23766
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Don't be tossed to and fro with every wind of doctrine, by cunning deceptive men [Paul]
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Full Idea:
Henceforth be no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive.
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From:
St Paul (10: Ephesians [c.55], 4:14)
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A reaction:
One quoted to me by a learned religious friend, in response to Idea 23767. I sympathise. I find it extraordinary the nonsense that students of philosophy can be led into, when they swallow some specious argument.
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7720
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Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
A problem for resemblance nominalism is that in saying that two particulars 'resemble' one another, it is necessary to specify in what respect they do so (e.g. colour, shape, size), and this threatens to reintroduce what appears to be talk of universals.
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From:
E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
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A reaction:
We see resemblance between faces instantly, long before we can specify the 'respects' of the resemblance. This supports the Humean hard-wired view of resemblance, rather than some appeal to Platonic universals.
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7714
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Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
There is the question of the identity of a person over or across time ('diachronic' personal identity), and there is also the question of what makes for personal identity at a time ('synchronic' personal identity).
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From:
E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.5)
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A reaction:
This seems to me to be the first and most important distinction in the philosophy of personal identity, and they regularly get run together. Locke, for example, has an account of synchronic identity, which is often ignored. It applies to objects too.
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7715
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Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
'Mentalese' would be neither conventional nor a means of public communication so that even to call it a language is seriously misleading.
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From:
E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
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A reaction:
It is, however, supposed to contain symbolic representations which are then used as tokens for computation, so it seems close to a language, if (for example) symbolic logic or mathematics were accepted as languages. But who understands it?
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21798
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To universalise 'give everything to the poor' leads to absurdity [Hegel]
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Full Idea:
If everyone gave everything to the poor, then soon there would be no more poor to give anything to, or no more persons who would have anything to give.
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From:
Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion [1827], III: 152), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 10 'Faith'
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A reaction:
Matthew 5:8, 19:21. Beautifully clear. [I always believed that I had thought of this idea - but not so]. If the logic is that it is better to be poor than to be rich, then the implication is that all excess wealth should be thrown into the sea.
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21797
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Immortality does not come at a later time, but when pure knowing Spirit fully grasps the universal [Hegel]
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Full Idea:
The immortality of the soul must not be imagined as though it first emerges into actuality at some later time; rather it is a present quality. ...As pure knowing or as thinking, Spirit has the universal for its object - this is eternity.
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From:
Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion [1827], III: 208), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 10 'Death'
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A reaction:
An unusual view of immortality, which challenges orthodoxy. The idea seems to be that 'pure knowing' is a grasping of the pure reason which embodies nature, which in turn is the nature of God. You enter eternity, rather than reside in it?
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