25 ideas
12036 | Xenophanes began the concern with knowledge [Annas] |
Full Idea: Xenophanes begins a long concern with knowledge and its grounds. | |
From: Julia Annas (Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: Having that on his cv ought to make Xenophanes more famous than he is. |
12046 | Plato was the first philosopher who was concerned to systematize his ideas [Annas] |
Full Idea: In the ancient world Plato was seen as a pivotal figure, the first philosopher who was concerned to systematize his ideas. | |
From: Julia Annas (Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction [2000], Ch.6) |
12056 | An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: x bears to y the 'ancestral' of the relation R just if either x bears R to y, or x bears R to some w that bears R to y, or x bears R to some w that bears R to some z that bears R to y, or..... | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.10.1) | |
A reaction: A concept invented by Frege (1879). |
12050 | Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Substances are things that have a source of change or principle of activity within them. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.4.1) | |
A reaction: A vey significant concession. I think we can talk of 'essences' and 'powers', and drop talk of 'substances'. 'Powers' is a much better word, because it immediately pushes the active ingredient to the forefront. |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A problem for resemblance nominalism is that in saying that two particulars 'resemble' one another, it is necessary to specify in what respect they do so (e.g. colour, shape, size), and this threatens to reintroduce what appears to be talk of universals. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: We see resemblance between faces instantly, long before we can specify the 'respects' of the resemblance. This supports the Humean hard-wired view of resemblance, rather than some appeal to Platonic universals. |
12052 | We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: What is singled out is never a bare this or that, but this or that something or other. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.5.1) | |
A reaction: I like, in ontological speculation, to contemplate the problem of the baffling archaeological find. 'This thing I have dug up - what the hell IS it?'. Wiggins is contemptuous of the term 'thisness', and the idea of bare particulars. |
12055 | Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Predications which answer the question 'what is x?' are often called 'sortal predications' in present-day philosophy. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.10.1) | |
A reaction: The word 'sortal' comes from Locke. Wiggins is the guru of 'sortal essentialism'. I just can't believe that in answer to the question 'what really is David Wiggins?' that he would be happy with a sequence of categorisations. |
12059 | A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: To say that the river is changing constantly in every respect is not to say that it is changing in respect of being a river. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.11.2) | |
A reaction: Can't a river become a lake, or a mere stream? Wiggins's proposal does not help with the problem of a river which sometimes dries up (as my local river sometimes does). At what point do we decide it is no longer a river? |
12063 | Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The sense of the sortal term under which we pick out an individual expands into the scientific account of things of that kind, where the account clarifies what is at issue in questions of sameness and difference of specimens of that kind. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.13.1) | |
A reaction: This is how the sortal approach is supposed to deal with individuals. So the placid tiger reveals much by falling under 'tiger', and a crucial extra bit by falling under 'placid'. See Idea 12053 for problems with this proposal. |
12051 | If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Substance are what the world is articulated into when the segments of kinds corresponds to the real divisions in reality. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.5.1) | |
A reaction: This is very helpful in clarifying Wiggins's very obscurely expressed views. He appears to be saying that if we divide the sheep from the goats correctly, we reveal sheep-substance and goat-substance (one substance per species). Crazy! |
12053 | 'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: One person can be more or less of a poet than another, so 'poet' is not a conclusory answer to the question 'What is it that is singled out here?' 'Poet' rides on the back of the answer 'human being'. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.5.1) | |
A reaction: So apparently one must assign a natural kind, and not just a class. Wiggins lacks science fiction imagination. In the genetic salad of the far future, being a poet may be more definitive than being a human being. See Idea 12063. |
12054 | Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: A system of secondary substances with a claim to separate reality into its genuine primary substances must arise from an understanding of a set of principles of activity on the basis of which identities can be glossed in terms of determinate relations. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.5.1) | |
A reaction: I translate this as saying that individual essences are categorised according to principles which explain behaviour and relations. I'm increasingly bewildered by the 'secondary substances' Wiggins got from 'Categories', and loves so much. |
12047 | We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: A substance is a persisting and somehow basic object of reference that is there to be discovered in perception and thought, an object whose claim to be recognized as a real entity is a claim on our aspirations to understand the world. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.1) | |
A reaction: A lot of components are assigned by Wiggins to the concept, and the tricky job, inititiated by Aristotle, is to fit all the pieces together nicely. Personally I am wondering if the acceptance of 'essences' implies dropping 'substances'. |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Later philosophers emphasised different strands of Aristotle's concept of substances: Leibniz (in his theory of monads) emphasised their unity; Spinoza emphasised their ontological independence; Locke emphasised their role in relation to qualities. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Note that this Aristotelian idea had not been jettisoned in the late seventeenth century, unlike other Aristotelianisms. I think it is only with the success of atomism in chemistry that the idea of substance is forced to recede. |
12057 | Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Matter ex hypothesi is what ultimately underlies (to huperkeimenon) a thing; it is that from which something comes to be and which remains as a non-coincidental component in the thing's make-up. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 192a30) | |
A reaction: This is an interesting prelude to the much more comprehensive discussion of matter in Metaphysics, where he crucially adds the notion of 'form', and gives it priority over the underlying matter. |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
Full Idea: According to one school of thought, perception is simply a mode of belief-acquisition,and there is no reason to suppose that any element of sensation is literally involved in perception. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Blindsight would be an obvious supporting case for this view. I think this point is crucial in understanding what is wrong with Jackson's 'knowledge argument' (involving Mary, see Idea 7377). Sensation gives knowledge, so it can't be knowledge. |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Only a causal theory of perception will respect the facts of physiology and physics ...meaning a theory which maintains that for a subject to perceive a physical object the subject should enjoy some appropriate perceptual experience caused by the object. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: If I hallucinate an object, then presumably I am not allowed to say that I 'perceive' it, but that seems to make the causal theory an idle tautology. If we are in virtual reality then there aren't any objects. |
12064 | The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: For us the importance of the category of substance, if it has any importance, is not so much ontological as relative to our epistemological circumstances and the conditions under which we have to undertake inquiry. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.13.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a rather significant concession. Wiggins has revived the notion of substance in recent times, but he is not quite adding it to the furniture of the world. Personally I increasingly think we can dump it, in ontology and epistemology. |
12049 | Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Answering 'what is it?' with the secondary substance identifies an object with a class of continuants which survive certain changes, come into being in certain ways, are qualified in certain ways, behave in certain ways, and cease to be in certain ways. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.3.3) | |
A reaction: Thus the priority of this sort of answer is that a huge range of explanations immediately flow from it. I take the explanation to be prior, and the primary substance to be prior, since secondary substance is inductively derived from it. |
12065 | Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: It seems mandatory to an observer of soldiers to give 'the final touch of unity' to their aggregate entity (the army). ...Similar claims arise with the ontological and explanatory claims of other corporate entities. | |
From: David Wiggins (Substance [1995], 4.13.3) | |
A reaction: Wiggins must say (following Leibniz Essays II.xxiv,1) that we add the unity, but I take the view that an army has powers, and hence offers explanations, which are lacking in a merely group of disparate soldiers. So an army has an essence and identity. |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
Full Idea: There is the question of the identity of a person over or across time ('diachronic' personal identity), and there is also the question of what makes for personal identity at a time ('synchronic' personal identity). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be the first and most important distinction in the philosophy of personal identity, and they regularly get run together. Locke, for example, has an account of synchronic identity, which is often ignored. It applies to objects too. |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
Full Idea: 'Mentalese' would be neither conventional nor a means of public communication so that even to call it a language is seriously misleading. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: It is, however, supposed to contain symbolic representations which are then used as tokens for computation, so it seems close to a language, if (for example) symbolic logic or mathematics were accepted as languages. But who understands it? |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If meaning is a private mental picture, what does 'the cat is NOT on the mat' mean, and how does it differ from 'the dog is not on the mat?'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Not insurmountable. We picture an empty mat, combined with a cat (or whatever) located somewhere else. A mental 'picture' of something shouldn't be contrued as a single image in a neat black frame. |
12037 | Euripides's Medea is a key case of reason versus the passions [Annas] |
Full Idea: Euripides's Medea has remained a key case for discussion of reason and the passions. | |
From: Julia Annas (Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction [2000], Ch.1) |
12040 | Virtue is a kind of understanding of moral value [Annas] |
Full Idea: There is a widespread view in ancient ethics that virtue is a kind of understanding of moral value. | |
From: Julia Annas (Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction [2000], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: In Aristotle's case, this coincides with his apparent view that 'understanding' is the aim of all areas of human thought. See Idea 12038. |