7720
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Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
A problem for resemblance nominalism is that in saying that two particulars 'resemble' one another, it is necessary to specify in what respect they do so (e.g. colour, shape, size), and this threatens to reintroduce what appears to be talk of universals.
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From:
E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
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A reaction:
We see resemblance between faces instantly, long before we can specify the 'respects' of the resemblance. This supports the Humean hard-wired view of resemblance, rather than some appeal to Platonic universals.
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20618
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Persons must be conscious, reasoning, motivated, communicative, self-aware [Warren, by Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Suggested characteristics of personhood: consciousness (esp. of pain); reasoning and problem solving; self-motivated activity; varied communication on many topics; self-concepts and self-awareness.
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From:
report of Mary Anne Warren (On the Moral and Legal State of Abortion [1973], p.55) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 8 'Standing'
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A reaction:
[a 'famous' article] A number of non-human animals come very close to passing these tests. I suspect the complex communication is only in there to disqualify them from getting the full certificate. (But she wrote on animal rights).
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7714
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Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
There is the question of the identity of a person over or across time ('diachronic' personal identity), and there is also the question of what makes for personal identity at a time ('synchronic' personal identity).
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From:
E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.5)
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A reaction:
This seems to me to be the first and most important distinction in the philosophy of personal identity, and they regularly get run together. Locke, for example, has an account of synchronic identity, which is often ignored. It applies to objects too.
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5495
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Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan]
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Full Idea:
In machine functionalism, pain tokens (individual instances of pain) are identical with particular neurophysiological states, but pain itself, the kind, universal, or 'type', can be identified only with something more abstract.
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From:
report of Hilary Putnam (The Mental Life of Some Machines [1967]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.6
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A reaction:
This is where the "what is it like?" question seems important. Pain doesn't seem like a physical object, or an abstract idea. Personally I think the former is more likely to be correct than the latter. Causation by pain is not like causation by gravity.
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7715
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Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
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Full Idea:
'Mentalese' would be neither conventional nor a means of public communication so that even to call it a language is seriously misleading.
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From:
E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
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A reaction:
It is, however, supposed to contain symbolic representations which are then used as tokens for computation, so it seems close to a language, if (for example) symbolic logic or mathematics were accepted as languages. But who understands it?
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