11 ideas
2626 | A philosopher is outside any community of ideas [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas; that is what makes him a philosopher. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Zettel [1950], 455) | |
A reaction: A bit surprising from the man who gave us 'language games' and 'private language argument'. |
6569 | 'This sentence is false' sends us in a looping search for its proposition [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: According to Wittgenstein, 'this sentence is false' sends us off on an endless, looping search for the proposition to be evaluated. | |
From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Zettel [1950], §691) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Fogelin quotes this as one possible strategy for dealing with the Liar Paradox. It doesn't sound like much of a solution to the paradox, merely an account of why it is so annoying. Wittgenstein's challenge is that the Cretan can't state his problem. |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
Full Idea: A problem for resemblance nominalism is that in saying that two particulars 'resemble' one another, it is necessary to specify in what respect they do so (e.g. colour, shape, size), and this threatens to reintroduce what appears to be talk of universals. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: We see resemblance between faces instantly, long before we can specify the 'respects' of the resemblance. This supports the Humean hard-wired view of resemblance, rather than some appeal to Platonic universals. |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Later philosophers emphasised different strands of Aristotle's concept of substances: Leibniz (in his theory of monads) emphasised their unity; Spinoza emphasised their ontological independence; Locke emphasised their role in relation to qualities. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Note that this Aristotelian idea had not been jettisoned in the late seventeenth century, unlike other Aristotelianisms. I think it is only with the success of atomism in chemistry that the idea of substance is forced to recede. |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
Full Idea: According to one school of thought, perception is simply a mode of belief-acquisition,and there is no reason to suppose that any element of sensation is literally involved in perception. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Blindsight would be an obvious supporting case for this view. I think this point is crucial in understanding what is wrong with Jackson's 'knowledge argument' (involving Mary, see Idea 7377). Sensation gives knowledge, so it can't be knowledge. |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Only a causal theory of perception will respect the facts of physiology and physics ...meaning a theory which maintains that for a subject to perceive a physical object the subject should enjoy some appropriate perceptual experience caused by the object. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: If I hallucinate an object, then presumably I am not allowed to say that I 'perceive' it, but that seems to make the causal theory an idle tautology. If we are in virtual reality then there aren't any objects. |
3790 | Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: The causes of our belief in a proposition are indeed irrelevant to the question of what we believe. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Zettel [1950], i.437) | |
A reaction: This should have nipped the causal theory of knowledge in the bud before it got started. Everyone has a different cause for their belief that 'it sometimes rains'. Cause is not justification. |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
Full Idea: There is the question of the identity of a person over or across time ('diachronic' personal identity), and there is also the question of what makes for personal identity at a time ('synchronic' personal identity). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be the first and most important distinction in the philosophy of personal identity, and they regularly get run together. Locke, for example, has an account of synchronic identity, which is often ignored. It applies to objects too. |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
Full Idea: 'Mentalese' would be neither conventional nor a means of public communication so that even to call it a language is seriously misleading. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: It is, however, supposed to contain symbolic representations which are then used as tokens for computation, so it seems close to a language, if (for example) symbolic logic or mathematics were accepted as languages. But who understands it? |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If meaning is a private mental picture, what does 'the cat is NOT on the mat' mean, and how does it differ from 'the dog is not on the mat?'. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Not insurmountable. We picture an empty mat, combined with a cat (or whatever) located somewhere else. A mental 'picture' of something shouldn't be contrued as a single image in a neat black frame. |
19745 | The nature of people is decided by the government and politics of their society [Rousseau] |
Full Idea: Everything is rooted in politics, and whatever might be attempted, no people would ever be other than the nature of their government made them. | |
From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (The Confessions [1770], 9-1756) | |
A reaction: A striking anticipation of one of Marx's most important ideas - that society is not created by individual minds, because the nature of consciousness is created by society. The central idea in the subject of sociology, I think. |