Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'The Actual and the Virtual' and 'Putnam's Paradox'

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13 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
14212 A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A consistent theory is, by definition, one satisfied by some model; an isomorphic image of a model satisfies the same theories as the original model; to provide the making of an isomorphic image of any given model, a domain need only be large enough.
     From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Model')
     A reaction: This is laying out the ground for Putnam's model theory argument in favour of anti-realism. If you are chasing the one true model of reality, then formal model theory doesn't seem to offer much encouragement.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
14213 Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Anti-realists say the only world is imaginary, or only has the parts or classes or relations we divide it into, or doubt that reference to the world is possible, or doubt that our interpretations can achieve truth.
     From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Anti-R')
     A reaction: [compression of a paragraph on anti-realism] Lewis is a thoroughgoing realist. A nice example of the rhetorical device of ridiculing an opponent by suggesting that they don't even know what they themselves believe.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
21907 We don't want another new set of categories; we want a variety of flexible categories [Deleuze, by May]
     Full Idea: For Deleuze, the task is not one of replacing a single set of categories with another set. It is one of being able to create and move among various sets of categories, and even to cross between them.
     From: report of Gilles Deleuze (The Actual and the Virtual [1977]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 4.05
     A reaction: This sounds fun, but I'm not clear why we need this anarchic mix of categories. The motto of Deleuze seems to be 'at all costs, keep moving'. He loved the idea of nomads. Is Rimbaud our role model? The influence of Foucault is obvious.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
     Full Idea: A problem for resemblance nominalism is that in saying that two particulars 'resemble' one another, it is necessary to specify in what respect they do so (e.g. colour, shape, size), and this threatens to reintroduce what appears to be talk of universals.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
     A reaction: We see resemblance between faces instantly, long before we can specify the 'respects' of the resemblance. This supports the Humean hard-wired view of resemblance, rather than some appeal to Platonic universals.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Later philosophers emphasised different strands of Aristotle's concept of substances: Leibniz (in his theory of monads) emphasised their unity; Spinoza emphasised their ontological independence; Locke emphasised their role in relation to qualities.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.4)
     A reaction: Note that this Aristotelian idea had not been jettisoned in the late seventeenth century, unlike other Aristotelianisms. I think it is only with the success of atomism in chemistry that the idea of substance is forced to recede.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14210 A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The mereological sum of the coffee in my cup, the ink in this sentence, a nearby sparrow, and my left shoe is a miscellaneous mess of an object, yet its boundaries are by no means unrelated to the joints of nature.
     From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Might')
     A reaction: In that case they do, but if there are no atoms at the root of physics then presumably their could also be thoroughly jointless assemblages, involving probability distributions etc. Even random scattered atoms seem rather short of joints.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
     Full Idea: According to one school of thought, perception is simply a mode of belief-acquisition,and there is no reason to suppose that any element of sensation is literally involved in perception.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Blindsight would be an obvious supporting case for this view. I think this point is crucial in understanding what is wrong with Jackson's 'knowledge argument' (involving Mary, see Idea 7377). Sensation gives knowledge, so it can't be knowledge.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
7711 Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Only a causal theory of perception will respect the facts of physiology and physics ...meaning a theory which maintains that for a subject to perceive a physical object the subject should enjoy some appropriate perceptual experience caused by the object.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3)
     A reaction: If I hallucinate an object, then presumably I am not allowed to say that I 'perceive' it, but that seems to make the causal theory an idle tautology. If we are in virtual reality then there aren't any objects.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
7714 Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
     Full Idea: There is the question of the identity of a person over or across time ('diachronic' personal identity), and there is also the question of what makes for personal identity at a time ('synchronic' personal identity).
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This seems to me to be the first and most important distinction in the philosophy of personal identity, and they regularly get run together. Locke, for example, has an account of synchronic identity, which is often ignored. It applies to objects too.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
7715 Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
     Full Idea: 'Mentalese' would be neither conventional nor a means of public communication so that even to call it a language is seriously misleading.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
     A reaction: It is, however, supposed to contain symbolic representations which are then used as tokens for computation, so it seems close to a language, if (for example) symbolic logic or mathematics were accepted as languages. But who understands it?
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7722 If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If meaning is a private mental picture, what does 'the cat is NOT on the mat' mean, and how does it differ from 'the dog is not on the mat?'.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
     A reaction: Not insurmountable. We picture an empty mat, combined with a cat (or whatever) located somewhere else. A mental 'picture' of something shouldn't be contrued as a single image in a neat black frame.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14215 Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Whatever happens in special cases, causal theories usually make it easy to be wrong about the thing we refer to.
     From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Is')
     A reaction: I suppose the point of this is that there are no checks and balances to keep reference in focus, but just a requirement to keep connected to an increasingly attenuated causal chain.
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
14209 Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Description theories of reference are supposed to have been well and truly refuted. I think not: ..it is still tenable with my seven points, and part of the truth of reference [7: rigidity, egocentric, tokens, causal, imperfect, indeterminate, families].
     From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Glob Desc')
     A reaction: (The bit at the end refers to his seven points, on p.59). He calls his basic proposal 'causal descriptivism', incorporating his seven slight modifications of traditional descriptivism about reference.