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B207), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.22 | |
A reaction: The pleasures we should prefer are those which involve the whole person, rather than the mere stimulation of one sense. Sez me. |
505 | Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: For all men, good and true are the same; but pleasant differs for different men. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B069) | |
A reaction: Truth is not 'for' anyone, but there's good-in-itself, and good-for-me. Are there some pleasures we should all enjoy (such as watching our children flourish)? |
508 | Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Accept no pleasure unless it is beneficial. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B074) | |
A reaction: Maybe all pleasures bestow some benefit - even if they are linked to harm. I struggle to see what is wrong with a harmless and non-beneficial pleasure, and I doubt if anyone could explain it to me. |
520 | The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B194), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.03.46 | |
A reaction: Only, of course, for those able to perceive the nobility. In what does the 'nobility' consist, other than in the morally acceptable pleasure? Hard to explain 'noble'. Just 'wow!'? |
522 | Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Moderation multiplies pleasures, and increases pleasure. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B211), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.27 | |
A reaction: So moderation is a sneaky trick to avoid moderation? I presume the most intense pleasures are mostly unfamiliar, and so add novelty to the mix. Apart from eating chocolate, of course. |
506 | Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not a man. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B070) | |
A reaction: Not factually correct, since the world is full of adults who have immoderate desires (notably for money). However, there are plenty of grown ups who don't seem very adult. |
523 | It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: The brave man is not only he who overcomes the enemy, but he who is stronger than pleasures. Some men are masters of cities, but are enslaved by women. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B214), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.07.25 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure if 'bravery' is the relevant virtue here.Sounds like self-control or temperance. I suspect that mastering a city is quite pleasurable, if that's your thing. |
503 | Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Virtue consists, not in avoiding wrong-doing, but in having no wish thereto. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B062), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.17.37 |
497 | Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Refrain from crimes not through fear but through duty [deon]. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B041), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.95 | |
A reaction: [not sure about the translation here] |
518 | A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: To live badly is not just to live badly, but to spend a long time dying. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B160), quoted by (who?) - where? |
499 | Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Repentance for shameful deeds is salvation in life. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B043) |
524 | Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: More men become good through practice than by nature. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B242), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.66 |
519 | One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B190), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.91 |
500 | The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the man wronged. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B045) |
1539 | The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Unless a point of satiety is reached, the desire for money is far more cruel than the utmost poverty, because the greater the desire, the greater the need | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B219), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.10.43 |
526 | Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Small appetite makes poverty equivalent to wealth. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B284), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.33.24 |
511 | It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: The friendship of one intelligent man is better than that of all the unintelligent. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B098) |
498 | It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B042), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.44.68 | |
A reaction: Something wrong with the translation here, if there is no Greek word for 'duty'. |
1541 | It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)] |
Full Idea: Poverty in a democracy is as preferable to what is called prosperity under autocracy as freedom is to slavery. | |
From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B251), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.40.42 |